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Kathleen Elizabeth Bachynski 
 
Tackle football has been one of the most popular sports for boys in the United States 
since the mid-twentieth century. This dissertation examines how debates over the safety of 
football for children at the high school level and younger have changed from 1945 through the 
present. After World War II, the expansion of youth tackle football leagues, particularly for pre-
pubescent children, fostered a new range of medical and educational concerns. Yet calls for 
limits on tackle football were largely obscured by the political and social culture of the Cold 
War, including beliefs about violence, masculinity, and competition.  
A broad range of groups and individuals were involved in debating the safety of youth 
football throughout the remainder of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. These groups 
included doctors, coaches, educators, lawyers, engineers, parents, athletes, journalists, and 
sporting goods manufacturers. Their arguments over the risks and benefits of youth football 
involved not only the sport’s effects on physical health, but also on social and emotional well-
being. By the 1970s, researchers were applying injury epidemiology methods to studying key 
mechanisms involved in football injuries, while a broader consumer product safety movement 
contributed to the development of the first football helmet standards. Football equipment not 
only remained a primary focus of football safety debates, but often symbolized safety itself. 
Sporting goods manufacturers largely succeeded in framing the issue of football safety as a 
matter of individual responsibility. 
 
 
The social position of children and their communities shaped debates over the risks and 
benefits of football, including the sport’s spectator nature. By the early twentieth-first century, 
concerns about football-related brain injuries at all levels of the sport emerged as a topic of 
national debate. New medical findings and the reporting and advocacy of journalists and former 
athletes contributed to increasing awareness of brain trauma in the sport. Debates over the 
appropriate policy recommendations to make in the context of uncertainty over youth football’s 
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The Strenuous Life (excerpt) 
“They say it’s dangerous!” said I; but he said, “I don’t care; 
We’ll get back seats. I understand there’ll be policemen there.” 
So there we sat and viewed the whole preposterous affair. 
 
It turned out safe enough for us, and as for those young chaps 
Who played, they all made nothing of astonishing mishaps, 
Enduring superhuman-seeming strains without collapse. 
 
They’d kill a player frequently, and on his corpse would pile 
A score of them, and then pile off, and he’d get up and smile, 
And kick the ball, the blessèd crowd all hollering meanwhile. 
 












In 1905, Professor Shailer Matthews, the dean of the University of Chicago’s Divinity 
School, urged the abolition of “a social obsession—a boy-killing, education prostituting, 
gladiatorial sport. It teaches virility and courage, but so does war. I do not know what should 
take its place, but the new game should not require the services of a physician, the maintenance 
of a hospital, and the celebration of funerals.” Matthews was referring to youth tackle football, 
and he was far from the sport’s only critic at the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, Matthews 
wrote at a time when roiling debates over football’s safety and its association with schools 
spurred significant reforms. In 1906, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United 
States, later renamed the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), was established to 
oversee the sport at the college level.
1
  
In 1931, a football team physician published a survey of football injuries in the high 
schools of Massachusetts. His study was motivated in large part by persistent concerns that the 
sport was too risky for children. He introduced his medical study by describing the prevailing 
fears that prompted his work. “‘If I had a son I’d never let him play football—it’s too 
dangerous.’ How many times have those associated with football heard that or similar remarks?” 
The doctor hoped that his injury survey would alleviate these concerns. He maintained that 
“football, under proper supervision, gives boys a natural outlet for their nervous energies and 
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keeps them off the streets, thereby avoiding many mishaps, such as automobile, motor-cycle and 
trolley car injuries, and others too numerous to mention.”
2
 
In 1961, a sports journalist worried that football was becoming increasingly violent and 
dangerous and warned that reform to youth football was essential to prevent the goal line from 
becoming “the ghoul line.” He emphasized that head and neck injuries were of particular 
concern, and that the object of the game needed to be scoring points, not scoring casualties. “Any 
further progression in the direction of brutality instead of ballet and they may have to stop 
counting touchdowns and start counting concussions.”
3
  
In 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama told the New Republic: “If I had a son, I'd have to 
think long and hard before I let him play football.” The president’s remarks came amid 
widespread media coverage of the dangers of concussions associated with the sport, as well as 
lawsuits filed against the National Football League by former players who alleged that the 
League failed to adequately inform them of the risks. Another prominent round of anxiety over 
the risks football posed to young athletes was under way.
4
 In 2014, an essayist expressed 
astonishment at the longstanding and extraordinary prominence of the violent youth sport in the 
United States: 
What does it mean that our society has transmuted the intuitive physical joys of 
childhood—run, leap, throw, tackle—into a corporatized form of simulated combat? That 
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a collision sport has become the leading signifier of our institutions of higher learning, 
and the undisputed champ of our colossal Athletic Industrial Complex?
5
 
Such questions about the risks and benefits of youth football, its intimate association with 
American educational institutions, and its existence as a form of entertainment for adults have 
persisted to a remarkable extent throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first century. What 
exactly were the health consequences of football? Did the sport build strong bodies and turn boys 
into men, or did it harm the health of vulnerable children? Arguments over the nature and safety 
of this most popular American sport, its suitability for children, and the effectiveness of 
protective equipment in preventing injuries are as old as the game itself.
6
  
In this dissertation, I examine the history of American debates over the safety of youth 
football and the effectiveness of injury prevention strategies (notably helmets and other 
protective equipment). After providing an overview of the growth of youth football since the 
Progressive Era, the remainder of the project primarily focuses on the period after World War II, 
when youth football grew immensely in popularity and prepubescent boys increasingly 
participated. This project ascertains the centers of controversy throughout this period, including 
identifying influential individuals and groups involved in critical moments of change in debates 
over the safety of youth football in the United States.   
This project focuses on youth football because the vast majority of tackle football athletes 
have been children. Comparatively few athletes continue to play football in college, let alone 
professionally or as older adults, whereas every year millions of American boys participate in 
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 11-player football remains the high school sport with the greatest number of male participants according to 2014-
2015 data.  “2014-2015 High School Athletics Participation Survey,” National Federation of State High School 






football. The ethical questions related to the physical risks that children can assume are quite 
different from the corresponding questions about the risks that adults can assume. In addition, 
children’s still-developing bodies are differently susceptible to injuries than those of fully-grown 
adults. Consequently, examining the youth level of play has more significant implications from a 
public health perspective. In addition, while the NFL and college levels of play have generally 
entailed far more money and media attention, studying youth sports is also important from a 
cultural and historical perspective. As Roberta J. Park concluded in an essay on “A Decade of the 
Body,” while sports and exercise may often be consigned to a sort of “special” history bin, given 
their prominent role in the daily lives of adults and children, they provide a highly useful 
approach to the study of the past.
7
  
Yet the history of youth sports remains relatively overlooked as compared to college and 
professional sports, and youth football in particular remains significantly understudied.  Sports 
historian Michael Oriard has noted that the vast history of high school football is “nearly 
unwritten.”
8
 Studies examining the history of institutions administering high school athletics 
have not focused on student health and safety.  Several authors have written histories of college 
and professional football, and a handful of largely laudatory accounts of the high school game 
tangentially refer to efforts to address injuries. Thus, there is a gap in the existing literature that 
this study addresses by examining the history of debates over the sport’s safety and health effects 
at the high school level and younger.
9
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Debates over the safety of youth football occurred among doctors, lawyers, equipment 
engineers, and sporting goods manufacturers, as well as among the general public, including 
journalists, parents, coaches, and the players themselves. One goal of this project is to understand 
when and how public health and medical professionals became involved in efforts to improve 
football safety.  When did health professionals begin to systematically study the epidemiology of 
football injuries and to evaluate the effectiveness of equipment and other protective 
interventions?  How did medical and nonmedical understandings of sports safety—and threats to 
safety—change over time? Further, in what ways did medical opinions not only highlight risks, 
but also downplay them? 
This project also examines how arguments based on players’ physical safety interacted 
with arguments based on moral and cultural concerns. For example, how did broader cultural 
transformations, such as the changing demographics of who played high school football, and 
changing attitudes toward masculinity, childhood and adolescence, influence debates over the 
safety of football? What cultural norms and attitudes, such as notions of “manhood” and 
“toughness,” were involved, and how did these change? By addressing these questions, this 
project aims to place football and other sports-related injury prevention efforts in critical social, 
cultural and historical context. 
I also examine the role of sporting goods manufacturers in these debates.  Many histories 
of public health have described how a range of consumer products, from tobacco to lead, have 
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posed a threat to the public’s health. Yet manufacturers of protective sports equipment were 
offering products explicitly intended to protect consumers’ health. They thus formed alliances 
with public health and medical professionals, rather than opposing their interventions. In 
promoting their business interests, sporting goods dealers and manufacturers influenced 
arguments and ideas about the football’s health effects, and the role that their various products 
could play in mitigating risks. 
Development of American Tackle Football and Mechanics of the Game 
Tackle football has its early origins in rugby and soccer. All these sports involved two 
teams of players competing for control of a ball, and in each of which the ball could be kicked 
through a goal or run across a line in order to score points. While football would continue to 
share similarities with these other competitive team sports, this quintessentially American sport 
developed its own particular set of rules in the United States in the late nineteenth century.  
Although the modern sport would primarily develop at elite colleges in the Northeastern 
United States, the first football match may in fact have taken place among high school students 
in the 1860s. By the 1920s, a number of leading football luminaries would accept the Oneida 
Football Club of Boston as the first organized football club. This club included boys from several 
Boston area high schools, and its first match likely occurred on November 7, 1963, according to 
a newspaper account two days later. The news account stated that “an interesting game of 
Football took place on the Common on Saturday afternoon, between the well known Oneida 
Club and a chosen sixteen of the High and Latin schools of this city.” The surviving members of 
this Oneida Club proudly highlighted that as schoolboys, they had played a new version of 
American football several years before any college students at Princeton, Rutgers, Harvard or 




monument at the entrance to Boston Common in honor of the club’s athletic achievements, 
emphasizing their victorious record. The seven surviving teammates had inscribed on their 
plaque that in all their matches, “the Oneida Goal was never crossed.”
10
  
The origins of modern college football, however, are most usually traced to a November 
6, 1869 game in New Brunswick, New Jersey between Princeton and Rutgers. Princeton 
modified rules of the London Football Association, a rugby club, to allow for 25 players to a 
side, kicking or butting the ball with the head, scoring six goals to win a game, and placing goal 
posts 25 feet apart. In the ensuing years, other Ivy League schools, including Columbia, Cornell, 
Harvard, and Yale began to join in with their own various sets of rules. To attempt to standardize 
the game, several of these schools formed the Intercollegiate Football Association in 1876.
11
 
In a series of meetings over the ensuing years, modern football took shape. The 
previously used round rubber ball was discarded in favor of an egg-shaped leather ball. The 
number of players on a team was reduced to eleven. In 1880, a new method of putting the ball 
into play was introduced: an athlete would place the ball on the ground in front of him and either 
kick the ball or snap it back with his foot. This development proved to be the origin of the 
modern American football scrimmage. The American scrimmage established the principle of 
possession of the ball, distinct from a more haphazard rugby scrum where neither team had the 
right to possess the ball or put it into play. In 1882, a system of “downs” was introduced into 
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college football. This system prescribed the number of consecutive tries a team had to attempt to 
advance a particular number of yards down the field before they would be required to surrender 
the ball to their opponents. The system would be installed on football fields by marking off yards 
on the field, known as a gridiron. Another profound change occurred in 1888, when tackling 
players below the waist was legalized. Football thus developed into a sport where repeated series 
of violent, full-body collisions were involved in attempting to gain control of the ball and move 
it down the field.
12
  
Football equipment was introduced gradually. In 1932, football star John Heisman would 
recall that in the earliest days players wore no padding or protection of any sort. In the 1890s and 
1900s, however, players began to wear “shin guards, rubber nose guards, and home soft pads for 
elbows.” Much of this padding was made of leather and wool and soon covered the most 
vulnerable parts of the players’ bodies. As an 1897 Chicago Daily Tribune article delicately 
observed, “especial precaution has been made this year for the hips, and a protuberance greater 
there than anywhere else shows extra padding.” After the introduction of these relatively soft 
protective pads, Heisman recounted, next “came leather helmets and sole leather shoulder pads-
sometimes reinforced with metallic plates—and thigh and knee pads of more or less murderous 
composition. Inflexible and unyielding pads often did damage to the opponent.”
13
  
Although leather head protection would be become so ubiquitous that football players 
could be described as “leatherheads,” the headgear was initially viewed with skepticism. 
According to one author, around the turn of the twentieth century, “an enterprising manufacturer 
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put the first pneumatic head harness on the market made of soft black rubber with an inflated 
crown. The old timers thought such head guards ‘sissy,’ contending that no ‘real football player’ 
would wear one.” From its earliest introduction into the sport, then, football equipment could 
serve to protect its wearer or to cause harm to other players, and whether the gear enhanced a 
player’s masculinity or rendered him a coward was a source of contention.
14
  
Professional medical journals were beginning to remark upon the frequency and severity 
of deaths and injuries sustained in youth football matches. In 1902, the Journal of the American 
Medical Association (JAMA) reported from that year’s football season twelve fatalities (“enough 
to supply a respectable Spanish-American war”), eighty serious injuries, and innumerable 
“smaller items” such as sprains, lost teeth, and torn ears.
15
 In discussing this JAMA report, one 
commenter observed that future generations would be surprised “that there should be a medical 




This study proceeds in six chapters. The first provides an overview of the development of 
youth football in the United States, followed by placing debates over the safety of football after 
World War II through the 1950s in the social and political context of the Cold War. The second 
introduces doctors, coaches and parents as interested adults involved in understanding and 
framing football injuries as a medical issue. In the third chapter, I focus on efforts to standardize 
and assess the efficacy of the key protective device – the helmet. The fourth chapter examines 
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how sporting goods manufacturers shaped debates over the risks of youth football, not only 
through advertising their products, but also by trying to limit their liability in lawsuits related to 
football helmets. The fifth chapter evaluates how football’s role as a prominent community event 
in many locales influenced perceptions of risk. A few bumps on the head or broken bones often 
appeared of minor concern in relation to promoting children’s academic and social success. 
Finally, the sixth chapter examines the contemporary “concussion crisis” and other recent 
developments in youth football safety debates, notably how recent NFL-sponsored research and 
programs have influenced the ways the youth game is (and is not) discussed.  
This dissertation primarily relies on a wide variety of archival material, including medical 
and public health literature, material from state and local athletic associations, education 
journals, government agency reports and other archival material from relevant government 
agencies and associations, articles in trade journals, proceedings from sporting and coaches' 
associations, local and national newspapers, youth- and sports-oriented magazines, and historical 
advertisements for protective football equipment placed by sporting goods manufacturers in 
these publications.  
There are several important limitations of this project to consider. The first is the 
challenge of identifying archival material specifically oriented to youth football programs. While 
college and professional associations such as the NCAA and the NFL have the resources to 
maintain greater documentation of materials, such as meeting minutes, conference agendas, and 
letters, amateur and/or youth organizations operating on a shoestring budget largely lack the 




States, Pop Warner Little Scholars, did not have archival material available for research use.
17
 
This introduces significant bias into the kinds of archival material that are available. The primary 
source of youth football archival material used in this dissertation, the Dave and Mary Vannicelli 
Collection of the King of Prussia Historical Society, was made available due to the generous 
donation of youth football archival materials provided by the founders of a local youth football 
league. While this material provides an illustrative example of how one youth football league 
operated, systematic comparisons of youth safety debates across different geographic regions of 
the United States or different type of youth league structures were not possible. 
Additionally, this dissertation largely examines the safety debates and arguments put 
forward by a broad range of adults who supervised, supported, protested, or even profited from 
youth football. While several stories and quotes provide some indication of how young players 
themselves viewed the risks and benefits of the game, this project provides relatively limited 
insights into the perspectives of child athletes on the risks they were undertaking.  
Despite these important limitations, studying history of debates over the safety of a 
violent recreational sport for boys is a way to understand major themes in the history of 
American sport, health, culture, politics and law. This history continues to shape the debates over 
the sport’s risks. In the fall 2015 season, at least eleven boys died playing high school football. 
Despite many rule and equipment changes, over a century since Professor Shailer Matthews 
decried youth tackle football, many elements of his critique remain pertinent to the twenty-first 
century game.  
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While a number of physicians and other observers have long been aware of head injuries 
in football, only recently have they been framed as a major public health crisis. As one 
researcher noted in 2014, “what gained attention a century ago as a medical problem among 
young men playing football in elite colleges is now a serious problem of public health.”
18
 
Beyond concerns over head injuries, however, this history indicates that a wide range of other 
concerns and priorities have shaped youth football safety debates. Indeed, in many ways, youth 
football injuries and deaths represent an inscription of adult values onto children’s bodies. 
Tracing the history of debates over the sport’s safety is essential to better understanding these 
values and their implications for children’s health.
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Chapter One: “We Are Not a Nation of Softies”— Growth of Youth Football from the 
Progressive Era to the Cold War  
 
Although American high school students had played informal football matches in parks 
and fields since the second half of the nineteenth century, by the 1880s students in Northeastern 
and Midwestern cities had begun to organize their own leagues, often with encouragement from 
alumni. Initially, faculty members or school administrators did not supervise such matches; 
nonetheless, the games often attracted spectators and interest from local communities.
1
 By 1902, 
early inter-regional matches were taking place, with Brooklyn Polytechnic students, champions 
of greater New York, traveling to Chicago to compete against Hyde Park High School. In what 
historian Robert Pruter has deemed “perhaps the most one-sided high school intersectional 
contest of all time,” Hyde Park defeated Brooklyn Polytechnic 105 to 0.
2
 While acknowledging 
that the younger boys had been “a little slow in picking up the game” as compared to college 
students, an enthusiastic 1905 Washington Post article claimed that there was “barely a high 
school which does not possess its college eleven.”
3
  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, newspapers published opinion pieces 
warning of the dangers that tackle football posed to college participants, and advising either 
altering or banning the game. For instance, an 1892 commentary in the Chicago Daily Tribune 
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warned that should football become a national pastime, it “must be reformed or it will cripple 
and physically ruin thousands of young men.”
4
  Two years later, the same newspaper published 
an opinion piece whose author asserted that the dangerous game “has trickled down among the 
schoolboys who are preparing for college” and that such a vicious sport “which may be won by 
disabling your adversary, or wearing out his strength, or killing him, ought to be prohibited, at all 
events, among [civilized people’s] youth.”
5
  By the turn of the century, the increasing popularity 
and visibility of the sport at the university level had attracted unfavorable attention. Several 
prominent university leaders argued that, while such risk-taking might be justified in occupations 
such as fire protection and seafaring, “no mere sport” should imperil life.
6
 Some observers 
confidently predicted that the football would soon fall into disfavor.
7
 
Although the best-known efforts to ban or modify the sport occurred at the college level, 
with President Theodore Roosevelt’s calls for reform ultimately contributing to the formation of 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA),
8
 some high school officials also tried to 
prohibit the game.  In 1909, the New York Board of Education banned football from city high 
schools, with one member, John Greene, explaining that the game fostered “a desire to maim,” 
and Commissioner Frederic R. Coudert characterizing it as “homicidal, barbaric and brutal.”
9
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The Board of Education’s decision elicited protests from defenders of football, who contended 
that “there is no special hazard in the game if it is properly planned and properly controlled.”
10
  
In 1910, New York reinstated football in public high schools under new rules that would 
purportedly reduce the most serious safety threats.
11
 
As efforts to ban football failed and its popularity increased, school officials instead 
sought to supervise the sport.
12
 As historian Elliot Gorn writes, by the 1920s, professional team 
sports such as baseball and football had long since established themselves as part of the business 
world, with “regulatory bureaucracies, marketing strategies, a managerial ethos, profit 
orientation, an obsession with victory, specialization of function, an emphasis on statistics, and 
an insistence on meritocratic values.”
13
 Many of these characteristics also permeated athletics at 
the high school level, where informal football matches in parks and fields gave way to 
interscholastic games that were organized and officiated by adults. Ensuring that only eligible 
students participated in competitions, providing adult and institutional supervision for matches, 
and implementing rule changes (such as adding a third official) had helped make the sport “more 
palatable” to school officials and parents concerned about the safety and suitability of tackle 
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football for young players.
14
 By the 1923–1924 school year, only three states lacked statewide 
oversight of interscholastic contests.
15
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This chapter introduces this public health history of youth football by reviewing the 
development of high school football before World War II, followed by the increase in youth 
football that emerged in the postwar era. At the convergence of suburbanization, the 
consolidation of schools, postwar prosperity, and increasing high school attendance, youth 
football grew in popularity. Children younger than high school age were also increasingly 
playing tackle football outside school, primarily through privately organized leagues such as the 
Pop Warner youth football league. Although critics worried about the impact of this trend on 
children’s health and safety, the social climate moved in the other direction, toward the 
expansion of youth football, as well as other organized competitive team sports such as baseball 
and ice hockey. The threat of communism during the Cold War inspired increased calls for 
improved physical education reflected in public discussion as well as policy decisions, such as 
Eisenhower’s executive order to establish a President’s Council on Youth Fitness. Football was 
presented as a solution to a perceived fitness and moral crisis, including gendered fears that boys 
needed exposure to a “rough” sport in order to avoid becoming effeminate. 
Growth of Youth Football in the Progressive Era 
Interscholastic sports were increasingly seen as part of the educational mission of 
secondary schools during the early twentieth century. Historian S.W. Pope has observed that the 
trend in physical education away from gymnastics and toward athletic sports reflected “the new 
educational psychology of John Dewey (and others), who believed that children should learn 
from experience.” Many educators interpreted competitive team athletics as offering students the 
practical opportunity to experience the “rules of life,” namely victory and defeat, in a way that 
other physical activities could not. As historian Brad Austin characterized this reasoning, “where 






 In addition, progressive and religious leaders particularly promoted football 
as a means to instill moral values in boys, which in turn would improve their academic 
performance. In 1904, the Reverend A. E. Colton of the American Bible Society wrote that his 
son left his high school football season 
in prime condition for the hardest kind of tackling and protracted endeavor with 
languages, physics and mathematics. Thus we gladly pay tribute to the great game which 
is doing so much for developing our young men physically and morally, preparing them 
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Interscholastic sports received further justification during World War I as a means to 
meet national defense needs and foster physical fitness among citizens. In January 1917, 
President Woodrow Wilson told a delegation from the Maryland and Massachusetts League for 
National Defense that “unquestionably, physical training is needed . . . . but it can be had without 
compulsory military service.”
20
 Adopting the president’s statement as their slogan, a newly 
formed Committee for Promoting Physical Education in the Public Schools of the United States 
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sought to introduce physical education without military features in public schools.
21
 Chaired by 
John Dewey of Columbia University and composed of a number of other leading educators, this 
committee placed a model bill before the general assemblies of California, Indiana, and 
Connecticut in 1917. By 1923, 32 states had passed legislation requiring physical education as 
part of the high school curriculum.
22




John Dewey’s committee explicitly characterized physical education as essential to 
American citizenship, stating in the preamble to their 1917 model bill: “We believe the time has 
come when the public schools can, and should, enter deliberately and purposefully upon a 
definite plan for the preparation of our youth physically for the exigencies of life and for all the 
demands of citizenship.”
24
 Organized athletic competitions were portrayed as a means to instill 
teamwork and responsibility in boys, contributing to “the building up of character of the 
manhood of America.”
25
 Daniel Chase, the first president of the New York State Public High 
School Athletic Association, recalled drafting 14 points of “Good Sportsmanship” in 1920, to be 
printed in all of the association’s earliest handbooks. These included that a good sport should 
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play for the joy of playing, be a good team worker, accept adverse decisions gracefully, 
congratulate the winner, back his team in every honest way, and play hard until the end.
26
  
In 1926, Chase left the State Department of Education to serve as the executive director 
of the recently formed International Sportsmanship Brotherhood. A New York Times profile of 
this organization also emphasized the character-building nature of sports, asserting that 
sportsmanship had educational value that would translate to the business world. “But can any 
one [sic] doubt that a fine sense of honor on the links or an inward compulsion to do the fair 
thing on the playing field will find its expression in the vocations, in dealings between employer 
and employee or in transactions in business? Were this not true the games and sports of a nation 
would make but little contribution to character.”
27
 Such notions of sportsmanship and fair play 
were considered essential in justifying the educational value of athletic competition. As one 
administrator put it, to the extent that educators emphasized “fair play” and trained boys in habits 




Some administrators feared school athletics had become far too popular. George D. 
Strayer and N.L. Engelhardt of Columbia Teachers College asserted that football had taken on an 
unhealthy level of importance in high schools and in universities: “Athletic contests have come 
to occupy the time and attention of the pupils in the schools and of the community in general in a 
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manner most unwholesome for the contestants and for the spectators as well.”
29
 In particular, the 
nature of youth sports as a public spectacle for adults worried educators who feared that the 
educational value of athletics was being warped. As Frederick Rand Rogers, the New York State 
Director of Health Education, wrote in 1929,  
When adults insist upon spending their leisure time watching children at play, and not 
through any interest in the children themselves except as actors on a stage, the wisdom of 
a culture which provides the leisure is open to serious indictment. Probably the remedy 
lies in more education. But any education which accustoms adolescents to spectacles of 
adults excited over adolescent athletics is an unhealthy form of training for the children.  
The school must solve its problems more effectively if it is to save itself.
30
 
These early concerns about the spectacle nature of contact sports, particularly football, 
would persist throughout the twentieth century. Such anxieties underscored the remarkable 
popularity of high school and college athletic contests in communities. During the 1920s and 
1930s, men’s intercollegiate athletics not only became firmly established in the administrative 
structure of universities, but became a key source of entertainment, revenue, and “a focal point 
for student and alumni loyalty.”
31
 Throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, the 
status of college football made the sport ripe for satire. In 1906, American satirist Ambrose 
Bierce quipped that academe could be defined as “an ancient school where morality and 
philosophy were taught,” but an academy was “a modern school where football is taught.”
32
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Such biting satire also made its way into the movies. Notably, in 1932, the Marx 
Brothers’ film Horse Feathers lampooned the outsized and corrupting role of football in higher 
education. In the movie, the new president of fictional Huxley College, Quincy Adams Wagstaff, 
portrayed by Groucho Marx, asserts that “this college is a failure. The trouble is we’re neglecting 
football for education.” He further states that the university can’t support both the college and 
football, so “tomorrow we start tearing down the college.” The scene offers a trenchant and 
hilarious take on the incredibly, even absurdly, prominent role of football on college campuses.
33
  
Limited finances during the Great Depression, followed by wartime restrictions during 
World War II, circumscribed the growth of high school extracurricular activities, including 
athletics. If anything, the increasing challenge of funding school athletics, conjoined with 
prominent student deaths, left football more vulnerable to safety-related criticisms. Indeed, the 
1931 death of Cadet Richard Brinsley Sheridan Jr. of a broken neck, sustained while playing 
college football for the Army team, prompted “the most violent excoriation football has been 
subjected to since 1905,”
34
 with commentators questioning whether boys and young men should 
play the sport at all. The New York Herald Tribune reported on calls “to the very heavens for 
revision and emasculation [of football] to a point where young men, who are expected to amount 
to something in the world of business and affairs in time to come, can be permitted to 
participate.”
35
 The belief in football’s ability to prepare young players for future business careers 
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was threatened by Sheridan’s death. The sport needed to be altered and “emasculated” in order to 
retain its educational value, and such a process would involve addressing the spectacle nature of 
the sport in schools. The New Haven Register editorialized that a complete survey of football 
injuries and deaths among students should “silence the most rabid fanatic, who today shouts: 
‘Play the game! Take what’s coming to you and smile!’”
36
 
The fatal injury had occurred while Sheridan was making a flying tackle head-on, a 
dangerous method of tackling that was also considered “one of football’s most spectacular 
sights.” In response to the outcry over Sheridan’s death, the Intercollegiate Football Rules 
Committee, chaired by coach E. K. Hall, introduced “the most far-reaching modifications 
adopted in the playing rules of the game in a quarter of a century.” The changes, intended to 
reduce the hazards of the game, included making the flying block and tackle illegal, allowing 
more frequent substitutions, and forbidding players from striking opponents on the head, neck, or 
face. Sportswriter Allison Danzig observed that the supportive response of coaches, officials, and 
athletic executives to these rule changes “reflected the belief that something constructive had 
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In the fall 1932 season, the first season after these new changes had taken place, the New 
York Times reported on ten football-related deaths, all but one of which had occurred in high 
school, prep, or sandlot games. The newspaper observed that “just as last year’s toll came mainly 
through head injuries, so do the deaths reported so far this season bear out the necessity for 
protective measures against this type of accident. Particularly do these injuries seem to occur on 
the high school gridiron.” While the new 1932 safety code appeared to have reduced injuries and 
deaths at the college level, the rule changes had “failed to eliminate the hazards to prep school, 
high school and sandlot combatants.”
38
 The risks for child athletes persisted, and the debate over 
the educational value of football for students continued. 
In fact, a number of administrators and coaches characterized the Depression as an 
opportunity to refocus school athletics on the wellbeing and development of students. Among 
them was renowned football coach Glenn Scobey “Pop” Warner, who was widely acclaimed for 
his coaching record, particularly his experience coaching football star Jim Thorpe at the Carlisle 
Indian School. The many innovations he is credited with introducing to the sport of football 
include tactics such as the huddle, the idea of numbering plays, the body block, the double-wing 
formation, the spiral pass, and the spiral punt.
39
 Echoing President Franklin Roosevelt’s call for 
“a new deal for the American people,” in 1933 Warner wrote an article for the Saturday Evening 
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Post proposing a “new-deal code to restore normal, sane conditions to college and school 
athletics, and to football in particular.”
40
  
According to Warner, the transformation of football into a big business designed to 
generate money for academic institutions had warped the purpose of amateur athletics. To rectify 
the situation, he argued that “we should revalue athletics in terms of the good they can do for the 
athletes themselves.”
41
 This would involve “deflating” high school and college football. 
Provided that football could be kept a sport and not a business, Warner expressed his hope and 
expectation that football would “thrive more than ever as the great American sport, with every 
able-bodied youngster playing it, even in his grammar-school days.”
42
 Even this sharp critic of 
the over-commercialization of athletics, then, envisioned football as being appropriate not only 
for high school and college students, but for even younger children. 
In his history of the rise of American high school sports, Robert Pruter has argued that 
“high school sports were essentially put on hold” during the 1930s and early 1940s.
43
 While high 
school football remained popular, limited funds generally hampered the expansion of existing 
athletic programs, and in some regions, attendance diminished. In Pennsylvania, some high 
schools reduced the price of admission to football games from a dollar to fifty cents, yet crowds 
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declined nonetheless as many fans still could not afford the reduced prices.
44
 Tight budgets were 




Although the Great Depression limited funding for athletics during this period, New Deal 
programs helped build the infrastructure that would contribute to making football a ubiquitous 
sport in high schools across the United States. Throughout the duration of the Works Projects 
Administration program (WPA), workers built or improved nearly 3,300 stadiums, grandstands, 
and bleachers, and about 5,600 athletic fields. In fact, in 1946 the WPA acknowledged in its final 
report that there
 
 was “an early tendency to overbuild” parks and recreational buildings, given 
that such facilities “furnished a ready use for WPA labor.”
46
 Many of these stadiums were 
designed for high school football, frequently using a football-track combination design which 
included a quarter-mile running track surrounding the football field.
47
  
Such stadium construction projects not only provided much-needed work in local 
communities, but also were consistent with popular ideals about masculinity and civic autonomy. 
For example, in 1938, the WPA financed the construction of Oakley High School Stadium in 
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Oakley, Kansas. The stadium would go on to be used to host football games and track meets 
continuously since workers completed work in 1939. The team of unskilled laborers, made up of 
local farmers who were struggling financially, built the stadium to include a standard 100-yard 
football field encircled by a 400-meter track.
48
 The construction by men of football stadiums in 
local communities, intended for the use of men and boys to engage in athletic competitions, fit 
with WPA narratives that affirmed masculine civic respectability. As Holly Allen has observed 
in her examination of gendered New Deal narratives, “highly visible, tangibly productive, and 
affirming of project workers’ masculinity, construction projects dominated the rhetoric and 
iconography of federal work relief.”
49
 Football stadiums were one way to affirm workers’ self-
reliance, masculinity, and local autonomy in the face of widespread unemployment and an 
expanding federal government. Such construction projects also legitimized competitive sports as 
“wholesome” leisure activities, as well as a means to provide labor of value to society.
50
 
After the United States entered World War II, additional constraints further threatened 
school sports. Facing gas rationing, difficulty in retaining coaches, and other restrictions, some 
schools resorted to unprecedented measures to maintain their high school football programs. In 
Pennsylvania, Bell Township High School administrators hired a woman to coach their football 
team, garnering attention from national media. The New York Times described Miss Pauline 
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Rugh as “probably the nation’s first feminine football coach.”
51
 She had never played football 
and “accepted her duties only after no man could be found for the position,” explained the New 
York Times.
52
 Rugh nonetheless had her own athletic background and accomplishments, with a 
degree in physical education from Penn State, where she had been a badminton champion. She 
told the New York Times that she had always enjoyed and followed the game of football, 
“although I certainly never intended to coach it.”
53
 Her team’s 47-0 loss in its opening game left 
notions that football should be the province of men unchallenged, and also provided local media 




More commonly, however, schools chose to curtail their team’s football schedule, reduce 
the size of their coaching staff, or temporarily suspend their football programs.
55
 By the end of 
1942, the National Federation of State High School Athletic Associations estimated that about 5 
percent of the nation’s schools had dropped their football programs, 25 percent had reduced their 
coaching staffs, and 35 percent had limited travel connected with football team schedules.
56
 At 
Seward Park High School, a public school on New York City’s Lower East Side, over 800 
students went “on strike” to protest the loss of their team, indicating the importance many 
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students attached to the high school football program. However, the principal of the school, Dr. 
Samuel Streicher, defended the decision as a wartime necessity. He told the New York Times that 
he had explained to members of last year’s team “that the suspension was inevitable and a war 
sacrifice that they would have to make.”
57
  
Yet high school football by no means ceased during this period, and neither did concerns 
over the sport’s safety. In 1942, Dr. Logan Clendening, a nationally known physician and 
medical historian with a syndicated health column published in 383 daily newspapers, 
questioned the safety of high school football in his column. Without citing sources for his 
statistics, he asserted that boys who played high school football had a 1 in 4 chance of getting 
injured and a 1 in 5 chance of receiving a permanent injury that would last a lifetime, such as 
loss of teeth, a dislocated knee, or a fractured pelvis. Boys had a 1 in 1,000 chance of dying and a 
1 in 10,000 chance of having a leg amputated if they played football in high school, he 
continued. Dr. Clendening claimed that college players were at lower risk of injury due to having 
more mature bones and access to better protective equipment. Consequently, he argued that 
football should be prohibited for high school students until at least their senior year. To any 
coaches who disliked his views, Dr. Clendening warned that football coaching was in itself a 
hazardous occupation, with coaches at risk for heart failure.
58
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Despite wartime limitations and such ongoing medical critiques, youth football persisted, 
and many schools continued to benefit financially from cash receipts from football games.
59
 
Spectators continued to flock to big games: in 1937, Chicago’s annual Prep Bowl match drew an 
estimated 120,000 fans, “making it one of the largest crowds for any sporting event in the United 
States, at any time, on any level.”
60
 With the end of World War II, high school football surged in 
the context of increasing prosperity, high school attendance, and suburbanization.
61
 In postwar 
southwestern Pennsylvania, for example, as area coal mines closed, schools in nearby towns lost 
enrollment, and nearly all became involved in school district mergers.
62
 This consolidation of 
smaller school districts into larger, and often more suburban, districts influenced the game.
63
A 
larger student body might facilitate the formation of a football program or make an existing 
program more competitive. For instance, James F. Byrnes High School was created as the 
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eventual result of the reorganization and consolidation of multiple schools in Spartanburg 
County, South Carolina, in 1950. The new high school opened in 1955 and kicked off its first 
football season that same year.
64
 Furthermore, in expanding, wealthier districts, additional 
funding supported increasingly sophisticated football programs with such amenities as weight 
rooms, football stadiums, and summer training camps.
65
   
Historian Michael Oriard argues that, in the 1940s and 1950s, magazine profiles of 
“football towns” produced a generic image of small town high school football which implicitly 
symbolized “idyllic small-town America everywhere.”
66
 Yet even depictions of such football 
towns acknowledged the “big business” aspect of football in these communities. For instance, a 
1946 profile of the White Plains (New York) High School football team opened by observing the 
enormous economic influence of the sport: “Elevation of football at the White Plains High 
School to virtually a college level, with adults thronging the $2,500,000 stadium, has given to the 
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Critics of the commercialization of football worried about the impact on children’s health 
as well as their education. In a 1952 commentary for the Saturday Evening Post, former high 
school football coach Don Group charged schools with neglecting the physical welfare of student 
football players, stating that “some schools don’t even go through the motions of safeguarding 
the boys.”
68
 He decried the failure of many high schools to implement basic precautionary 
measures, such as having a team physician under contract to treat injured players. Asserting that 
schools were “exposing boys, through negligence, to crippling injuries,” Group argued that “big-
time football” was harming high school students. 
Despite such critiques, by the 1950s, the business of high school football was booming, 
sometimes even to the perceived detriment of other sports. The general manager of the Cleveland 
Indians baseball team reportedly felt that the appeal of playing college football among high 
school boys was “robbing baseball of promising material.”
69
 As Bob Harrell, who coached Texas 
high school and college football teams from 1938 to 1963, recalled, “After the war football just 
took off, and there weren’t enough coaches to go around.”
70
 H. V. Porter, secretary of the 
National Federation of State High School Associations, estimated that in 1950-1951 
approximately 9,000 high schools participated in football, with about 600,000 high school boys 
playing the sport.
71
 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, 3,568,000 
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American boys aged 14 to 17 were enrolled in high schools in 1950.
72
 These figures suggest that 
roughly 1 in 6 American boys enrolled in high school at midcentury played football.  
Citizens Fit for a Dangerous World 
Some of the growth of youth football after World War II had its roots in the promotion of 
competitive team sports during World War I. In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson had asserted 
that physical training could occur without military service, inspiring physical educators to draft 
model physical education bills based on this principle. Nonetheless, concerns over the need for 
military preparedness, as well as concerns about the need for fit citizens to successfully serve the 
country and address national challenges even in peacetime, continued to inform the debate over 
physical education. At times, football was promoted as means to unite countries and avert war. 
Writing for the Athletic Journal, Professor E. W. McDiarmid of Texas Christian University 
expressed optimism that football could foster “world-wide mutual understanding and comity.” 
Referring to the Roman god of war, he observed in 1935 that as the American sport began to 
enter Japan, “football enters and (let us hope) Mars will take a back seat.”
73
 
More commonly, however, school administrators, faculty and coaches promoted 
competitive sports as a means to prepare young American men against international threats, 
including war. A 1940 address to the American Football Coaches Association provides a 
particularly clear example of the relationship promoted between competitive athletics and 
national defense. William Lewis Mather, president of Lafayette College in Pennsylvania, spoke 
to the football coaches’ 35th convention with the NCAA. Speaking on “Athletics and National 
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Defense,” Mather explicitly connected competitive athletics, and in particular football, to 
national defense. He stated that far more challenging than addressing the particular rules of 
football or any other sport, would be “the development of a generation of young men who have 
the red blood, who have the stamina, who have the loyalty, to protect the American way of life.” 
No more effective group to meet this challenge existed than the coaches and administrators of 
college football and other sports, Mather continued. Observing that France had fallen to 
Germany that year because of “weakness within,” Mather argued that athletic departments had a 
responsibility to build up “clean manhood” in order to help preserve civilization. Whether or not 
the United States would ultimately enter World War II, “there isn’t a chance in the world that the 
boys in your gymnasiums, in your locker rooms, will not be called upon, when they graduate, to 




Advocates for physical education and athletic programs pointed to major world events 
and geopolitical strife as evidence for the need to promote physical fitness and strength among 
students. Through initiatives such as Hale America and Operation Fitness USA, from the 1940s 
through the 1960s the U.S. government partnered with “corporate, nonprofit, civic and religious 
organizations to advance the importance of physical fitness as both an individual and a patriotic 
necessity for men, women, and children.”
75
 In the 1950s, the threat of communism further 
inspired calls for improved physical education as an urgent matter of national interest and 
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national defense. Notably, in 1954, Clifford Lee Brownell, the president of the American 
Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation, told the association that: 
The struggle in Indo-China has again brought us face to face with many crucial problems. 
The world situation has focused attention upon the general failure of our schools to 
provide adequate programs of physical education, health education, and recreation . . . .  
In the high schools are the young men and young women who will become the workers 
and defenders of the nation tomorrow.
76
 
Anxieties over the fitness of American youth were further heightened by a 1954 article 
finding that American schoolchildren fared poorly on a measure of muscular fitness as compared 
to European children.
77
 In a 1955 article for Sports Illustrated, sportswriter Robert Boyle 
described the media and political response to these research findings, dubbing the publication 
“The Report That Shocked the President.”
78
 Indeed, President Eisenhower invited Dr. Hans 
Kraus and Ms. Bonnie Prudden, coauthors of the study, to a White House luncheon to discuss 
their report.
79
 In her remarks, Prudden, director of the Institute for Physical Fitness at White 
Plains, NY, told the president, celebrity athletes, sports officials, and other attendees:  
American mothers are afraid of their children hurting themselves. This is a Band-aid 
society. If a child breaks an arm, the arm may be in a plaster cast six weeks. That is not a 
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catastrophe. The catastrophe is that so few opportunities for adventure remain to 




At the President’s Conference on Fitness of American Youth convened in June 1956, 
Vice President Nixon warned attendees that “we are not a nation of softies” but could become 
one “if proper attention is not given to the trend of our time, which is toward the invention of all 
sorts of gadgetry to make life easy and, in so doing, to reduce the opportunity for normal health-
giving exercise.”
81
 In response to the concerns raised at these meetings, on July 16, 1956, 




Both Prudden and Nixon’s comments framed this 1950s “fitness crisis” in gendered 
terms. They portrayed a picture of overanxious mothers hovering over their children with Band-
Aids, potentially rendering their sons’ childhoods overly secure and feminized. These comments 
were part of a wider discourse about overprotective mothers that was influenced in particular by 
American author Philip Wylie. A novelist who had first achieved fame with works of science 
fiction, Wylie subsequently turned his pen to works of non-fiction. He critiqued social mores in 
several polemical books which “straddle[ed] a number of different genres.” In 1942, Wylie’s 
best-selling book Generation of Vipers popularized the term “momism,” defined by the Oxford 
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English Dictionary as “excessive attachment to, or domination by, the mother.”
83
 Doctors and 
commentators and scientists referenced and expanded on this notion in the popular press, 
warning of the dangers of domineering mothers stifling their children’s growth. As one 
psychiatrist wrote in the Saturday Evening Post, “One can have little patience with these moms 
who worry constantly and needlessly about the health of healthy children . . . .  Undue solicitude 
on mom's part is harmful.”
84
 
 Thus, mothers were blamed not only for the illnesses and injuries and their children 
suffered, but also for being unduly protective.
85
 By preventing their children from taking risks 
and enjoying healthy youthful “adventures,” these mothers placed American youth, particularly 
boys, at risk of becoming unfit “softies.” Tackle football was a sport for men and boys that, by 
seeking to exclude feminine influence, would protect boys from becoming such “softies.” While 
mothers were called upon “to embrace domesticity in service of the nation,” fathers were 
expected to encourage their sons to take risks and have adventures.
86
 Fathers were typically 
assigned responsibility for preventing their children from becoming a “sissy,” which Dr. Luther 
E. Woodward, coordinator of the New York State Health Commission, defined as a child “who 
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gets too much satisfaction from what his mother does for him and not enough from what he does 
for himself.”
87
 On this view, fathers needed to encourage their children to take risks and limit 
mothers’ influence if necessary.
88
  The term sissy was homophobic; football was not just about 
making boys into men, but making boys into straight men. Indeed, in the 1960s satirist Russell 
Baker would dub young men uninterested in sports as being “asportual,” writing that the great 
majority of such men “live in shame of their peculiar tastes and seek to conceal them by 
pretending to enjoy sports as much as the normal man.”
89
 
The function of American football in promoting a particular vision of masculinity was so 
obvious that across the Atlantic, British correspondent Don Iddon found in football the perfect 
target to mock American athletes’ pretensions to toughness. Whenever “American football 
players in their outlandish padded costumes and helmets appear on an English screen, the 
audience hoots with laughter,” he wrote. To the British, he claimed, such protective equipment 
represented not toughness, but cowardice and weakness. He placed the blame for such 
“pampering and effeminacy,” of course, squarely on American mothers. “The colossal cult of the 
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Boys’ efforts to avoid the stigma of being considered a sissy, as manifested in the sport of 
football, alarmed some medical practitioners. Dr. William Brady, who wrote a health column for 
the Los Angeles Times, warned that this fear of being perceived as a sissy was “the ruling spirit 
of high school football,” and caused players to obey coaches’ orders to the point of harming their 
own well-being. He recounted a story of a boy who had sustained a concussion while playing 
football, but who did not reveal that he suffered a constant headache for fear that he would be 
perceived as a sissy. The child athlete’s parents only learned of his symptoms when his vision 
began getting blurry, and he ultimately had to spend a month in the hospital. Brady concluded, 
“In my judgment no high school boy should play football—especially not interscholastic or 




Similarly, in a 1958 article examining the dangers of high risk sports, journalist John 
Lagemann warned that “the greatest danger of permanent deformity comes from the sports injury 
which is concealed because the child is afraid of being called a sissy by his coach and his fellow 
players.” Lagemann then recounted the tale of 12-year-old “Billy C.,” who bumped heads with 
another player during tryouts for a junior high school football team. Billy told nobody of the 
resulting pain in his neck, continued to play for weeks, suffered another collision, and ultimately 
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Such voices of caution, however, had little effect on the popular view that boys needed to 
become “tough” and experience a certain amount of risk, especially given that this view was 
promulgated at the highest levels in the presidential fitness programs of the 1950s. Indeed, one 
columnist observed that boys anxious to convince their skeptical mothers to allow them to play 
football would likely “make full persuasive use of the fact that the President has come out 
strongly in favor of more competitive sports among youth.”
93
 Football and other contact sports 
offered boys the opportunity for physical contact in a modern world where gadgetry made life 
“too easy” for growing boys. “I believe that competitive body contact sports are good for 
America’s young men,” Vice President Nixon would later tell the American Football Coaches 
Association at a 1958 luncheon.
94
  
Nixon spoke of football from personal experience. He had been an avid, though not 
especially gifted, football player. A childhood friend, Gerald Shaw, recalled that Nixon “used to 
be the dummy for everybody to tackle. He wasn’t coordinated enough for a football player. He 
had two left feet, I think.”
95
 He served as “scrimmage cannon fodder” at Fullerton Union High 
School, and similarly was never more than a third-string substitute on Whittier College’s football 
team.
96
 Nonetheless, Nixon persisted and attached great importance and meaning to his 
participation, and invoked the experience in crafting his public persona. He would later write in 
his memoirs that his happiest college memories involved sports, and that his football coach 
deeply influenced his life, recalling, 
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Ever since I first played in high school, football has been my favorite sport. As a 150-
pound seventeen-year-old freshman I hardly cut a formidable figure on the field, but I 
loved the game—the spirit, the teamwork, the friendship . . . . I think that I admired 
[Coach Wallace “Chief” Newman] more and learned more from him than from any man I 
have ever known aside from my father.
97
 
President Eisenhower, who had played football at West Point, similarly pointed to his 
own athletic experience as evidence of its importance, and also believed that football in 
particular helped train men to become leaders. He would later observe, “I believe that football, 
almost more than any other sport, tends to instill into men the feeling that victory comes through 
hard—almost slavish—work, team play, self-confidence, and an enthusiasm that amounts to 
dedication.”
98
 The belief in football’s ability to train young bodies and minds was therefore 
explicitly endorsed by several American presidents, as well as by football coaches and 
administrators.  
The organizers of youth football also framed the sport in terms of promoting the 
“American way of life” and protecting the United States from foreign threats. Football could 
meet this need not only in schools, but also in external organizations such as the Pop Warner 
Conference. National Pop Warner registration certificates stated that coaches would agree to 
comply with the conference’s standards “along lines of Scholarship, Sportsmanship and Safety 
First Football as a medium of inspiring the nation’s youth in the American Way of Life.”
99
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1959 Los Angeles Times story on Pop Warner football opened by claiming that “today, as an 
acceptance to the challenge to our American way of life, we have the National Pop Warner 
Conference teaching physical condition, religious tolerance and economic freedom principles to 
more than half a million youths in the country annually.”
100
  
How could the sport of football instruct young athletes in “economic freedom 
principles”? The competitive nature of football was portrayed as preparing boys to succeed in 
competitive, free market economic systems, while its nature as a team sport would prepare boys 
to cooperate with colleagues in their professional futures. A 1960 report on school athletics, 
published by a commission of the National Education Association and the American Association 
of School Administrations, asserted: “We believe that cooperation and competition are both 
important components of American life.”
101
 Vice President Nixon emphasized the importance of 
experiencing competition and failure as preparation for adult life: “Young Americans need the 
fighting spirit, the determination, the team work and the discipline which competitive athletics 
inevitably instill . . . . Our young men are going to enter a competitive world where they 
experience failure as well as success. Let’s not kid ourselves, they won’t be properly prepared 
for life if they have been shielded from the disappointment of a failure.”
102
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Football, then, would prepare boys to succeed as adults working in the American free 
market system. As David Wallace Adams observed in his examination of football at the Carlisle 
Indian Industrial School, football was “an ideal forum for creating the new American man—half 
Boone, half Rockefeller.”
103
 Imparting American values through competitive team sports such as 
football might thus lessen the dangers of socialism and other threats to American security. 
Indeed, opposition to competitive sports was even conflated with support for the USSR, and 
football was highlighted as a particularly wholesome way to lessen the threatening appeal of 
communism. For example, in 1958, radio commentator Bill Stern asserted that boys “like to hoot 
and holler and wave pennants and if they can’t do it at the football stadium you may well be sure 
that they will do it in the party cell.”
104
  
Claims about the moral benefits of youth football were related to a host of ideological 
beliefs about freedom and masculinity in American society. One important and persistent view, 
implied by Stern’s quote above, was that boys had an extraordinary amount of youthful energy 
and instincts that could only be satisfied by vigorous, even violent, contact sports. According to 
this belief, non-contact sports, even ones that might require significant physical exertion, simply 
would not suffice. As one Ohio high school football coach put it, football provides “a wholesome 
outlet” for the “tremendous energy” of boys. “You can’t channel this sort of energy into passive 
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pursuits such as chess or stamp-collecting, and the explosive urge cannot be completely satisfied 
by such otherwise wonderful sports as golf and tennis.”
105
  
Even educators concerned about the risks of football shared the assumption that non-
contact sports could not satisfy this physical need. In response to a high incidence of serious 
football injuries, educators at Purdue University sought an alternative, less hazardous sport, 
while “realizing that a successful program of intramural sports needs at least one contact game.” 
To address this need, assistant professor George Haniford advocated “American ball,” a sport 
created in 1934 as a combination of elements of baseball, basketball, and football, as a suitable 
and safer alternative. Writing for the journal Recreation, Haniford acknowledged that American 
ball was not well known, but encouraged readers to consider it.
106
 Emphasizing the point that this 
purportedly safer sport nonetheless fulfilled players’ need for physical contact, a quote from 
military psychiatrist William C. Menninger introduced the article: “Competitive games provide 
an unusually satisfactory social outlet for the aggressive drive. The most aggressive outlet is seen 
in those sports in which there is bodily contact.”
107
  
The assumption that competitive contact sports filled a necessary biological need for men 
was generally conjoined with the view that women did not experience such needs. Indeed, this 
assumption permeated not only defenses of the sport of football as necessary for boys and men, 
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but furnished an explanation as to why such sports were not considered desirable or appropriate 
for women and girls. As philosopher Paul Weiss would later write a 1969 examination of sports, 
“Most women do not make the effort to train or to participate because they are not subject to the 
tensions that young men suffer . . . .  The women have already achieved a satisfying integration 
of mind and body.”
108
  
Coaches and educators argued not only that football fulfilled a necessary physical need, 
but also that the competition in some sense protected boys. The sport certainly fit in with broader 
efforts to use organized activities to prevent juvenile delinquency or street crime. For instance, in 
1948, Dr. Walter Boyd organized the Long Beach Junior Football League for boys aged 14 and 
under in order “to get the boys off the streets.”
109
 Writing for the Athletic Journal in 1951, an 
assistant high school football coach asserted, “A boy on a football field is a boy off the street and 
out of trouble.”
110
 A 1949 Saturday Evening Post story highlighted the ability of football to 
foster boys’ moral well-being and enrich their relationships with their parents. The article 
profiled a youth football program at the Cleveland Park Dad and Son Athletic Club where fathers 
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coached football and scrimmaged with their sons. The program’s founder, Larry Conant, 
explained that “boys have a herd instinct” and that paternal involvement could channel that 
instinct and provide boys with an appropriate role model. “The whole parent-child relationship is 
improved, for here are . . . . status and mutual respect between child and adult.”
111
  
Football was presented as offering a unique opportunity to impart moral virtues that 
would ultimately protect them from greater hazards than a knock or two on the field. Columbia 
University football coach Lou Little asserted, “I think it’s dangerous for boys not to play 
football. Nowadays, particularly, when so much courage, moral and physical, is demanded of our 
sons.”
112
 According to this view, exposing boys to a certain amount of risk would benefit their 
mental and physical health. Developing moral and physical courage would enable children to 
face the challenges of the modern world. In fact, competitive sports would benefit children by 
teaching them to endure a certain amount of pain, and that “it does not hurt to get hurt.”
113
 Rough 
bodily contact at younger ages was also justified in preparing boys to continue to play sports as 
they grew older. “The body contact actually makes the youngsters better equipped for play in 
interscholastic and collegiate competition as they attain maturity.”
114
 An improved ability to 
compete in high school and college football, then, was considered to be a worthwhile goal in 
itself.  
Pre-High School Football in the 1950s  
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The belief in the merits of high school football had overwhelmed concerns that the sport 
might adversely affect older adolescents’ health, or that large crowds of spectators cheering on 
student athletes might be inappropriate in an educational venue. In fact, football had grown so 
immensely popular that some observers could not foresee it expanding any further. The authors 
of a 1951 study on the cultural diffusion of the sport speculated that “it may be that football has 
reached the apex of its audience appeal.”
115
 Yet this speculation was quickly disproved as the 
numbers of both spectators and participants continued to increase. A significant portion of this 
growth consisted of an expansion of the sport to increasingly include pre-high school aged 
children.  
While high school football was enormously popular, however, younger players were 
much less likely to play in junior high or elementary school settings. Educators were reluctant to 
host competitive athletics for prepubescent children. Administrators were not only concerned 
about safety, but also about the expense of administering a football program relative to the 
number of students who would be able to participate. As one school principal remarked, “Boys 
of this age are not ready physically or emotionally for intense competition, and a program for a 
few cannot be justified in terms of the amount of time and money required.”
116
 During the 1950s 
and 1960s many professional medical and education groups expressed their disapproval of any 
highly organized sport, including football, for young children.
117
 A notable 1952 report 
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published by a joint committee of the American Association for Health, Physical Education, and 
Recreation recommended against any “interschool competition of a varsity pattern” for children 
below the ninth grade.
118
  
In his comments to journalists on the report, however, Simon A. McNeely, the 
committee’s chair, was nonetheless concerned that the committee might be perceived as overly 
cautious or as spoilsports. He told an Associated Press reporter, “I’d like to have the idea 
emphasized that we’re for sports and we’re for competition. I don’t want people thinking we’re a 
bunch of fuddy-duddies.”
119
 In their report, they encouraged alternative and less competitive 
forms of physical activity, including sports days and informal games.
120
 But consistent with the 
broader concerns about the dangers of an overemphasis on winning, a 1950 survey found that the 
majority of elementary schools offered no competitive athletics for their students, and none of 
the schools surveyed offered any competitive sports below the fourth grade level.
121
  
Educators were more open to offering competitive sports at the junior high school level. 
A survey of interscholastic athletics during the 1957-1958 school year, to which 2,329 junior 
high schools responded, found that slightly more than 85 percent offered interscholastic 
athletics.
122
 Despite the ubiquity of athletic programs at this level, however, junior high school 
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administrators were only slightly less reluctant than their elementary school counterparts to 
permit tackle football for students of this age. Notably, a 1962 survey of junior high school 
administrators in California found that a majority believed that tackle football was not desirable 
for junior high school students, although three quarters of respondents favored interscholastic 
athletics at this level.
123
 
In fact, respondents to this survey singled out tackle football as being uniquely worrisome 
among options for competitive athletics. “All things considered, the consensus of opinion of the 
coaches at the junior high level seems to be that, except in the case of tackle football, 
interscholastic athletic competition is a beneficial part of the physical education program.”
124
 
Respondents considered that tackle football required greater supervision, protective equipment, 
and coaching than other sports, and that junior high schools were not able to supply the 
necessary support. Only 15 percent disagreed with the statement that many schools could not 
afford the equipment and facilities needed “to make participation in this type of competition 
relatively safe for their players.” One respondent wrote that tackle football “requires a great deal 
of specialized coaching as no one should play football unless the fundamentals have been taught 
rather completely.”
125
 Such comments suggested that administrators considered football too 
expensive, complicated, and unsafe to offer at the junior high school level. Consistent with these 
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attitudes, the survey found that only 20 percent of junior high schools in the state of California 
competed in tackle football.  
School-based tackle football programs for children before they reached high school 
remained relatively limited. Yet voluntary sports organizations outside the school grew at a 
remarkable pace. In 1952, the professional journal Recreation reported the conclusions of a joint 
Committee on Highly Organized Competitive Sports and Athletics for Boys Twelve and Under. 
The committee noted that most of the increase in organized sports that had prompted their work 
had occurred outside the school system.
126
 In emphasizing the complexity of the subject, the 
committee identified some of the most notable organizations on the youth sports scene. “Clearly, 
no one study or research project will produce noncontroversial evidence that Little League, Pop 




And when it came to organized youth football, the Pop Warner Football League was an 
extraordinary force. Founded in Philadelphia in 1929 by Joseph Tomlin, a former high school 
football player, in 1934 this football league was named after Pop Warner, the famous and 
influential football coach.
128
 Although initially the league’s players were predominantly older 
teenagers and adults, during World War II, the Pop Warner Football Conference lost most of its 
older players to the military draft. As many of its teams folded or merged, the league’s finances 
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suffered as well. But after the war the league rebounded, fielding 88 teams in 1946, of which 36 
had players aged 15 or younger.
129
 Its membership was shifting toward younger players, as many 
returning adult service members abandoned playing football.
130
 
In 1947, Joseph Tomlin opened a national office in order to establish Pop Warner football 
programs in Washington, Baltimore, and New York.
131
 In 1956, the Pop Warner Conference 
decided to become an exclusively youth football association, allowing only boys aged 16 and 
under to participate, and with a particular emphasis on children beginning at age 13 and under.
132
 
League organizers hoped to expand beyond the Philadelphia community and build a national 
football league for youth players, modeled in many ways on the success of Little League 
Baseball for youth baseball players.
133
 In the 1950s the league grew beyond Pennsylvania when 
teams were established in Northern and Southern California.
134
 By 1957, the New York Times 
reported that approximately 266 cities had engaged in Pop Warner football that year.
135
  
In 1959, the conference was reorganized and legally incorporated as “Pop Warner Little 
Scholars, Inc.,” a new name which reflected its focus on young players and projected an 
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emphasis on the educational benefits of participation.
136
 The league’s organizers intended to 
promote and reward both athletic and academic accomplishments among their “little scholars.”
137
 
The duty of determining whether players met the minimal academic standards to participate was 
often assigned to one of the team members’ mothers. This “grade mother” was placed in charge 
of “regularly reporting players’ grades to the coach; those who slip below a C average are 
usually banished to the bench.”
138
 
In fact, the league’s expansion and growing popularity in some circumstances helped to 
overcome longstanding rules limiting tackle football among younger children. For instance, in 
Los Angeles, Venice High School hosted 1958’s first annual Pop Warner Football Bowl 
championship match. This event broke a 35-year-old Board of Education rule which had 
prohibited tackle football by pre-high school players on school property.
139
 This example also 
suggests that even if schools were reluctant to permit elementary and junior high school tackle 
football under their jurisdiction, school officials might allow children to play the sport on school 
grounds under the aegis of an external league.    
Although Pop Warner emerged as one of the largest and most famous football leagues in 
the country, it was by no means unique, as smaller youth leagues were organized in communities 
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across the United States by groups such as the local boys clubs or the Catholic Youth League.
140
 
In 1956, the New York Times estimated that over 90,000 children were playing on 2,000 
organized “midget” football teams across the United States, for children ranging from 60 pound 
7 year olds to 160 pound teenagers. This glowing article on Long Island football attributed the 
sport’s spread to parental realizations that it was “useless” to forbid their boys from playing. 
“They realize the next best thing to do is to organize the activity, provide competent supervision 
and buy adequate equipment.”
141
 
A Sport for the American Nuclear Family: Worried Moms and Coaching Dads 
News stories describing the growth of youth football in flattering terms nonetheless had 
to acknowledge parental concerns, even if only to dismiss them or to suggest they were 
dissipating. For instance, a profile of the sport in Orange County, California, observed that 
football for young children was “on the boom in Orange County, and apprehension over whether 
a boy in his tender years is able to absorb the bumps that go with the game as it is played in high 
schools and colleges has just about disappeared.”
142
 A glowing 1958 Wall Street Journal article 
about the increase in spending on sporting goods equipment despite an economic recession 
sounded one note of caution—sales of youth football equipment. Despite the increasing 
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popularity of the sport, manufacturers were concerned that parental fears still limited equipment 
sales in the youth market. “A lurking dread of football still exists in many mothers’ hearts and 
sports manufacturers admit that the major growth in this activity for little tykes is still ‘about 
three or four years away.’”
143
 
As this comment about mothers’ hearts suggests, equipment manufacturers and 
promoters of youth football tended to cast parental concerns about safety in highly gendered 
terms. They attributed much of the apprehension over the sport’s safety to fearful or overbearing 
mothers. This was consistent with a broader trend of assigning mothers the primary 
responsibility for making decisions about their child’s and health safety, a tendency which was 
further influenced by prevailing gender norms during the 1950s.  
These attitudes extended to perceptions of mothers’ involvement in youth football. 
According to this framing, children eager to play football, coaches, and league administrators 
would all need to persuade these anxious mothers that their boys would not be subject to great 
dangers while playing tackle football. To illustrate his contention that parents were unreasonably 
keeping their children “aloof” from the game, a coach recounted the story of a boy who might 
have played football, but “the boy’s mother said she would give him a Thunderbird if he didn’t 
play.”
144
 This was an extreme example of the supposedly unfair and perhaps futile lengths 
mothers might go to in order to prevent their child from participating in the attractive sport. One 
commentator observed that “well-informed youngsters” would plead to be permitted to 
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Mothers not only needed to be reassured, but needed to be prevented from overly 
influencing the masculine game. In 1955, team coaches and managers drew up a code of ethics 
for the Pop Warner Conference which explicitly addressed maternal interference with the sport. 
A list of behaviors that “intelligent parents” would never engage in included the following: 
“create a ‘Momma’s boy’ stigma by a mother cuddling her son in front of other player and public 
with words and gestures.”
146
 While mothers were expected to keep their distance from their sons 
playing on the field, the presence of mothers on the sidelines was welcomed as an indication of 
the sport’s safety and support among women. “Mothers who used to be worried when their sons 
participated in the rough game of football now jam the sidelines and cheer their offspring onto 
greater effort.”
147
 Mothers were also encouraged to be involved in supporting the team off the 
field by providing financial and secretarial assistance. For example, at Niles-McKinley High 
School in Niles, Ohio, the “Mothers’ Club” assisted in preparing the team banquet and providing 
money for the football program.
148
 
In 1959 the Christian Science Monitor published an article by a reader, Barbara Fox, 
describing her experiences as the mother of a seventh grade football player. She described her 
role as a mother as involving such tasks as cleaning uniforms, repairing damaged football 
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equipment, and driving young football players and cheerleaders to the football field. She 
concluded, “I can spend my weekends with scrub brush and detergent, working on football pants. 
And we feel that it is all a real family experience.”
149
 Similarly, one newspaper profiled a “Pop 
Warner mom,” Hazel Besserer, who exemplified this ideal mother who supported Pop Warner 
football without threatening the masculine culture on the field. The article described the types of 
roles considered appropriate for mothers: preparing food and snacks, patching uniforms, 
listening to recitations of plays, doing clerical work, and putting together the league newspaper. 
Ms. Besserer described how the different roles of each family member could make Pop Warner 
football an “all-family deal”: “Little sisters act as cheerleaders. Fathers act as head coaches or 
team fathers. And in addition to dishing out hot dogs (and advice) we gals perform as team 
mothers.”
150
 By offering roles for each member of the family, football represented a means by 
which Americans aspiring to cultural ideals of the suburban, middle-class, heterosexual nuclear 
family could strive to conform.
151
 
Girls who served as cheerleaders for their brothers could also have the opportunity to be 
judged on their poise, personality, and character. The King of Prussia Indians Football Team’s 
competition for the Queen of the First Annual Indian Bowl was held in 1963. “Here are the 
young beauties. . . . See how good you are at judging” offered one newspaper account. The girls, 
aged 9 to 13, were all each a sister of a player on one of the King of Prussia football teams, or a 
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daughter of one of the coaches. In 1963, Deborah Ann Fillman, whose mother coached 
cheerleaders on the 80 pound football team, won the Indian Bowl Queen Crown. Fillman posed 




While mothers scrubbed muddy football pants and sister cheered on the sidelines, fathers 
were responsible for coaching youth players on the field. It was not merely adult supervision that 
was required to ensure player safety, then, but a particular male form of supervision. Male 
coaches and fathers were responsible for overseeing their sons’ safety, but also for making them 
men. Male authority figures needed to “toughen up” their young charges by exposing them to a 
certain amount of risk, while also managing that risk so that children were not harmed. On this 
view, then, a certain level of roughness was beneficial. As a reporter summarized the remarks of 
one university football coach, “Football is a game designed to make men out of boys. It is 
healthy for young men to bump heads on Saturday afternoon.”
153
 
Girls on the Field 
If it was healthy for young men to bump heads on a Saturday afternoon, what about 
young women? Football was framed as the exclusive province of boys and men, and indeed, the 
sport was justified as being designed specifically to turn boys into men. Yet some girls did 
manage, at least temporarily, to participate in high school football in the 1940s and 1950s. The 
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response to the presence of girls on the football field highlighted underlying assumptions about 
the nature of the sport, and ultimately reinforced the prevailing view that football was not an 
acceptable option for girls or women.  
In 1947, 16-year-old Frankie Groves played for Stinnett High School’s football team in 
front of a crowd of 3,000 people. The team’s coach, Truman Johnson, explained that he had 
recruited her after seeing her play in a practice game at a school picnic. Coach Johnson told the 
New York Times that three more girls also wished to join the team. Although contemporary news 
stories marveled that Groves was the first girl to play Texas high school football and that “she 
didn’t even smear her lipstick,” Frankie Groves would later remember the more negative 
reactions from locals who disapproved of her participation. In 1992, she recalled that her 
presence on the football team embarrassed her family and inspired derision and ridicule. “In the 
warmups, they sent an ol’ boy out on the field dressed in a dress with ‘Frankie’ written on his 
back. They went all out to hit me.”
154
 
The response from league administrators was not welcoming, either. Ruling that Groves 
had been ineligible to play and portraying her participation as a publicity stunt, the Texas 
Interscholastic League added a prohibition against girls playing football in its rules for the 
following season. Groves later told the Houston Chronicle that her father resigned from the 
school board as a result of the ensuing controversy, that Coach Johnson was fired at the end of 
the school year, and that for a year her mother was too embarrassed to go out, even to get 
groceries. A 1979 examination of Texas high school football, Rites of Fall, examined how the 
response to this episode shaped the sport: “Thus was Texas high school football made officially 
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pure and simple: a man’s game, reserved for boys. Any feminine involvement would be strictly 




A Broadway comedy of the 1950s, Time Out For Ginger, also explored the possibility of 
girls playing football. Indeed, playwright Ronald Alexander told the New York Times that a news 
item about a Texas girl who played tackle on a boys’ team had inspired the story. Believing that 
critics and audiences would not accept the notion of a girl playing tackle, however, he decided to 
alter the premise for his play and “make her halfback on the boys’ football team. That was much 
more logical.” A girl playing the position of halfback, which involves carrying the ball on a 
running play, seemed more consistent with prevailing gender norms. Presumably, a girl running 




First presented in 1950 as Season With Ginger, the play was later edited and retitled 
before opening on Broadway in 1952 featuring Melvyn Douglas as Ginger’s father.
157
 In the 
story, Ginger, inspired by her father’s statement that “everybody should be allowed to do what 
they want to do,” decides to try out for her school’s football team. The reactions of her family, 
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classmates, and community reflect what an enormously transgressive act her presence in the all-
male sport represented, as well as the possible bases from which her parents could come to terms 
with her decision. In the play, Ginger asserts her freedom of choice and the equality of girls and 
boys, stating, “Every time one boy wants to insult another, he calls him a sissy. And by that they 
imply that girls are inferior to boys.” When the coach finally puts her in the football game, her 
team was winning 34-0, but her teammates wanted her in the match so they could arrange for her 
to score a touchdown. Presumably having a girl teammate score a touchdown against the 
opposing team would further humiliate their losing opponents. “They were laughing so hard, 
they fell flat on their faces. I had to score.” Ginger’s teammates then march with her on their 
shoulders in victorious triumph. As a result, Ginger remains frustrated that they cannot treat her 
as simply another football player: “But Mom, they all treated me like something special, not just 
like anybody carrying the mail.”
158
  
At the play’s conclusion, Ginger reconciles with her boyfriend, and decides to give up the 
sport: “Being a girl is so much fun, I’ve decided to give up football.” Despite this ultimately 
reassuring ending consistent with traditional gender roles, critics who enjoyed the comedy 
nonetheless deemed the notion of a girl football hero highly unrealistic, noting that Ginger 
“actually reaches that status for a few brief and rather fictitious moments.”
159
 Another critic, 
acknowledging that the show was humorous and appealing, nonetheless dubbed it “an utterly far-
fetched, silly sort of play,” and the show was a hit with the public.
160
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It is also worth noting that in the play, Ginger’s mother Agnes, who ultimately supports 
her daughter and even hopes she’ll be “elected Captain of the team,” is the character to voice 
anxiety about the game’s safety. She asks her daughter, “But darling, don’t you realize it’s a 
dangerous game? You might get hurt.”
161
 Even this seemingly unconventional theatrical 
representation of a girl playing football, then, reflected the prevailing view that mothers 
specifically were the people most concerned about the physical risks of the sport. And the play 
was received as an entertaining farce, not as a serious examination of gender roles. 
The sporadic instances of girls attempting to play football on boys’ teams, as well as 
artistic representations of such instances, questioned prevailing assumptions about gender. 
Friends, family, and community members might be outraged, confused, fascinated, or even 
occasionally supportive of girls’ ability to play football. Girls who participated in organized 
football, however, remained rare and temporary curiosities. Schools did not begin to organize 
teams for girls, and girls were generally swiftly excluded from football if they attempted to 
participate. While other sports began to increasingly open their doors for girls and women, 
football remained almost exclusively a male domain. The associated risks and benefits of the 
sport, then, continued to be framed in terms of their impact on boys and men.  
Throughout the history of the sport, educators and doctors had expressed concern about 
the risks of tackle football for boys in the United States. The growth of high school football after 
World War II inspired renewed concerns about the “big business” aspects of the sport and the 
harm it might cause children. Tackle football’s proliferation at even younger ages, an even newer 
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development, fostered a new range of medical and educational concerns, particularly among 
pediatricians. A scattering of incidents, such as player deaths and newspaper exposés, attracted 
public attention and prompted proposals for reining in the sport, even among prominent medical 
and educational professional organizations.  
Yet the calls for limits on tackle football were ultimately obscured by the political and 
social culture of the Cold War. Parental anxieties were repudiated as infantilizing and 
emasculating boys who needed to be exposed to rough, physical contact. Locking children in 
nuclear fallout shelters was even presented as the ridiculous and objectionable alternative to 
allowing boys to tackle one another. “If your boy is or soon intends to be playing high school 
football, your conscience likely has acid indigestion,” one article told parents. “So what shall we 
do? Build a fallout shelter and confine him to a playpen?” Concerns about the safety of football 
could be cast as Cold War anxieties and maternal interference run amok. From coaches to 
American presidents, tackle football was widely celebrated and promoted as a physically and 
morally beneficial sport for boys. To reassure worried mothers, football’s proponents highlighted 
that the organized sport was carefully supervised by adult men. These supervisors—football 
coaches and team physicians—were key constituencies involved in framing youth football safety 
as a medical question, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
162
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Chapter Two: “The Duty of Their Elders” – Doctors, Coaches, Parents, and the Framing of 
Youth Football’s Health Risks, 1950s-1960s 
“Whenever young men gather regularly on green Autumn fields, or Winter ice, or polished floors 
to dispute the physical possession and position of various leather and rubber objects according 
to certain rules, sooner or later somebody is going to get hurt.” 




In 1959, writing for the Journal of School Health, Dr. Carl Willgoose, a professor of 
health and physical education, noted a growing trend of younger football players with some 
concern. He remarked that in Nassau County, New York, a single village league of the Long 
Island Midget Football League would attract hundreds of boys to a call for players. “There is a 
pee wee division for 10 year olds, a junior varsity division for 11 year olds, and a midget division 
for 12 year olds. . . . Football for younger boys may already be here to stay.”
2
 Observing that 
football was becoming a big business even among this younger set of players, and that it raised a 
new and different set of health and safety questions than other team sports such as baseball, 
Willgoose expressed uncertainty as to whether the contact sport of football was a “medically 
sound” option for children. He was concerned not only about physical injuries, such as 
“disclosed and undisclosed fractures,” but also about the emotional health of children playing 
“under the kind of pressure conditions which involve newspaper displays, athletic editorials, 
large adult crowds in attendance, and a game tension comparable to high school or college 
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athletics.” Willgoose concluded with a call for additional research to examine whether the health 
benefits of highly competitive contact sports for young children outweighed the risks.
3
  
The popular press was raising similar questions, with articles aimed at worried parents. 
“He is somewhere between 8 and 14, and he wants to play football. In fact, he is playing football. 
Is it good for him?” opened a 1955 article published in the Chicago Daily Tribune.
4
 With more 
children of this age playing football, this issue was increasingly of public and medical concern. 
To inform their decisions about whether to allow their child to participate in the sport, parents 
solicited medical advice, and also looked to educators, football coaches, and sports 
administrators for their opinion. This chapter examines medical and public health perspectives 
on the safety of youth football in the 1950s and 1960s, and how these in turn were communicated 
by doctors and football coaches to parents and the popular press. 
Both doctors and football coaches were in particularly important positions to influence 
perceptions of the risks of youth football. In the early to mid-twentieth century, there was 
significant overlap between these two groups. Many doctors who conducted early research into 
football injuries were also involved in supervising the sport, either as coaches, team physicians, 
or parents. The tension between promoting football and studying its risks influenced the ways 
many doctors conceived of the sport’s dangers, and it constrained the solutions they proposed. 
As the fields of injury prevention and sports medicine developed as public health and medical 
specialties, the issue of athletic injuries became increasingly visible, and doctors and coaches 
both sought to establish their authority on matters of youth football safety.  
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During this period, largely lacking epidemiological data on risk factors for injuries, 
doctors and coaches instead based their views on the safety of youth football on other sources. 
These included available tabulations of injuries and deaths, extrapolation of this data to younger 
populations, clinical experience, personal experience of the sport, or all of the above. On these 
bases, doctors and coaches also described strategies for making the game safer. Protective 
equipment featured prominently as a key safety strategy, while medical advice to prevent 
football injuries frequently focused on adult supervision. Such advice included recommending 
medical supervision in the form of physical exams and the availability of athletic trainers or 
physicians to youth teams, as well as the involvement of non-medical adults, namely football 
coaches and parents, to supervise youth. This emphasis on adult supervision, which I call a 
“supervisory imperative,” necessarily contained an element of self-interest: doctors and coaches 
argued for expanding the role of doctors and coaches. Yet by the mid-1960s, debates among 
physicians and coaches over the health risks of youth football would increasingly highlight the 
inadequacy of existing data and of protective equipment.  
Medical Uncertainty  
The medical debate over the relative safety of youth football in the 1950s and 1960s was 
decidedly unsettled. This was not because the existence of deaths and injuries associated with 
football had been invisible or ignored until this period. Indeed, as we have seen, doctors and 
football coaches had observed and commented on the health effects of football since its outset. 
This commentary often emphasized the particular vulnerability of youth in playing a violent 
sport. For example, pointing to numerous deaths and severe injuries among football players, a 
1907 editorial in the Journal of the American Medical Association highlighted the deaths at the 




been over 20 years in age, the editorial concluded that there need be no hesitation “in deciding 
that football is no game for boys to play.”
5
  
Through the early decades of the twentieth century, several doctors, often affiliated with 
schools that had football teams, published medical reports on the football injuries that they had 
observed in their practices. Physicians who were most likely to observe youth football injuries 
included orthopedists, surgeons, pediatricians and school physicians. Although colleges were 
more likely to have a school or team physician than middle or high schools, some affluent high 
schools also had physicians who looked after their athletes. Other high schools, particularly 
public high schools, typically did not have the same medical staff or reporting resources of more 
elite prep schools and colleges. Consequently, youth football injuries were probably greatly 
underreported, and published injury counts generally did not include injuries sustained by high 
school players at less affluent high schools.  Nonetheless, these counts represent important early 
efforts at documenting football injuries as a medical concern. 
For example, in the 1930s Dr. Thomas N. Horan served as a resident physician at 
Cranbrook School, a private boys’ preparatory school in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, where 80 
percent of the boys played football. In a 1934 article published in JAMA, Dr. Horan reported on 
the number and types of football injuries he had seen in Cranbrook students playing in the 
previous four football seasons (1930-1933). He observed the most commonly injured regions of 
the body in this group of players (fingers, hands, ankles, muscles, knees) and offered 
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recommendations such as warming up with exercises before games and the use of protective 
padding and Ace bandages.
6
  
At Phillips Academy, an elite preparatory school in Andover, Massachusetts, school 
physician James Roswell Gallagher also reported on the football and other athletic injuries he 
had seen. In 1948, Dr. Gallagher described the injuries he had documented among the school’s 
students during a period of seven years, from 1940 to 1947. He reported that varsity level 
football had the highest incidence of major injuries per player, followed by junior varsity 
football. Combined, Dr. Gallagher added, these two levels of football averaged more than twenty 
times as many major injuries per player as did soccer or lacrosse. He wrote that knee and head 
injuries in football were of particular concern. To prevent knee injuries, Dr. Gallagher suggested 




Head injuries, on the other hand, were more difficult to control. “The best in helmets and 
the proper fitting of helmets is the least, and perhaps the most, that can be done,” acknowledged 
Dr. Gallagher. In this article, Dr. Gallagher insisted that he was not concerned with the relative 
merits of the particular sports he studied, but rather with documenting the types of injuries one 
might expect. In fact, however, he had previously expressed concern about the role of football in 
a school setting. As Heather Munro Prescott has observed in her history of adolescent medicine, 
Dr. Gallagher felt the physical education department at Phillips Academy was more preoccupied 
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with creating a winning football team than fostering physical fitness among all its students. 
Arguing that the program should be redesigned to provide each student with an individualized 
exercise regimen, Dr. Gallagher had persuaded the headmaster to allow him to take control of the 
physical education department. The particular needs Dr. Gallagher observed among his teenaged 
patients, from athletic injuries to mental health concerns, would eventually lead him to become a 
central figure in the development of adolescent medicine.
8
 
At the college level, Dr. Augustus Thorndike, Jr., who served as physician to Harvard 
University’s athletic department beginning in 1926, became one of the most prominent doctors to 
write about his medical findings on the sidelines. In fact, he would eventually contribute to the 
development of sports medicine as a subspecialty. Beginning in the 1930s, Dr. Thorndike 
reported on the incidence of trauma in organized athletics at Harvard College in several articles 
and monographs. In a 1938 article for the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Thorndike 
wrote that he had observed the most serious injuries among college students in unorganized 
skiing, baseball and polo, rather than organized football. Even so, he wrote, more individuals 
were participating in sports, such that more injuries were to be expected, and doctors would need 
to be responsible for preventing recurrent minor injuries to protect athletes’ health.
9
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In 1940, one week after Dr. Thorndike published another review of some of the most 
common athletic-related injuries, Time Magazine published a profile of the doctor’s work. While 
most athletic injuries were slight, Dr. Thorndike told Time, he acknowledged that “more 
accidents occur in football per playing hour than in any other game.” Nonetheless, the Time 
profile stated that there was nobody more vehement than this eminent physician, himself a 
former Harvard football player, about the physical benefits of athletics.
10
 Dr. Thorndike, then, 
along with many other doctors who treated athletic injuries, endorsed and promoted the overall 
benefits of sports. Rather than arguing for limitations on athletic participation, Dr. Thorndike 
supported medical supervision of popular contact sports to protect athletes.  
Dr. Thorndike’s perspective was hardly unique. Doctors overseeing youth athletics 
typically saw their supervisory role as ensuring that participants could continue to enjoy the 
health benefits of organized sports. Of course, the belief in the value of organized sports was 
widespread in American society and among medical professionals. Even those physicians 
without any athletic team affiliations, and those who were most concerned about the physical 
risks of football or boxing for young children, hastened to make clear that athletic competition 
could not and should be eliminated. “Competition is part of our American way of life,” 
emphasized pediatrician George Maksim in a 1958 article in JAMA.
11
  
Yet team physicians occupied a particularly ambivalent position, in some ways 
reminiscent of the dilemma that company doctors faced while studying occupational illnesses. 
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Company doctors’ duty to their employees was in tension with their duty to their patients.
12
 But 
unlike company doctors, who were paid to be held accountable to corporate employers, most 
doctors and coaches serving youth football teams were volunteers. Their potential conflict of 
interest was not financial, but rather ideological, given that the team physician’s very role 
compromised the equipoise that would be needed to assess the real risks of the sport. In other 
words, doctors serving school athletic teams may have consciously or unconsciously 
underestimated the risks of youth football because they believed a priori in the value of the sport.  
In this sense, football coaches were in a somewhat similar position to medical doctors. 
Coaches expressed faith in the value of competitive athletics, of course, but amid public fears of 
the risks, they found it essential to demonstrate that they were addressing injuries. In fact, 
responding to injuries was a means of advocating that football could remain beneficial. At the 
1931 annual meeting of the American Football Coaches Association, Coach John Heisman told 
the rules committee in an open discussion that a number of football-related deaths occurred every 
year, “and what are you going to do about it? You cannot just laugh it off and you cannot just 
argue it off. That is not the way the public and the press are built.”
13
  
In response to ongoing debates and concerns over athletes’ deaths and the sport’s overall 
safety, football coaches themselves sought to track deaths and severe injuries associated with the 
sport. In December 1921, college football coaches had formed the American Football Coaches 
Association (AFCA), in part due to their alarm over the professionalization of the sport. They 
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considered professional football to be “detrimental to the best interests of American football and 
American youth.” At the AFCA’s annual meeting in 1932, president Mal Stevens explained that 
in the past year the organization had deemed it wise to embark on a study of the sport’s safety 
“so that we would be in a position to either answer the criticisms which have been directed at us, 
be able to refute them, or to acknowledge the criticisms as just and try to improve the game from 
a coaching standpoint.” While in the ensuing years the AFCA would make changes to the 
particular format of the survey, the organization continued to collect information on football 
injuries and deaths every year. As a result, since 1931, the AFCA has tabulated the numbers of 
catastrophic injuries and fatalities in football occurring in children and young adults.
14
  
A photograph of Mal Stevens signing a football for two girls at New York’s 1939 World 
Fair indicates a particular public profile that many football coaches enjoyed, particularly at the 
college level (see Figure 3). Football coaches such as John Heisman, Vince Lombardi, and Pop 
Warner could be celebrities in their own right. They thus carried a somewhat ambivalent 
responsibility to be ambassadors for their own sport while also overseeing the physical regimens 
of their players and maintaining the health of their teams. This ambivalence was only further 
compounded when they also had other careers as athletes, physicians, or both. Mal Stevens, a 
former football player as well as a coach, would also go on to a career in orthopedic surgery 
treating sports-related injuries. 
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While the National Federation of High School Athletic Associations (NFHS) did not have 
its own separate survey of injuries and deaths comparable to the AFCA’s, the organization did 
periodically share available statistics with its membership. For example, at its December 1948 
annual meeting, the NFHS shared football injury counts from a study conducted by an insurance 
company, the Security Life and Accident Company of Denver, Colorado. The company reported 
these statistics according to several factors, such as age of player, player’s position, date, and the 
nature of the competition (game versus practice). But these numbers were useful neither for 
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calculating rates, nor for evaluating whether any of these factors were meaningfully associated 
with injuries. For example, the percentages of total football injuries by age appeared to indicate 
that in general, the younger the player, the greater the risk of injury, with the highest percentage 
of injuries occurring among 17-year-olds (see Figure 4). However, as H. V. Porter of the NFHS 
pointed out in reporting this data, the high percentage was “due to the fact that a large majority 
of high school players are of that age.” In fact, without relevant denominators indicating how 
many athletes of each age had played tackle football in total, and how many of the players out of 




Figure 4. Football Injuries by Age, Security Life and Accident Company
17
  
Age Percent of Total Injuries 
Under 16 25.5% 
16 years 28.7% 
17 years 38.5% 
18 years 5.3% 
19 years 1.5% 
20 years 0.5% 
Total 100% 
 
Despite these various death and injury counts, then, systematic epidemiological analyses 
to identify risk factors associated with football injuries and deaths remained limited to 
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nonexistent. In fact, the very notion of injury prevention as a field of public health inquiry was 
rather new. Injury researcher Dr. Jess Kraus, whose professional career in injury epidemiology 
began in the 1950s, recalled that “the literature on epidemiology and injuries before the 1960s 
was sparse.” Studying injuries systematically would require a shift from a prevailing folkloric 
view of injuries as random or unpredictable “acts of God” to an understanding of injuries as 
predictable and preventable occurrences. The prevailing attitude that injuries were “natural” 
mishaps that could not be prevented was evident even in some of the language used by doctors in 
reviewing football injuries and deaths. For instance, in his 1935 review of football injuries, New 
Orleans surgeon Dr. Lucian Landry noted that “the natural hazards of the game still were the 
major cause of all accidents.” Dr. Landry cited one analysis finding that over a quarter of the 
more serious football injuries might have been preventable with greater attention to coaching, the 
players’ condition, and the quality of playing fields. Nonetheless, he contended that the 
remaining majority of football injuries were “natural hazards,” and thus an inherent part of the 
game that one could not expect to prevent.
18
  
Meanwhile, in the larger context of American public health, rather than blaming injuries 
on happenstance or on the carelessness of individuals, in the 1950s and 1960s researchers 
increasingly began to attribute injuries to dangerous environments or poorly designed systems. 
Some historians have analyzed changes in the English language, such as neologisms, to illustrate 
this shift. For instance, John C. Burnham has argued that the very term “childproofing,” which 
emerged in the 1950s, illustrated this new understanding that engineering solutions could 
effectively protect the safety of children. Another particularly important development in injury 
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prevention during the period was increasing attention to preventing automobile-related injuries, 
highlighted by the publication in 1965 of Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed.
19
  
Doctors pointed to such injury efforts in other fields in order to call for similar organized 
efforts to be paid to injuries among athletes. For example, Dr. Augustus Thorndike introduced a 
1956 medical article on sports injuries by pointing to the work of James P. Mitchell, the U.S. 
Secretary of Labor. Mitchell had drawn public attention to the importance of preventing 
occupational injuries and deaths that affected nearly two million workers. Despite continuing 
“appalling numbers,” the disability rate among American workers had declined from 1943 to 
1954, a visible success for industry and insurance companies. Yet, Dr. Thorndike continued, in 
contrast with the organized efforts to prevent injuries and enhance worker safety, “one can 
observe little organized endeavor on the part of coaches, trainers, and others in the field of sport 
to institute training programs along the same lines.”
20
 
In conjunction with the growing prominence of injury prevention in workplaces and on 
the roads, sports medicine and related medical fields began to grow more organized and 
specialized. The National Athletic Trainers’ Association (NATA) was founded in 1950, and the 
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American College of Sports Medicine was founded in 1954.
21
 In 1960, the American Medical 
Association developed a Committee on the Medical Aspects of Sports.
22
 As sports medicine 
developed as a subspecialty, its practitioners would often find themselves confronting the 
competing nature of their obligations. Akin to the ways that the role of team physicians 
influenced the way they perceived the risks of youth football, the field of sports medicine itself 
developed not only with a focus on preventing injuries, but also with the goal of improving 
sports performance. In 1975, for example, several sports medicine experts participated in a 
roundtable discussion of the legal, ethical, and moral questions involved in their field. As one 
panelist, Dr. Sekerak, a general surgeon and team physician for the Cleveland Cavaliers, 
observed, the team physician’s first obligation was to the player. Even so, “the physician also has 
an obligation to the coaches, or in professional teams, the owners, because he must help obtain 
the maximum function of an athlete.” Expressing this perception more colloquially, in 1974 one 
reporter described team physicians as “a combination of Dr. Spock and Dr. Feelgood.”
23
 
Sports medicine thus seemingly occupied a compromised position as a medical field. 
Nonetheless, the medicalization of sports-related injuries lent greater professional authority to 
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trainers and doctors. For example, a 1965 news story would highlight the increasingly 
“scientific” nature of athletic training. Whereas athletic trainers had once primarily dispensed 
aspirin and rubdowns, marveled a Chicago Tribune sports reporter, they now “bandied about and 
absorbed technical terms that would send Dr. Ben Casey scurrying for his medical dictionary.”
24
  
Despite this new scientific appearance, however, large-scale systematic studies of 
football injuries and injury prevention techniques remained rare through the mid-1960s. Doctors 
and coaches had repeatedly called for better data, but medical societies, funding agencies and 
public health organizations had not developed formal centers or programs that would support 
systematic research on youth sports injuries. In 1959, Dr. George B. Logan, who would later 
serve as the president of the American Academy of Pediatrics, remarked that “there is 
remarkably little factual material published on the injury rate among children engaged in various 
sports.”
25
 As late as 1964, the author of an article in JAMA on high school football injuries 
observed that “no data have been gathered which demonstrate which parts of the game or 
equipment are responsible for the injuries.”
26
 As one 1966 report from the American Academy of 
Pediatrics stated,  
The fact that 65 deaths in high school age boys from 1960 through 1964 resulted directly 
from participation in high school football suggests the need for preventive measures and 
adequate medical supervision. The actual amount of morbidity and mortality is unknown 
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but is significant enough to raise serious questions about contact sports for youth who are 
too young, physically inadequate, or improperly protected by inadequate gear.
27
 
Even without clear data, several leading medical and educational organizations felt 
compelled to take a stand against football for prepubescent children. In 1953, the National 
Education Association (NEA) hosted a two day conference in Washington, DC on program 
planning in games and sports for young children. The 44 delegates in attendance ultimately 
recommended banning football and other contact sports for children aged twelve and younger. 
Dr. George Maksim, representing the American Academy of Pediatrics, argued that “the risk of 
permanent bone and joint injuries is just too great.” Joe Tomlin, who represented Pop Warner 
football at the conference, was the lone representative to vote against recommending a ban on 
football and other body contact sports. As reported by J. Bertram Kessel, coordinator of the 
conference, Tomlin stated that he had founded Pop Warner “to get the children off sandlots and 
into a supervised program that stressed proper equipment and coaching.”
28
  
Leaders of youth football leagues naturally dissented from banning football, but leading 
medical organizations did not share their endorsement of the overall benefits of organized 
football for youngsters. In 1957, the American Academy of Pediatrics’ Committee on School 
Health, which had been founded in 1931, published a policy statement on competitive athletics 
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for children twelve years or younger.
29
 According to the statement, due to children’s 
susceptibility to bone and joint injuries, “body-contact sports, particularly tackle football and 
boxing, are considered to have no place in programs for children of this age.”
30
  
Doctors and educators who believed that any permanent deformity resulting from youth 
football was an unjustified risk had little data to indicate just how severe or minimal this risk 
might be. Nonetheless, during this period the medical concerns about football for growing 
children focused a great deal of attention on bone and joint injuries. Consequently, in addition to 
pediatricians, orthopedists were particularly vocal in their opposition to tackle football. Of 403 
orthopedists who responded to a 1947 questionnaire on the safety of competitive sports, only 19 
indicated that they considered football safe for participation for the junior high school age group. 
Yet 153 respondents considered boxing safe, and 235 approved of touch football.
31
 The author of 
this questionnaire included a space for comments, and quoted one survey respondent as saying, 
“I believe it is a tragic situation when any school permits the students to participate in football in 
the 10th grade or below.”
32
   
In 1960, Time Magazine ran an article examining doctors’ perspectives on organized 
sports, and quoted several physicians emphasizing that collision sports such as football could not 
be made appropriate for children. “Cutting down the field and changing the rules doesn't make 
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football a kid's sport.”
33
 The November 1960 Bulletin of Westchester County’s Medical Society 
published an editorial calling for limiting football among pre-adolescent children, stating that 
“one permanent deformity as a result of such activity is an unwarranted risk.”
34
 According to 
Hollis Fait, an instructor in physical education at East Oregon College of Education, “almost 
without exception the literature which has appeared has been in opposition. Many physical 
educators and professional groups have gone on record opposing interscholastic competition for 
pupils below the tenth grade. Yet the practice continues.”
35
  
The Burden of Proof 
Who had the authority to interpret the available evidence and evaluate the risks and 
benefits of youth football? A comparison between the perspectives of Dr. John Reichert, an 
assistant professor of pediatrics at Northwestern University Medical School, and Creighton Hale, 
the director of research and vice president of Little League Baseball, Inc., illustrates this fiercely 
contentious issue. In 1958 and 1959, Dr. Reichert and Hale each authored lengthy examinations 
of existing research on competitive athletics for young children. The contrast between their 
interpretations of the limited available evidence reveals a contest over which evidence was 
considered reliable, who had the authority to best interpret the evidence, and also where the 
burden of proof ought to lie in evaluating the benefits and risks of competitive sports.  
As an assistant professor of pediatrics, previous chair of the American Academy of 
Pediatrics’ Committee on School Health, and member of the city of Chicago’s Board of 
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Education, Dr. Reichert had exhibited an extensive interest in school health. In 1958, the 
prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association published an article by Dr. Reichert in 
which he characterized his perspective on the debate over competitive athletics for children 
younger than thirteen. While acknowledging that the lines were not too clearly drawn, he 
nonetheless described two rather distinct groups as standing on each side of the issue. On one 
side, Dr. Reichert wrote, were people who believed that some limitations should be placed on 
competitive athletics for young children: “In this group are the majority of educators and 
physicians who have studied the issue.” On the other side stood a group largely composed of 
“sports promoters, professional athletes, sports fans, and some coaches,” who considered highly 
organized and competitive sports desirable for young children. Dr. Reichert observed that more 
research would be needed to clarify the long term impact of athletic competition, but in the 




In the face of scientific uncertainty, then, Dr. Reichert counseled that the preponderance 
of medical opinion favored a precautious approach. Much of this uncertainty specifically 
centered on the health benefits and safety of tackle football. As safer alternatives to the tackle 
sport, Dr. Reichert recommended touch or flag football for children. To support this opinion, he 
cited a personal communication from Dr. Eddie Anderson to Dr. Fred Hein, both physicians with 
interest and experience in youth health and fitness. Dr. Anderson had observed that touch 
football would be a better training program for pre-teenagers than tackle football. In fact, Dr. 
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Anderson was a successful college football coach at the College of the Holy Cross who had also 
earned a medical degree, and who would later be inducted into the College Football Hall of 
Fame. These experiences lent him credibility as an authority on both football and health. Further 
citing a handbook of the National Federation of High School Athletic Associations, Reichert 
wrote that “about 60% of all injuries occurring in tackle football occur while tackling or being 
tackled,” and that a switch to supervised touch or flag football would eliminate these injuries. He 
concluded that his recommendations were based on “the considered judgment of the majority of 
capable professional educators and physicians who have studied the problem.”
37
 
Not surprisingly, sports organizers disputed such assessments. Creighton Hale, vice 
president of Little League Baseball, Inc., characterized efforts to discourage competitive athletics 
for pre-high school age children as a “crusade.” Hale, a prominent youth sports administrator, 
was also a physiologist with interests in sports safety research. Hale was a former athlete 
himself, having attended the University of Nebraska on a track scholarship. Before joining the 
Little League organization as its director of research in 1955, Hale had earned a doctorate in 
physiology and conducted research at Springfield College. He would design a batting helmet to 
cover the full head and ears, and would later serve as the president of Little League.
38
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 Hale’s 1959 article for the Journal of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation 
observed that medical professionals’ studies had thus far been largely limited to opinion pieces 
and review articles. Hale criticized how “the armchair philosophers and the encyclopedic 
researchers, utilizing their intuitive knowledge and the crystal ball,” had transformed competitive 
athletics for young children into the most controversial topic of the 1950s for the American 
Association of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation. Though he argued that more studies 
were needed to determine the educational value of competitive athletics, Hale nonetheless 
contended that the available research was favorable toward athletic competition. He wrote that 
children who participated in competitive sports attained higher social status and prestige, and that 
they were more likely to exhibit many “desirable personality traits,” such as cooperation, 
confidence, leadership, sportsmanship, and sociability. While the children who participated in 
sports such as football and baseball were primarily boys, Hale also cited research indicating that 
girls with experience in athletics experienced similar social benefits, such as showing improved 
leadership qualities, greater activity in clubs, and improved emotional stability.
39
  
Concluding that children benefited considerably from competitive athletics, Hale asserted 
that “normal” children would not be harmed by strenuous physical activity. To support this 
claim, Hale did not primarily address concerns about injuries, but rather sought to refute beliefs 
that strenuous activity might damage children’s hearts or hinder their growth. He cited several 
physiological studies on the development of the heart and arteries in children, and concluded that 
human hearts were protected by “certain safety valves which prevent physiological trauma 
during and following strenuous activity.” To defend against claims that interscholastic sports 
might harm children’s growth, he cited several studies of the rate of physical growth in youth 
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who participated in athletics compared to those who did not. The findings of these studies were 
mixed, and Hale further acknowledged that differential rates of maturation in children of the 
same age meant that child athletes needed to be carefully matched against competitors of a 
similar developmental stage to prevent injury. Nonetheless, for Hale, the existence of studies 
finding that youth athletes were taller and heavier than their non-athlete counterparts was 
sufficient to discount concerns about the impact of athletics on growth. “What is impossible to 
explain, if competitive athletics do retard growth, is why athletes are larger than nonathletes.”
40
  
Both Dr. Reichert and Hale, then, acknowledged a lack of research evidence and 
critiqued the debate over competitive sports for youth as being based in emotion rather than fact. 
Yet they reached very different interpretations of the available research. At the outset of his 
article, Hale suggested that personal experience playing sports and male gender—two factors 
which were certainly not independent of one another in the 1950s—lent those making claims 
about sports safety greater authority and credibility. He implied that those seeking to place limits 
upon competitive sports for children were biased against athletics, casting suspicion on the basis 
for their concerns: “It has been established that women are less favorable toward athletic 
competition than men and that people who have not had athletic experience are less favorable 
toward competition than those having this experience.” Hale’s arguments were further based on 
the view that the burden of proof lay with doctors and educators to clearly demonstrate 
detrimental effects of competitive sports on children. He considered that the limited and 
inconsistent medical evidence on the harmful health effects of youth sports, even sports as 
seemingly dangerous as boxing, failed to meet this standard.
41
  









Dr. Reichert, on the other hand, elevated the authority of medical and educational 
professionals to assess the health effects of sports over the views of athletes, sports coaches or 
sports administrators. He recommended that children should participate in safer, alternative 
sports in the absence of evidence demonstrating that full body contact sports were not harmful. 
Perhaps most strikingly, Dr. Reichert challenged not only evidence and claims in favor of the 
benefits of competitive athletics, but also beliefs that adults could effectively mitigate the risks of 
injuries. Arguing that the notion that “injuries can be insignificant with adequate and intelligent 
adult supervision” contained numerous fallacies, Dr. Reichert asserted that children were 
susceptible to bone and joint injuries, as well as organ damage that might not be evident at the 
time of injury, but could manifest itself weeks or even years later. Even the most careful adult 
supervision could not control such risks. Dr. Reichert concluded that immature children’s bodies 
were too vulnerable to safely engage in body contact sports such as football or boxing, and that 
“the burden of proof rests with those who disagree.”
42
 
Team Physicians, Medical Supervision, and Promoting a “Wholesome” Sport  
Among his numerous arguments, Dr. Reichert had highlighted and disagreed with a 
prevailing assumption that adequate adult supervision of sports would reduce player injuries. He 
likely emphasized this point in response to the prevailing belief that organized sports were safer. 
The notion that adult-organized athletics were safer for children than playing in unsupervised 
sandlot games underlay much medical and coaching advice about how to effectively prevent 
injuries. Indeed, many doctors had asserted this belief as fact in the medical and education 
literature without supporting data. For instance, in 1947 an orthopedic surgeon wrote that “sand 
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lot” games were “far more dangerous than supervised school competition where children should 
be well matched and taught how to defend and protect themselves.”
43
 On this view, adults 
protected children by ensuring that only players of a similar age and size competed against each 
other, and by instructing young athletes in football techniques. Such techniques included, for 
instance, coaching children in how to fall so that they would not land on their heads or necks, 
hitting other players with their shoulders instead of their heads, and always keeping their necks 
straight (never bent up or down) as they hit.
44
 
Personal involvement in football as a parent, coach, team physician, or trainer often 
motivated physicians to examine the sport’s medical aspects. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
physicians commenting from this perspective typically endorsed the importance of supervision. 
This emphasis also shaped the interpretation of the data that were available. A pre-existing 
involvement with the sport helped inspire physicians to consider the medical aspects of football 
as an important and worthwhile subject of study. On the other hand, these physicians would be 
unlikely to consider banning or limiting football. They instead generally regarded the sport as 
beneficial overall, with careful medical management sufficient to mitigate the risk of injuries. 
For instance, Dr. Joseph H. Burnett worked as a physician at Boston City Hospital and 
served as the attending physician for schoolboy games at Dorchester, Massachusetts, for many 
years. Players gave him the nickname “Hot Towels Burnett” for his standard treatment for 
bumps and bruises.
45
 His research on football safety focused on high school and college players. 
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In a 1940 article published in the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr. Burnett compared rates 
of injuries among Harvard College players versus Boston high school teams. He attributed 
differences in the percentages of injuries to the former setting having far more supervision than 
the latter setting. Dr. Burnett asserted that the worst injuries evidently occurred during 
unorganized games. “This type of play is unsafe, produces serious injuries and gives football an 
unjustified reputation as a dangerous game.”
46
  
Burnett therefore advocated for “a campaign of education and helpful advice” to respond 
to the risks of unregulated play, writing that adult supervision, adequate playing equipment, and 
removing injured or tired players from the game would help eliminate serious injuries. He 
extrapolated both his findings and advice based on older players to younger ones. He therefore 
praised fathers in Belmont, Massachusetts for organizing their 8- to 14-year old sons into teams 
and supervising their matches as an ideal strategy for preventing injuries in this age group. 
Burnett concluded that with such supervision, football was “certainly worth while,” adding that 
“young America will play football, with or without helpful supervision, so that it is the duty of 
their elders to help regulate the playing of juveniles.”
47
  
Among the elders regulating the youth game—coaches, parents, trainers, and doctors—
doctors unsurprisingly argued that team physicians should be the primary medical supervisors of 
the sport. Team physicians’ duties included conducting physical exams of players before the 
season began, as well as observing and treating players as necessary throughout the course of the 
season. Dr. James Daly argued that physical examinations were especially important in football, 
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because while all boys ought to have the opportunity to participate in athletics, tackle football 
was especially rough and dangerous. As a result, “it would be a serious mistake to include 
football for boys without real aptitude.”
48
 Physicians, then, would need to determine which boys 
possessed sufficient “real aptitude” to be able to safely participate. 
Physicians also argued that they ought to be granted the final authority in diagnosing and 
treating any injuries that might arise during play, whether minor or severe. “The team physician's 
prerogatives of early diagnosis and treatment must not be usurped by coach or trainer, lest a 
minor injury become aggravated by continued play, causing a long period of disability,” 
explained Dr. Thorndike. He argued that doctors were essential to early detection of injury, 
because coaches were understandably and necessarily primarily interested “in the technical 
perfection of team and position play,” and thus could not be expected “to spot a limping or arm-
weary player.” Adult supervision of youth football therefore required a clear division of labor, 
and medical oversight separated from coaching responsibilities was crucial.
49
  
In a 1957 article, orthopedist Rodney Atsatt described his 25 years of experience serving 
as football team physician at Santa Barbara High School in California. In addition to reviewing 
several kinds of specialized first aid involved in addressing football injuries, from treating a 
charley horse to taping ankles, Dr. Atsatt offered broader thoughts on the role a physician should 
play. In particular, he described how a team physician should ideally collaborate with a coach in 
serving a football team. He wrote that a football coach ought to have “complete confidence in the 
doctor’s judgment,” not only in deciding whether it was safe for a boy to continue playing, but 
also in “matters of psychology.” To address the latter issue, he described how he would observe 
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the boys’ attitude while taping their knees and ankles prior to games and relay his impressions to 
the coach. Dr. Atsatt proudly noted that his resulting observations would influence the coach’s 
pep talk to the players. He provided an example of how, after he advised the coach to appeal to 




While clearly advocating for the authority and independence of a team physician, then, 
Dr. Atsatt also implied that the team physician might assist with the team’s success on the field 
by advising the coach. In his discussion of his approach to managing concussions during games, 
he also acknowledged the presence and perception of spectators. He advised that after a hard 
blow where a player emerged with “wooziness” but did not lose consciousness, the doctor ought 
to carefully observe the athlete but need not remove him from play. But if a player were “really 
out cold” on the field, he ought to always be brought off on a stretcher, Dr. Atsatt explained, in 
case the athlete had sustained a possible neck injury. Moreover, “it is very bad from the 
standpoint of the spectators to see a semiconscious boy walked off the field with his head 
bobbing from side to side, to say nothing of the possibility of further serious damage to the 
patient.” In this way, a team physician not only worked to protect the health of football players, 
but also to prevent the unfolding of an unpleasant and disturbing scene following a serious 
injury, and to reassure the spectators on the sideline that the situation was under control.
51
 
In addition to the assumption that adult supervision was a key factor in youth football 
safety, related beliefs about the social value of the sport shaped medical advice. In a 1956 guest 
editorial published in JAMA, Dr. Allan Ryan characterized the American Medical Association as 
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working with educators and coaches to highlight “the character-building advantages of football” 
while minimizing “the danger of young boys playing too many games in one season.” Ryan 
portrayed football as a healthy sport for building boys’ bodies and promoting teamwork, but one 
that could be dangerous, even “a killer and a maimer,” without medical supervision. He 
advocated for regular physical examinations of players conducted by physicians, properly fitting 
uniforms, and pre-play warm-ups as effective means to preserve the benefits of the “wholesome 
and valuable” sport.
52
 In other words, adult supervision not only prevented physical injuries, but 
also helped shape moral, emotionally healthy, “wholesome” boys. 
Coaches and league administrators defended and promoted the sport in very similar 
terms. For example, Don C. Osgood, president of the East Fullerton Midget Football League, 
told a Los Angeles Times reporter that youth football was “becoming a safe, wholesome sport for 
the grade school youngster” because games were “under the strict supervision and the safeguards 
imposed by the mothers and fathers themselves and by the Pop Warner Midget Football 
Association of America.”
53
 Indeed, promoters of Pop Warner and other youth football leagues 
made remarkable claims for the safety of the sport. As Osgood continued in his remarks, “Unlike 
sand-lot football in which injuries sometimes mar contests, Pop Warner League is amazingly free 
of mishaps. . . . When healthy boys meet in a body-contact sport such as football, there’s not 
much chance of a serious injury.”
54
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Yet not all doctors were entirely convinced by claims that “the sport is as safe for 
youngsters as for their older brethren.” Citing a study of high school football injuries, Dr. Fred 
Hein wrote that “the younger and greener a youth,” the more likely he was to sustain an injury.
55
 
Yet other doctors contended that football experience and skills did not appear to confer any 
particular protection. A 1962 examination of high school football injuries in California found 
that “head injuries occurred, for the most part, in players whose ability was considered excellent 
or good.”
56
 Further, some doctors questioned the adequacy of physical examinations as a means 
to identify children who should not play the sport and thereby prevent injuries. An attendee at a 
1962 conference on head injuries reported seeing 120 boys processed in the space of three hours, 
and observed that this time was inadequate to thoroughly examine so many participants. It was 




Nonetheless, with many doctors, coaches, and league administrators publicly highlighting 
adult supervision as the key to ensuring that tackle football remained safe and wholesome, many 
parents also increasingly insisted on adult supervision in order to protect their children athletes. 
Indeed, to some parents, only the presence of adults could make football suitable for 
prepubescent children. As one father told the Chicago Daily Tribune, “You hear a lot about these 
kids being too young for this game, but with the supervision and rules in Pop Warner football 
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 This desire for supervision to promote safety was not limited to the smallest 
players, however, but extended through the high school level. For instance, in 1956, three 
hundred parents signed a petition presented to the Board of Education in Los Angeles, 




The collection and reporting of sports safety data was not, in itself, a neutral activity; 
injury counts could be used to serve specific purposes. The Long Island Midget Football League 
kept its own statistics to reassure worried parents that the game was not dangerous. In 1956, they 
reported that in the previous year, among 288 players who had participated in a total of 9,706 
boy-practice hours and 418 game hours, only eight injuries were reported. Neither the nature of 
these injuries nor the methods for reporting them are described. Yet these figures were shared not 
only to provide evidence of the sport’s safety, but also to suggest the importance of supervision. 
Indeed, the New York Times journalist who reported these figures concluded his article by 
asserting, “It is reasonable to assume that many more injuries would have resulted if the same 




Several historians and philosophers of medicine have discussed the notion of a 
“technological imperative” prevailing in medicine, particularly in the United States. This concept 
includes among its several definitions the notion of a strong faith in, focus on, and proliferation 
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of technological approaches to address medical problems.
61
 In youth football during this period, 
there might be said to exist a “supervisory imperative”: a prevailing belief that adult supervision 
was necessary and sufficient to provide for youth football safety. Ensuring such supervision was 
promoted as a primary approach to address youth football injuries. The investment of coaches 
and team physicians in the sport of football influenced not only their understanding of risks but 
also the solutions they promoted to address safety concerns. Coaches and doctors recommended 
the involvement of more coaches and doctors, and the supposed need for supervision in turn 
justified the existence and expansion of organized youth leagues run by adults. 
Putting the Risks in Context 
What did it mean for youth football to be considered safe? What exactly were the risks 
for children playing tackle football on fields across the United States in the 1960s? Debates and 
discussions over the safety of football commonly featured efforts to place the risks of football in 
the context of other ubiquitous activities in American life. Despite having little epidemiological 
data available to substantiate these comparisons, these analogies frequently featured in both 
defenses and denouncements of the sport. In fact, the lack of data may have facilitated the use of 
such comparisons, and it often made them more difficult to refute. These analogies functioned as 
a strategy to understand and frame the risks in ways that people could more easily comprehend.  
Drawing on their experiences and anecdotal observations, doctors and football coaches 
portrayed football as a “reasonably safe” sport in the context of other American activities, from 
horse racing to water sports. Boxing served as a particularly common foil to football, often 
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serving to make the risks of football seem relatively tame by comparison, though sometimes 
serving to highlight football’s dangers. Given the discrepancies in the quality of available data on 
the sports’ risks, the resulting claims could prove highly contradictory. The author of one 1951 
article decrying the dangers of boxing asserted without a citation that “professional boxing is 83 
times more deadly than high school football and 50 times more deadly than college football.”
62
 A 
1951 analysis published in JAMA, however, found that boxing competitions “produced far fewer 
deaths, in proportion to the number of participants, than occur in baseball or football.”
63
  
Boxing was also held up as a cautionary tale of what might befall youth football if the 
risks of injury could not be controlled. While the waning of professional boxing has been 
attributed by historians to economic factors rather than moral disapprobation, concerns over 
boys’ physical and moral well-being undoubtedly surrounded the sport at the youth level.
64
 As 
the author of one analysis of high school football safety equipment warned: “The sport of boxing 
is on the verge of being outlawed because of injury to the human body. . . . The sport of football 
could find itself in the same precarious situation in which boxing exists today if the coaching 
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 Jeffrey Sammons argues that the enormous growth of the television industry rendered boxing a less attractive and 
necessary form of programming, with major networks cutting back on telecasts and NBC becoming the first to drop 
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Orthopedic surgeon Mal Stevens compared football to boxing and a wide range of other 
popular activities to assert that football was not a dangerous sport. Stevens, who had served as 
president of the American Football Coaches Association for a one-year term in 1931, had helped 
initiate the AFCA’s collection of data on football-related fatalities and catastrophic injuries under 
his presidency. In 1962, he told readers of the Boston Globe that football was “safer than most 
water sports, less of a physical strain than basketball or tennis, less punishing than boxing. 
Football demands less stamina than soccer. There is more danger in being hit by a baseball, or 
being knocked from a racing horse, than being hit with a football or being tackled while running 
with one.” Stevens further argued that while bruises and minor cuts were an inherent part of 
football, serious injuries and deaths were not, and they could be prevented.
66
   
One of the most common comparisons employed in both academic literature and 
newspapers involved driving. Comparisons of the hazards of the road to those of the football 
field were almost always employed to portray football in a positive light, and this argument had a 
long history. As early as 1933, two doctors, including college football coach Mal Stevens, 
claimed that “the inherent dangers of football have been greatly exaggerated” and reassured 
concerned readers that “the majority of coaches have never seen a football fatality. . . . In our 
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experience it is definitely more dangerous to drive to the Yale Bowl as a spectator than it is to 
play football the entire season.”
67
  
In the 1950s, the risks of driving were often highlighted as particularly hazardous for 
teenage boys. In a column for the Baltimore Sun, Lou Little, a former president of the AFCA and 
a Columbia University football coach, asserted that “the injury rate for the millions of boys who 
play football is very low, and the fatality rate is 15 times smaller than that from walking around 
outdoors and driving in the family car.”
68
 While the original source for this figure remains 
unclear, the “15 times safer than driving” claim circulated among football coaches. In an article 
arguing that the advantages of football heavily outweighed the dangers, football coach Charles 
Mather asserted that for teenagers it was “approximately 15 times safer to play football than to 
be a pedestrian or driver of an automobile!”
69
 This figure bolstered the argument that if parents 
allowed their boys to drive a car, or even to ride in one, they could not reasonably oppose their 
son’s desire to participate in football.  
A more precise comparison of the risks of driving and football, focused on fatalities 
rather than injuries, was later published in the medical literature. In 1964, Floyd Eastwood, who 
chaired the AFCA’s survey committee on football fatalities from 1942 to 1964, reported the 
results of the annual survey in the New England Journal of Medicine. In addition to comparing 
the number of football fatalities with deaths from firearms and drowning, he specifically noted 
the number of motor vehicle deaths among teenagers and young adults. “It has been estimated 
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that for the group fifteen to twenty-five years of age there is approximately 1 football fatality for 
265.5 deaths associated with motor vehicles (August to January) . . . . This relative comparison 
indicates that other activities are more hazardous (fatal) than football.”
70
 
These figures did not, of course, capture the potentially catastrophic non-fatal hazards of 
football, such as spinal cord injuries or even paralysis.  Furthermore, without a denominator, the 
raw numbers did not represent the level of risk relative to the number of participants or time 
spent engaged in the activities being compared. Other researchers, however, did seek to calculate 
fatality rates using the number of high school students participating in football and driving. 
Using data from the 1963 football season, orthopedic surgeon A. Ross Davis estimated 1.5 
deaths per 100,000 high school students playing football, compared to approximately 21 deaths 
per 100,000 high school students from automobile accidents. Davis interpreted these rates as 




As did Lou Little and other football coaches, medical doctors communicated these 
comparisons to major American newspapers. With similar figures for football but a higher rate of 
deaths among teenaged drivers than Dr. Ross had reported, Dr. Stephen Reid told the New York 
Times that the fatality rate in high school football “was only 1.62 per 100,000 players compared 
with 57 per 100,000 for male automobile drivers between 15 and 19 years of age.”
72
 These 
various claims made by medical professionals, football coaches, and sports administrators 
circulated in the media and influenced public perceptions of the risks of football. Parents who 
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allowed their sons to participate in tackle football echoed the driving comparison. The Los 
Angeles Times noted, ‘A father reflects the sentiments of other dads when he says “they’re safer 
than if they were in an auto on a highway.’”
73
 In 1962, Coach Fred Parks of Oak Lawn told the 
Chicago Daily Tribune, “As a father and as a coach, I would a million times rather have my son 
on the football field than riding around in an automobile.”
74
  
Such comparisons, whether made by parents, coaches or doctors, relied on a false 
dichotomy: playing football and riding in a car were not mutually exclusive options for boys. 
The quality and sources of the data used in presenting such flawed comparisons were also 
questionable. In 1966, Dr. Kenneth S. Clarke of the American Medical Association’s Department 
of Health Education critiqued the careless use of statistics in debates over the safety of youth 
sports. In an article for JAMA he sought “to bring more professional sensitivity to this concern” 
by more judiciously tabulating outcomes and incorporating key variables such as the number of 
participants in the activity and how often they were exposed to the risk.  
In particular, Dr. Clarke observed that the American Football Coaches Association and 
the National Federation of State High School Athletic Associations relied on counts of football 
fatalities that distinguished between “direct” and “indirect” football-related deaths. These 
organizations considered fatalities caused by injuries sustained while playing football to be 
direct, whereas football-related deaths attributed to systematic failure, such as heat strokes, were 
categorized as indirect. These counts were widely promulgated. In particular, a 1965 Statistical 
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Bulletin published by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, relying on the AFCA’s counts, 
drew media attention. This report observed that the overall number of deaths “directly” 
associated with football among high school and college players had increased between 1955–
1959 and 1960–1964 (see Figure 5).
75
 
Figure 5. Number of Accidental Deaths Due to Football, Metropolitan Life, 1965
76
 
Type of Game Direct Causes Indirect Causes 
1955-59 1960-64 1955-59 1960-64 
Sandlot 19 13 4 10 
High School 49 66 18 34 
College 6 12 4 7 
Professional and 
Semi-professional 
4 4 1 2 
Total 78 95 27 53 
 
Dr. Clarke considered such classifications to be misleading, especially because they were 
strongly “influenced by the specificity of information provided by a voluntarily returned 
questionnaire” sent to the coaches or athletic directors. Furthermore, “few would argue that the 
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heat-stroke deaths in the first week of football practice are not ‘directly’ related to going out for 
football.” Rather than focusing merely on the counts of deaths sustained while playing football 
as compared to other activities, Dr. Clarke suggested the actuarial question: “Does a young male 
increase his statistical risk of death by announcing his candidacy for football?”
77
 
After reviewing significant pitfalls in interpreting the available statistics, Dr. Clarke 
sought to build a different model incorporating exposure estimates based on a range of 
assumptions (specifically a high school football season lasting 11 weeks, with two hour-long 
practices scheduled five days per week, and further accounting for periodic player absences due 
to injuries). He then compared the resulting fatality rate per hours of exposure to the fatality rate 
associated with “daily living” and with motoring; he found in his analysis that the football 
fatality rate was higher in both cases. Dr. Clarke did not use his analysis to advocate for or 
against youth football, but rather to argue that such calculations of fatality rates did not indicate 
whether the hazards outweighed the benefits of any of the examined activities. He added, 
furthermore, that one could not know what a football athlete might have otherwise chosen to do 
had he not participated in football. But “certainly, he would not choose football over riding in a 
car on the basis of the relative risk of death resulting from this exercise.”
78
 
Proponents of youth football who continually pointed to the risks of driving were 
certainly not alone in attempting to compare the risks of the sport to other dangerous activities. 
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To portray football in a less favorable light, one doctor turned to comparisons to occupational 
hazards. In 1963, physician Frank Tabrah examined the risk of disabling injury in high school 
football as compared to underground coal mining in a paper provocatively titled “High School 
Football: Valuable Sport or Sado-Masochistic Excess?”  As suggested by the paper’s title, 
Tabrah employed the coal mining comparison to contend that football was not a valuable sport 
given the risks. In his analysis, he compared 1962 data on high school football injury rates in two 
Hawaiian high schools with injury rates in high risk occupations such as logging, mining, and 
construction. Tabrah made the incredible claim that the frequency of injuries in football was 




In addition to asserting that the hazards of football outweighed the benefits, Tabrah 
further argued that football was not worthwhile because so few athletes continued to play the 
sport past their school years. “Astonishing amounts of time and effort are expended on a sport 
skill that virtually no one utilizes after high school or college age.” Tabrah argued that activities 
in which people might engage throughout their middle age and older years, such as tennis or 
swimming, should be prioritized over football and other risky sports predominately played by 
adolescents and young adults. This notion that “lifetime” sports should take precedence in 
physical education programs would continue to feature in debates over the safety and worth of 
youth football. 
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Yet Tabrah’s view was a distinctly minority opinion. In addition to the hundreds of 
thousands of parents who enrolled their sons in football programs, many medical professionals 
also endorsed the notion that the risks of serious injury or death were small compared to the 
benefits. A. Ross Davis, the orthopedic surgeon, reviewed athletic injuries in the Houston 
Independent School District, where football commanded the largest number of participants 
among the sports on offer. Acknowledging that some athletic injuries requiring treatment were 
inevitable, Dr. Davis concluded that overall these injuries were “not so severe as to negate the 
obvious advantages of participating.”
80
  
The particular benefits Dr. Davis highlighted included that children were participating in 
organized activities “rather than spending their afternoons in leisure and in the corner drug 
stores.”
81
  Writing for the Journal of the Medical Association of Georgia, Dr. Fred Allman, an 
orthopedic surgeon and sports medicine pioneer, similarly highlighted the moral and social 
advantages of sports. In describing the risks and benefits of competitive sports for boys younger 
than fifteen, he contrasted the value of organized athletics with alternative activities for youths. 
Dr. Allman wrote that in 1965, a ten-week YMCA tackle football program served 1,450 boys in 
grades two through seven, with only 31 recorded injuries, of which only six were fractures. 
During the same period, Dr. Allman asserted, a similar number of boys would have surely been 
injured falling from trees, riding bicycles, or even being hit by a car. Furthermore, “some might 
have even had time to engage in a mischievous act or embarked on a career in crime.” He 
approvingly quoted former president Herbert Hoover as stating, “Next to religion, sports are the 
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greatest developer of morals.”
82
 Tackle football was surely worth the risk if the alternative was 
for boys to embark upon a life of crime. To some extent, then, the belief in the moral benefits of 
football rendered moot the concerns about the sport’s physical risks. Few physical costs could 
outweigh the perceived social benefits of football when the sport was framed as a fundamental 
defense against delinquency and immorality among youth. 
 Football coaches and newspapers helped translate such perspectives on the moral and 
health benefits of football for the general public. In 1962, the Chicago Daily Tribune examined 
high school football safety by surveying 160 Illinois high school coaches. Addressed to parents, 
the article explicitly characterized the question as a matter of weighing the physical and moral 
benefits of football with the potential for injury. “Will the bone-crunching game of football make 
a man or a cripple out of your high school age son?” the newspaper asked its readers. “The 
answer, Mom and Dad, is very much up to you.”
83
  
Reporting that most football coaches did not think that football injuries were increasing, 
despite “scare statistics,” most of the article instead consisted of advice to parents to keep their 
sons safe. The list of rules included making sure their sons reached peak physical condition 
before the football pre-season, checking their son’s equipment for proper fit, not pampering their 
son “over minor bruises,” and not seeking to advise the coach or school’s athletic director. While 
parents were expected to investigate any possible injuries their child may have sustained, one 
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coach advised that “players and parents not be so injury conscious that they regard every 
hangnail as a catastrophe.” Players and parents ought not to overly fret about minor injuries, and 
they also needed to take responsibility for learning the basics of the sport.
84
  
In another article, football coach Lou Little similarly advised fathers that a little “home-
coaching” on their part would help eliminate bad habits and prevent injuries. “Football’s safety 
principles are so few in number and so easy to grasp that it’s foolish for a boy to be hurt for lack 
of knowing them.”
85
 Meanwhile, the president of a youth football league in California claimed 
that injuries were highly unusual, suggesting that those that did occur were attributable to the 
poor physical condition of individual players. He told the Los Angeles Times that “the rare 
instances in which injury has occurred have been traced to a team permitting an overweight boy 
to play.”
86
 Such articles not only served to minimize the potential risks of football, but also to 
largely transfer the responsibility for addressing these risks from sports organizations and 
coaches to the parents and even players themselves. The 1962 Chicago Daily Tribune article 
concluded that tackle football could be “just about as safe as Mom and Dad care to make it.”
87
  
Mechanism of Injury, Coaching Methods, and Spearing 
              In addition to emphasizing the importance of parental supervision, doctors and coaches 
also considered whether particular football techniques might be contributing to especially severe 
injuries. In a 1959 article examining the mechanics of football injuries, orthopedist Donald 
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Slocum wrote that medical professionals had paid only “scant” attention to the mechanics of 
football injuries, but that “a small corps of active observers—the team physicians, the coaches, 
and the trainers” —had observed recurring patterns of situations that were especially risky. As 
with protective equipment, such observations were hampered by a lack of data. Recognizing that 
he was expressing an opinion rather than documented facts, Dr. Slocum speculated that the knee 
was a prime culprit. “Although no accurate statistics are available as to how these injuries have 
occurred, it is my feeling that the most lethal weapon in football is the oncoming knee.” He 
provided a “rough example” of a 185-pound varsity level fullback who could run a 100-yard 
dash in 10.5 seconds. This hypothetical athlete could kick 500 pounds with his knee while 
standing, 625 pounds with one step, 725 pounds with two steps, and so on. Noting how much 
farther football players ran during actual play, and adding the formula “momentum equals mass 
times velocity,” Dr. Slocum left it to his readers to imagine the real-life risks.
88
  
             Dr. Slocum further suggested that whether and how a player was injured, or caused harm 
to another player, might be attributed to their personality and approach to the sport. “An 
aggressive, alert player may receive a serious head injury, and the fatigued, weak or ‘loafing’ 
player may be doubled up in flexion and receive serious spinal trauma.” Doctors particularly 
suspected players who were unskilled or reluctant to participate in football as prone to 
exaggerating their injuries. As several team physicians explained in 1959,  
A boy may use the injury as an excuse for not being on the first team. He may not have 
any real desire to play football, but feels he should because of his size; his family, or 
fraternity brothers may have encouraged him to go out for the team. This boy may not 
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want to heal his injury. A surgeon cannot put desire into a knee joint. We have been 
impressed with how few injuries we have seen after a winning ball game.89 
Other medical experts on sports trauma similarly agreed that there were athletes whose 
personality or player “types” left them especially susceptible. In response to the question “Is 
there such a thing as the injury-prone player?” at a 1962 symposium on football injuries, Dr. 
Richard C. Schneider responded in the affirmative. “Yes. The boy who does not actually wish to 
play football but is under pressure from his family or from his schoolmates to participate tends to 
have a high incidence of actual physical injuries as well as a slow rate of recovery. In addition, 
he may be subject to other symptoms, such as headaches which may be due to psychic 
tension.”
90
 None of these doctors had any data available to support the claims that there were 
certain “loafing” or otherwise “injury prone” types of players who suffered higher rates of 
injuries or recovered at slower rates than other athletes. 
 Although player attitudes and characteristics were blamed in part for injuries, coaches 
had consistently acknowledged responsibility for teaching their players how to play more safely. 
In fact, every AFCA fatality report from 1931 to 2008 mentioned improving coaching methods 
as a preventive measure to reduce football injuries and fatalities.
91
 Many recommended coaching 
techniques were relatively generic. In the 1950s, two journals aimed at coaches, Scholastic 
Coach and Athletic Journal, often featured articles on football that suggested improving various 
conditioning techniques; adding opportunities for recovery and treatment, such as allowing teams 
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to go to the sidelines during time outs; and fostering improved sportsmanship and player 
attitudes. For example, to minimize injuries purportedly associated with boys’ attitudes, ex-
trainer Larry Cappiello advised scrimmaging during practices where boys would be hit by their 
teammates. In this way, “the boys receive that ‘first shot’ which seems to cause so many injuries. 
But they receive it in a different manner. There is no tenseness and the boys are more relaxed . . . 
. that fear of the ‘first shot’ is gone.” Eliminating fearful attitudes was thus promoted as a means 
to promote safety.
92
   
In the early 1960s, however, concerns over coaching methods increasingly centered 
around one specific technique: spearing. “Spearing” essentially involved using one’s head as a 
weapon to block another player. Herbert Crisler, the chairman of the NCAA’s rules committee, 
drew attention to the need to potentially restrict the use of the head in blocking and tackling if 
football injuries persisted. He pointed to a recent survey, conducted for a sports equipment firm 
by the Armour Research Foundation of the Illinois Institute of Technology, reporting that head, 
neck, and spinal injuries were not declining. He attributed these injuries to “spearing and 
goring,” and he attributed these risky techniques in turn to the advent of helmets with face masks 
which “give a player the confidence to drive in on an opponent with his head.” Consequently, he 
concluded, either the design of the helmets or the practice of spearing, which was then perfectly 
legal under the rules of football, would have to change. “Unless we can find new equipment to 
reduce head and neck injuries, we may have to do something about these new techniques.”
93
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Doctors, too, were taking note of the risks of spearing as they began to conduct the first 
large scale studies of youth football injuries. A 1964 study of over 19,000 high school players in 
Southern California found that about 61 percent of the 203 players who had sustained head 
injuries had been taught to spear. The authors did not go so far as to argue that the dangerous 
technique ought to be removed from all levels of play, but instead framed their objections in 
terms of the youth of high school players. Children who were not yet fully developed adults 
seemed particularly vulnerable to a technique in which the head was used as a weapon. “One 
must question the place of spearing in high school football. A man who plays football at a 
university is quite different from a boy playing at the high school level.”
94
 
At the 1963 meeting of the National Federation of State High School Athletic 
Associations, Dr. Thomas Shaffer of the American Medical Association warned attendees of the 
dangers of both spearing and poorly made helmets. Both these issues had drawn much media 
attention in the early 1960s. While there was “great hazard” in the use of inexpensive, poor 
quality helmets, Dr. Shaffer also emphasized that the additional problem of spearing was not 
fundamentally a matter of equipment, but rather of “coaching ethics.” The face guard provided 
players with essential protection for their face and mouths, and should not be eliminated from the 
game or used as a weapon. Dr. Shaffer cautioned that as long as spearing was employed as a 
technique, injuries would persist.
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Pop Warner Football’s First Fatality  
Unfortunately, even the most supervised and organized youth football was not immune to 
the most tragic of outcomes for a young football athlete. On October 3, 1964, the Pop Warner 
youth football league saw its first reported football fatality.
97
 During a practice session in San 
Jose, California, a 14-year-old player, Keene Mitsuru Yamamoto, complained of pain in the back 
of his head. His discomfort did not diminish even when his coach allowed him to rest on the 
bench and remove his helmet. Yamamoto lost consciousness, was taken to a hospital, and 
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ultimately did not survive brain surgery for a blood clot. According to the Los Angeles Times 
story on the tragedy, doctors absolved Pop Warner organizers of blame for Yamamoto’s death. 
They stated that the physical examination given to Pop Warner players prior to participation 
would not have shown Yamamoto’s blood clot.
98
 Newspaper accounts were unclear as to 
whether Yamamoto had a pre-existing blood clot, and indeed, it may have been impossible from 
available medical records to tell.  
Nonetheless, at the time, Yamamoto’s death was used as evidence of football being a 
dangerous activity, prompting a two-part series in the Los Angeles Times on the issue. In 
November 1964, reporter Joseph Jares examined the popularity of Pop Warner football and the 
controversy over its safety for children. The boy’s death had furnished an opportunity to consider 
arguments for and against organized youth football, “an activity in which miniature Jim Browns 
crash into miniature Sam Huffs while miniature pompon girls prance on the sidelines.” Jares 
cited an official Pop Warner booklet stating that approximately 20,000 teams, with over half a 
million players, played Pop Warner football throughout the United States and in several foreign 
countries. With such numbers, and with the recent death of a participant, examining the debates 
over the safety of youth football was of great public interest.
99
  
According to Jares, supporters of the youth sport asserted that football promoted 
academic achievement and improved moral character among young players, and that football 
was no more dangerous than other activities. For instance, one parent, while acknowledging 
there was some danger of injury, felt the risk was “minimized by the fact that the kids that age 
are used to things like, oh, the rough and tumble, climbing fences and falling from trees.”  
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Jares also quoted Dr. Joel Adams, an orthopedic surgeon who had studied injuries in 
organized youth football and baseball, who recommended several safety rules that would help 
protect players. One was that: “Head injury with even momentary loss of consciousness 
automatically rules out the player for the remainder of the SEASON” (emphasis in original).
100
 
This recommendation indicated that at this time, physicians thought head injuries should be 
taken seriously, and should not be treated as a minor matter of a player seeing stars or getting his 
head dinged. Elsewhere, critics would argue that youth football coaches rarely followed such 
cautious safety practices. As one reporter later wrote in 1967, “How many young football players 
are pushed on to the field with broken or bruised ribs, wrists, arms, and minor head injuries? A 
shot of pain-killer and in they go. How many times do you see a young man knocked out on one 
play return immediately to action after a time out or brief rest?”
101
 In this 1964 series, however, 
Dr. Adams asserted that sponsors of youth football took medical supervision seriously, and that 
physical examinations and penalties for dangerous plays would mitigate the sport’s risks. 
Although California newspapers reported Yamamoto’s death while playing youth 
football when it occurred, Yamamoto’s death was not recognized in the medical literature 
examining the health impacts of tackle football for adolescents. Just two years later, in 1966, Dr. 
Fred Allman, Jr., then-vice president of the American College of Sports Medicine (for which he 
would later serve as president in 1968 and 1969), wrote an article examining the risks and 
benefits of competitive organized sports. While acknowledging that deaths might occur as a 
result of organized sports, Allman emphasized that they were very rare. He further asserted that 
“one of the largest tackle football programs for youngsters, the Pop Warner program, has had 
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over one million participants in the past 34 years without a fatality, a record that speaks well for 
the leadership and organization within the program.”
102
 
Moreover, the connection between the tragedy and youth football was gradually erased in 
subsequent newspaper accounts of football safety. In 1974, a New York Times examination of 
youth football referenced Yamamoto’s death as having a distant association with the Pop Warner 
league: “In 45 years there has been only one fatality remotely connected with Pop Warner.”
103
 
Four years later, in 1978, another New York Times story amended the claim to read that in almost 
fifty years of Pop Warner football, “there has not been one injury-related death.”
104
 This account 
implied that Yamamoto’s death was not associated with any injury sustained while playing 
football. By the 1980s, Yamamoto’s existence as a Pop Warner participant essentially 
disappeared: news reports were claiming that in the history of Pop Warner youth football, “there 
have been no fatalities among more than 1 million participants.”
105
 The claim persisted through 
the 1990s. In 1996 Sports Illustrated for Kids published a special supplement issue for parents on 
“how to help your kids get the most out of sports.” An article focused on football asserted, “Pop 
Warner has never had a player fatality in its 67-year history.”
106
  
Nonetheless, this 1964 series characterized football as being “reasonably safe” provided 
doctors’ recommendations were followed, and suggested that the organizers of youth football 
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largely did exercise such prudence. “Pop Warner safety-first football generally lives up to its 
slogan,” Jares reassured his readers.
107
  
Doctors, Coaches, and American Values 
As the United States experienced extraordinary social changes in the 1960s, coaches and 
athletic administrators were often associated with Republican-leaning politics and more 
conservative beliefs. As American author James Michener characterized his own coach in his 
1976 book Sports in America, “Like most coaches, he considered Democrats bad, and labor 
union people, and troublemakers, and college professors, and radicals, and anyone not 
wholeheartedly in support of the good society as he experienced it.”
108
 In the face of unrest and 
challenges to powerful institutions, coaches and athletic administrators promoted tackle football 
in the 1960s as a buttress against seemingly unpatriotic and undesirable behavior among youth. 
They argued that athletic programs in general, and football in particular, could foster in students 
a sense of loyalty to the United States and to “traditional” American values. In 1967, Art Baker, 
a football coach at Clemson University, summarized this perspective:  
Perhaps never in the history of the United States have we needed to develop loyalty so 
badly as today. Everywhere we look it seems some group of American youth is 
demonstrating against something, often nothing worthwhile. What kinds of homes and 
schools must we have to be turning out such products. . . . I am firmly convinced that if 
all American students were a part of a good athletic program we wouldn’t have the draft 
card burnings, the long-haired beatniks, the burning of our sacred “Old Glory,” or the 
waving of the enemy’s flag in our streets.
109
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Coach Baker’s interpretation of the moral benefits of sports for American youth was 
addressed to physicians reading the Journal of the South Carolina Medical Association. An 
accompanying editorial comment noted that the state medical association was greatly concerned 
with safety in athletics, and was consequently seeking to promote close relationships between 
physicians and athletic coaches. As part of this effort, Dr. Judson E. Hair, the chairman of the 
association’s Committee on the Medical Aspects of Sports, had submitted Coach Baker’s article 
for publication.  
In this way, the ability of sports to foster American pride and loyalty in response to 
activism in the streets was foregrounded by a professional medical association as part of its 
examination of the medical aspects of athletics. Coach Baker’s article illustrates the close 
connections between coaches and physicians in framing the risks of youth football. Cultural fears 
similar to Coach Baker’s persisted among physicians throughout the 1970s. Writing of the risks 
and benefits of youth football in 1975, orthopedic surgeon Dr. Richard W. Godshall 
editorialized, “I would certainly rather have one of my children play football than smoke ‘pot’ in 
some dark room.”
110
 The conceptualization of football injuries as a medical issue was thus 
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 It is also noteworthy that Baker’s article included an extended reflection on the religious, specifically Christian, 
aspect of coaching, reinforcing the connection between American football, nationalism, and Christianity: “But each 
of us has received the same special blessing from our Creator by having the wonderful opportunity, responsibility 
and talent of working with and influencing the lives of these young people. I feel that we owe a debt to God for this 
special blessing. I believe we should use whatever influence we have on these young lives for the good of His 




These beliefs would continue to inform discussions of youth football safety even as 
growing concerns about serious injuries and the quality of protective equipment prompted 
coaches and physicians to seek better injury data and equipment standardization. By the mid-
1960s, coaches and doctors were finding that the addition of plastic helmets with mouth guards 
had altered the techniques in youth football in ways that seemingly increased the risks of injury. 
The ensuing discussions raised significant concerns about the potential need for further 
equipment changes and/or rule changes in the game, as well as questions about whether youth 
football players required different sets of rules and coaching given their apparent vulnerability to 
the risks. The concerns about spearing and the prevalence of head injuries further highlighted the 
lack of systematic epidemiologic data or standardized equipment. The AFCA’s annual fatality 
reports, analyses from team doctors, observations by dentists, and numbers obtained from 
insurance companies had all helped doctors and coaches identify areas of concern. But it was 
increasingly clear that these methods were not sufficient. In addition to organizing larger scale 
studies and conferences specific to sports-related injuries, doctors and coaches would begin 
calling for the creation of standards that all football helmets would need to meet, a development 




Chapter Three: “Such Hazards Must Be Controlled”: Epidemiology, Equipment, and 
Helmet Standards, 1960s-1970s  
 
“All current methods of testing the effectiveness of headgear are somewhat unsatisfactory. . . . 
The single most important fact to remember is not what happens to the helmet but what the effect 
is upon the underlying brain.” 
 
-Glenn W. Kindt, Elwyn R. Gooding and Richard C. Schneider, 19731 
 
          How could parents ensure that the “bone-crunching game of football” would turn their 
child into a healthy young man? Protective equipment was one of the most prominent answers to 
this question. Although major sales growth in football equipment designed specifically for child 
athletes had not yet taken off to sporting goods manufacturers’ expectations by the 1950s, 
football equipment sales for high school, college and professional players were a boon to 
sporting goods manufacturers.
2
 By the mid-twentieth century it was widely assumed that not 
only was protective headgear an essential feature of the sport, but that football owed its very 
survival to the development and refinement of such gear. For instance, in 1950 a columnist for 
the Chicago Tribune asserted that the football of the early 20
th
 century had been rendered far less 
dangerous “when the players were compelled to wear headgear, braced shoes, and pads. If such 
protective measures had not been adopted it is questionable whether football would have 
survived as one of our national sports.”
3
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This chapter examines how protective equipment featured in debates over the safety of 
youth football, from the addition of mouth guards and plastic face masks to the development of 
the first football helmet standards in the 1970s. The increasingly systematic study of football 
injuries by physicians and state athletic associations in the mid-late 1960s raised questions about 
whether focusing on protective equipment was the most effective way to prevent certain kinds of 
football injuries. Nonetheless, calls by medical, public health and engineering professionals for 
research and evaluation of football equipment contributed to the formation of several equipment 
standards committees with a focus on football equipment, particularly helmets. American 
consumer safety and occupational health movements of the 1960s, especially research and 
legislation related to automobile safety, influenced the creation and research of these 
organizations. Concerns about football helmet related lawsuits, particularly in the context of a 
move toward strict liability in tort law, also motivated the standardization and evaluation of 
football equipment. Despite the difficulties involved in testing the effectiveness of headgear, 
helmet standardization would provide coaches, parents and athletes reassurance that the hazards 
of youth football could be controlled. 
“The Best Football Equipment Available” 
          In the 1950s and 1960s, there were no testing or safety standards that football helmets 
were required to meet before they could be sold to consumers. Dr. Stephen Reid, a researcher 
and team physician at Northwestern University, described the resulting range in quality: 
“Football helmets may be purchased in toy departments, sporting goods stores, or in plants where 






 Indeed, the American Medical Association warned parents that helmets sold as 
toys could not withstand low impacts, were sharp enough to cause lacerations, and had internal 
padding that provided no protection on impact. Consequently, the safety of children who wore 
such helmets was “in serious jeopardy.”
5
 Many schools, particularly those that served poor or 
marginalized communities, could not—or chose not—to invest the money in providing their 
students with “Cadillac class” helmets. As Charles Trimble recalled of his school days at the 
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota in the late 1940s, “Our original uniforms were 
straight out of the Jim Thorpe era –mothball smelly, lightly padded and outright dangerous to 
play in. We were ridiculed by the BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] boarding school jocks that we 




While doctors expressed concern about the quality of some of this football equipment, 
they also focused on improving such equipment as a key means to preventing injuries. In 
prominent medical journals, physicians called for more research. Notably, they asserted that 
changes in helmet construction could address particular mechanisms of injury in football. In 
particular, the American Medical Association’s Committee on Sports Injuries, established in 
1953, focused on football head injuries as one of the first problems to come before the 
committee. The committee encouraged “the production of a newer, safer type of football helmet” 
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in response. In 1957, Dr. Allan Ryan, the committee’s chairman, asked Edward Dye, a safety 
engineer with Cornell’s Aeronautical Laboratory, to prepare a set of recommended minimum 
performance standards for protective headgear.
7
 A 1955 article published in Sports Illustrated, 
reporting on Dye’s previous research on protective sports gear, described the available football 
equipment of the day as “an unscientific patchwork of steel-hard fibers and plastic which not 
only fails to protect the wearer but has converted him into a human battering ram.”
8
 
School sports administrators, too, had called for improved equipment for years, at both 
the high school and college level. For example, the September 1948 issue of the Kentucky High 
School Athlete told its readers that all school groups were interested in improved and more 
affordable equipment, given the publicity that football injuries received, as well as the high costs 
of athletic equipment. As a result, major sporting goods manufacturers were working “at top 
speed” to produce football helmets and shoulder pads that offered greater protection. 
Nonetheless, the manufacturers cautioned against the overly optimistic belief “that certain pieces 
of equipment constitute a panacea which will eliminate all fatalities and serious injuries. In a 
contact game, it is doubtful whether all danger [sic] hazards will ever be eliminated.”
9
  
The American Football Coaches Association (AFCA), representing football coaches 
across the United States, also continually insisted on the importance of better protective gear, 
with a particular focus on helmets. At the AFCA’s 1931 annual meeting, Coach Pop Warner had 
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told attendees that the hard material used in football headgear was contributing to injuries, and 
that a softer material ought to be used to help protect players. In their review of 
recommendations annually promulgated by the AFCA, two physicians observed that strongest 
recommendation from the AFCA’s 1946 report, in capital letters in the original, stated: “Appoint 
at once a qualified committee to scientifically study the construction and material used in the 
present headgear. This study committee, it is hoped, can recommend a headgear that will 




There is no evidence that this AFCA helmet recommendation resulted in any action 
taken. Indeed, the authors of the organization’s 1951 report acerbically noted that “there seems to 
be little reason for making new recommendations, as those submitted in 1950 were only 
infrequently, if ever, put into practice.”
11
 Nonetheless, nearly every year during the decade 1951-
1960, the report of the American Football Coaches Association included recommendations to 
initiate helmet research to reduce the number of direct fatalities from the sport and improve the 
safety of football. As of 1960, however, the recommended helmet research had not yet been 
published.
12
  Despite all the calls for research, there were few laboratories devoted to assessing 
athletic equipment, and few sources of funding to conduct such research. Furthermore, 
evaluating the variety of available equipment posed a significant challenge. In his studies of 
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football helmet impacts, with the hopes of ultimately identify minimum requirements for a safe 
football helmet, Reid reported that conditions that prevailed on the football field could not be 
simulated in the laboratory.
13
 
               Even with the multitude of pads and headgear already ubiquitous in tackle football by 
the 1950s, and the lack of standards or evaluation of such equipment, the decade saw calls for the 
addition of yet further protective gear. Concern about the frequency of tooth injuries in football 
led to the study, improvement and mandate of the mouth guard for use in tackle football. While 
evaluating the effectiveness of helmets in protecting brains was especially challenging, the risk 
of exposed teeth to injury was more visible and appeared more straightforward to address with 
equipment. 
            A survey of the 1950 college football season found an 18 percent incidence of teeth 
chipped or knocked out from playing football among players. The issue affected football players 
at all levels, from “kids in sand lots to ‘pros,’” wrote the author in Dental Survey. But available 
mouthpieces were too clumsy and uncomfortable for widespread use, making “breathing difficult 
and talking virtually impossible.”
14
 As a result, dentists increasingly promoted the use of better 
mouth protection in tackle football and offered techniques for how to fabricate mouth protection. 
In 1954, pointing to several sources of data, including statistics he had collected in a Kansas high 
school, dentist Howard Dukes wrote that mouth pieces ought to become standard football 
equipment. He further highlighted a 1952 Life magazine article on college football that had 
featured photographs of toothless Notre Dame football players, claiming that the images of boys 
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rendered toothless meant that “parents have become much more reluctant to allow their boys to 
play football.”
15
 Coaches, too, supported the addition of mouth protectors, with one report in 




In response to these studies and concerns, the National Alliance Football Committee, 
composed of the National Federation of State High School Athletic Associations, the National 
Junior College Athletic Association and the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, 
mandated the use of mouth guards for high school and junior college football beginning in the 
1962 season. In 1964, the American Dental Association reported that since the face guard had 
become mandatory, injuries in and around the mouth had declined about 50 percent. 
Furthermore, 99 percent of 238 high school football players surveyed agreed that wearing mouth 
protectors was a good way to protect the teeth. Coaches, dentists, and players were thus all 
enthusiastic about this new piece of protective equipment.
17
  
Such enthusiasm typically extended to the importance of football equipment more 
generally. In promoting their youth football leagues, organizers often emphasized the 
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standardized equipment that they offered—and the money they spent on it. For instance, a 1958 
article on the Mar Vista Giants, a team sponsored by the Mar Vista Optimist Club and entered in 
the Pop Warner Midget Football League, noted that “the Optimists have spent $1250 on the club. 
They have helmets, face masks, shoulder pads, football pants, tennis shoes with soft rubber 
cleats, and purple and gold jerseys.”
18
 Indeed, the equipment itself was a major selling point for 
organized play as compared to “sandlot” games. Organizers claimed that the “bump-absorbant 
[sic] material” of football uniforms worked to prevent injuries.
19
 A 1956 New York Times article 
on organized youth football set up the story by first describing children who played unsupervised 
in vacant lots: “Their equipment is meager at best. Few wear helmets or shoulder pads. Most of 
them don’t know what a pair of hip guards look like—nor do they care.” By contrast, youths 
playing on organized teams were outfitted with “the best football equipment available.”
20
 
“Something Depressing Has Happened To Football” 
In 1961, an influential article published in JAMA prompted renewed medical and public 
 
attention to whether protective football helmets were in fact protecting athletes. Dr. Richard 
Schneider, a neuroscientist at the University of Michigan, and his colleagues examined serious 
and fatal football injuries in an article that sparked widespread concern about the design of 
football helmets. Reviewing the mechanisms involved in several severe football-related injuries 
and deaths, these researchers observed that the recently introduced, rigid, plastic faceguards 
could act as a lever causing injury. One detailed case report, for instance, recounted how an 18-
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year old football player attempting to make a tackle had his faceguard struck by the knee of an 
opposing player. This forced his cervical spine into hyperextension, causing immediate and 
complete quadriplegia. Based on such cases, Dr. Schneider and his colleagues recommended 
several changes to the design of football helmets, including using a less rigid, more resilient 
material, and shortening the length of the face guard so that it would not protrude several inches 
from the face.
21
 The authors nonetheless concluded that among the estimated 2.5 million 
individuals who played football in the United States each year, “there are only an infinitesimal 
number of fatal injuries.”
22
 
 Despite this seemingly reassuring conclusion, the article prompted media coverage 
warning parents, particularly mothers, of the disturbing finding that helmets might not always 
represent a source of added safety. For instance, an article in the Chicago Daily Tribune 
presented the scenario of a young boy deriving a sense of pride and toughness from his helmet, 
while his concerned mother felt relief at the protection it provided. As the mother watches her 
son playing in “organized games that start as young as the sixth grade in some communities, she 
thinks: At least the helmet will protect him from hurting his face or head.” Not so, the article 
frighteningly continued: instead the football helmet could prove to be an added danger and even 
serve as a vicious weapon on the field.
23
 Meanwhile, Jim Murray, a sportswriter with the Los 
Angeles Times, observed that “something depressing has happened to Football, 1961 …. the 
sudden boom in head and neck injuries may speed a day when a team won’t need a head coach 
so much as a head neurosurgeon nor a bench so much as an operating table.” He even went so far 
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as to warn his readers that “football is creeping up on reckless driving as an important cause of 




Much of the debate centered on whether or not the recently introduced plastic helmets 
with faceguards increased or decreased the risks as compared to their older, leather counterparts. 
American sportswriter Bob Addie suggested that the new plastic helmets, when used as weapons 
by players, “may be more harmful than all the broken noses and facial injuries” that the face 
cages were intended to prevent. “It’s a 15-yard penalty to grab a runner by the cage but the 




Some coaches of youth and college teams argued that the transition from leather to plastic 
helmets had actually increased the risks. The athletic director of the University of Tennessee told 
the New York Times that the NCAA was concerned that an uptick in head and neck injuries 
might be due to modern equipment.
26
 A football coach at the University of Denver agreed: 
“There is a real question whether plastic head guards are the cause of an increased number of 
accidents.”
27
 Coaches observed that the hard, unyielding plastic magnified the impact of the 
equipment when a player’s head collided with part of another player’s body. Another college 
football coach characterized the plastic helmets as “devastating weapons” and recommended a 
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return to their leather predecessors.
28
  In 1962, Mal Stevens, orthopedic surgeon and former 




But in an article for the Journal of School Health, Clifford B. Fagan, the Executive 
Secretary of the National Federation of State High School Associations, disagreed with claims 
that returning to the use of leather helmets might reduce injury rates. “As a matter of fact, the 
consensus of experts is that the return to the use of the leather helmet would be taking a step 
backward. The plastic helmet is, at the present time, providing the best protection available.”
30
 
Instead, he argued that contemporary helmets were such an improvement over their predecessors 
“that they cannot even be compared with those used even a decade ago.”
31
 Ultimately, some 
observers argued, protective equipment was not the primary culprit for the game’s risks. Instead, 
coaches themselves needed to take more responsibility for limiting the brutality of football. 
Writing for the Los Angeles Times and referring to a major sporting goods company, sportswriter 




“We’ve certainly got to find out whether any weakness in equipment or in training can be 
overcome so we can better protect these youngsters,” insisted Jack Curtice, president of the 
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American Football Coaches’ Association. Curtice further speculated that the problem might be 
attributable to a lack of proper adult supervision. “We’ve been pushing sports competition for 
our youth so much maybe we haven’t enough trained people to supervise it in our growing 
population.”
33
 The supervisory imperative continued to be evident in the recommendations of 
coaches to address equipment concerns related to football safety.  
In the wake of the 1961 media outcry over injuries, in May 1962, the American Medical 
Association sponsored a national conference on head protection for athletes in Chicago to 
address some of the medical uncertainty surrounding helmets. All the symposium presentations 
focused on issues related to head protection in football.
34
 Despite the focus on helmets as a key 
area for possible safety interventions, an introduction describing the problems posed by the 
conference topic sounded a skeptical note about the ultimate impact such protective equipment 
might have on injuries. The authors wrote that an examination of “the mechanics of the head 
impact and protective helmet problem discloses that we are severely limited in the protection 
which can be afforded even with ideal materials and design.”
35
 
Even amid fears that plastic helmets might in fact be dangerous to their users and other 
players who came into contact with them, eliminating helmets was not offered as a solution. 
Instead, helmets needed to be improved upon with different materials or a different design. 
Although not everybody agreed that plastic helmets were providing the best protection available, 
nearly all adults involved in football seemed to agree on the centrality of equipment to injury 
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prevention efforts. When injuries occurred, better equipment was often put forth as the necessary 
solution. For instance, parents, industries and service clubs donated $13,500 to get the Pop 
Warner Tackle Football League under way in Westchester and Playa del Rey, California. In 
1957, the league’s first year of existence, one boy suffered a broken collar bone. The league’s 
vice president, Vern Perryman, attributed this major injury to poor equipment. He told the Los 
Angeles Times that in response to this injury, “we decided to buy the best equipment. This will 
eliminate the possibility of any boy getting hurt because of inferior equipment.”
36
 While doctors 
and engineers wondered how much protection even an ideal helmet might afford players, and 
sporting goods manufacturers warned that their products could not serve as a panacea against 
injuries, administrators of youth football emphasized that investing in available football gear 
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Collecting Data and the Problem of Knee Injuries 
Research before the 1960s on youth football injuries had underscored serious concerns 
about the safety of the sport. Yet methods for data collection typically did not allow investigators 
to clearly calculate the incidence of football injuries, meaning the number of new injuries 
occurring over a defined period of time in a defined population. Instead, football injury reports 
generally involved simple retrospective counts of injuries, lacking the data about the total 
number of participants that would be necessary as a denominator in order to calculate the rate of 
injury. Researchers who did report an incidence of football injury had typically conducted their 
studies on a very small scale, such as school physicians who had documented the injuries they 
treated among students at the single high school they served.  
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By the 1960s, however, medical societies and athletic associations started to conduct 
larger scale prospective studies to calculate the incidence of injury among youth players. The 
emergence of sports medicine as specialized field helped enable this research. By 1966 the 
American Medical Association published its first standard nomenclature of athletic injuries, “so 
that meaningful records and statistics concerning sports injuries and their causes” could be 
obtained and maintained. Efforts to treat athletic injuries as worthy of systematic study and 
treatment, similar to other forms of injury and disease, helped promote epidemiological research 
on football injuries. Such research, in turn, would begin to evaluate the extent to which football 
equipment served as a protective or even a risk factor for injury.
38
   
Some of the earliest large-scale football injury research happened at the state level, as 
state medical societies formed athletic subcommittees that provided greater institutional support 
for physicians to conduct research on football injuries. For example, the Athletic Medical 
Advisory Committee of the Academy of Medicine of Cincinnati, Ohio tracked football injuries 
among 2,846 students at 31 high schools from 1962-1964. The Ohio researchers shared their data 
with orthopedic doctor William Garrahan, who was conducting a similar study in Rhode Island. 
In 1960, Dr. Garrahan had started tracking injuries at 25 Rhode Island high schools, adding 
several schools over the years until 33 schools were included in his study by 1965. While the 
Ohio study had sent out questionnaires to schools, Dr. Garrahan instead relied on insurance 
claims forms to obtain injury data.
39
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Dr. Garrahan reported that approximately 1 out of 5 high school football players 
sustained some kind of injury, a very similar result to the Ohio study. He found that dental 
injuries had decreased after mouth guards had become mandatory in 1962, suggesting the 
effectiveness of the equipment. On the other hand, other types of injuries remained relatively 
stable. Dr. Garrahan further reported that only about 1 out of 13 players had sustained a 
“potentially serious” injury, which he defined as “injuries to vital parts of the body, but not 
necessarily serious because of the force involved.” Concussion, for example, did not constitute a 
serious injury according to this definition. Dr. Garrahan observed that the incidence of 
concussion remained high throughout the study, but that “there were no serious head injuries 
during the six year period.” Despite this relative lack of clarity in defining categories of injury 
and other limitations to the research, the studies in Ohio and Rhode Island nonetheless 
represented some of the first attempts to document the incidence and nature of high school 
football periods among a large group of students in a prospective, multiyear study.
40
  
In addition to the efforts of medical societies, state athletic organizations also 
increasingly sought to document the incidence of football injuries in order to improve player 
safety. Research sponsored by the New York State Public High School Athletic Association 
(NYSPHSAA) in the 1960s illustrates how one such association worked to collect data to 
improve safety efforts in their athletic programs. The NYSPHSAA’s publications, as well as 
broader discussion at medical conferences at which researchers shared this data, indicate how the 
researchers confronted and addressed the challenges of gathering and interpreting football injury 
data. Importantly, the NYSPHSAA’s research suggested the limitations of protective equipment 
                                                          
40
 Ibid. The rate of injury found in the Ohio study was 19.5% (550 injuries among 2,826 players) as compared to 





in preventing football knee and ankle injuries, which influenced the safety recommendations 
offered by the athletic association’s researchers.  
In August 1963, the State Football Committee of the NYSPHSAA began a voluntary, 
experimental pre-season football conditioning program. The program was intended to minimize 
injuries and improve athlete fitness, and was open to any school interested in participating. In 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of this program, the NYSPHSAA allocated funds for tracking 
injuries. In conjunction with this effort, the association initiated a series of studies intended to 
identify the major causes of injury among interscholastic youth football players in New York 
State. In May 1966, a report evaluating the three year experimental program indicated a 
reduction in football injuries.
41
  
In addition to continuing this successful conditioning program, in 1967 the NYSPHSAA 
leadership decided to undertake another study of head, thigh, knee and ankle injuries, for which 
they received a grant from the State Education Department. Ultimately the NYSPHSAA 
sponsored two studies, one large and one small, examining whether equipment modifications 
could prevent injuries to players’ legs. The smaller study assessed whether various shoe and cleat 
combinations would help prevent knee and ankle injuries among 1,235 high school varsity level 
football players at 44 schools in 11 New York State counties. Orthopedic surgeon Murle Laurens 
Rowe of the University of Rochester
 
led this project, hypothesizing that football cleats might 
contribute to injuries that occurred when players cut or pivoted on their feet. Using multiple 
combinations of shoe and cleat types, Dr. Rowe sought to evaluate whether instead shorter 
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cleats, or alternatively adding a plastic disc heel to ordinary street shoes, were associated with 
fewer injuries as compared to the conventionally cleated football shoe. In 1969 he would report 
his results at several New York State based conferences and journals, concluding that the low-cut 




In addition to Rowe’s “numerically limited,” smaller scale study, in 1967-1968 the 
NYSPHSAA also undertook a much larger a statewide study with the support of the New York 
State Education Department. This study included over 17,000 varsity high school football 
players, representing over 90% of such players in the state. The authors asserted that the program 
was “unparalleled in scope” and “the first statewide survey in the nation designed to catalogue 
such injuries, in a standardized and medically acceptable manner, by type and severity.” In 1967, 
the first year of the study, the researchers surveyed injuries to lower extremities sustained by 
these high school football athletes. Yet they largely failed to control for key variables related to 
injuries, such as equipment worn and the number of games played. Consequently, the authors 
could not draw many conclusions from the data they had collected about whether different types 
of equipment were associated with injuries. They reported, however, that they learned much 
“about the basic problems of data handling and interpretation” that would inform the study 
design the following year.
43
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In 1968, based on their experience the previous year, the NYSPHSAA researchers 
adjusted their study design to include data on several experimental variables, such as player’s 
conditioning, experience in sports, and type and extent of injury. Physician members of the 
Committee on Medical Aspects of Sports of the New York State Medical Society developed a 
system of injury classification, including a four-point scale to assess seriousness of injury. They 
also incorporated several checks of the reliability of the data, such as checking 10% of injury 
notations against school health and/or athletic department records.  
Based on the experimental data collected in 1968, the researchers reported that several 
shoe/cleat combinations, such as a low shoe with a disc heel, were associated with fewer injuries 
than expected at a level of statistical significance. The clearest finding, however, was that players 
who had sustained a previous knee injury were far more likely to be reinjured seriously, as 
compared to those players without a previous injury. Their first and primary recommendation, 
then, was that players with a previous knee injury should undergo a planned program of 
rehabilitation before being permitted to return to football. Furthermore, physicians should 
thoroughly examine such players before each football season began to evaluate the athletes’ 
fitness to participate. The NYSPHSAA researchers further suggested that football players ideally 
be outfitted with low shoes and some form of disc or flat heel, or short cleats.  
Yet even with such modifications, the NYSPHSAA’s final report emphasized that the 
majority of knee and ankle injuries would not be prevented. Out of the 328 total serious knee 
injuries recorded, their estimates suggested that only some 10-20 cases would be reduced even if 
all players were outfitted with the ideal shoes. And even if all players with a previous knee injury 




be reduced by only 40-50 cases. Based on these numbers, the report’s recommendations section 
sounded a highly cautious note: 
This is not to reduce the urgency of outfitting youngsters with the safest equipment 
combinations or of improving the rehabilitation and screening processes. But it does 
point out that those seeking to improve the safety of the game must turn to both factors 
related to the condition of the organism [athlete] and factors related to the nature and 
conduct of the sport. Further research in the area of shoe equipment may well turn out to 
be a somewhat unrewarding process.
44
 
Instead of focusing on protective equipment, the study results suggested that the nature 
and conduct of the sport should be examined, especially in order to eliminate dangerous 
situations caused by such tactics as “spearing” and players piling on each other. The 
NYSPHSAA researchers concluded that various rule changes, such as restricting players from 
blocking one another above the waist, needed to be attempted and evaluated, “regardless of 
whether they change the ‘traditional’ nature of the game.”
45
   
In addition to supporting research on injuries among youth football players, the 
NYSPHSAA also sponsored conferences in collaboration with doctors and educators to further 
examine the issue of player safety. In 1968, the NYSPHSAA co-sponsored its first symposium 
on the medical aspects of sports along with the Medical Society of the State of New York and the 
Health, Physical Education and Recreation Association. At the symposium, researchers 
described the preliminary results of some of the youth sports injury data that had been collected 
over the previous 5 years in New York State. Every year, reported Dr. Rowe, about one third of 
18,000 New York state high school football players sustained a reportable injury. Of these 
injuries, about one third affected players’ legs (16% were knee injuries, 13% ankle injuries, and 
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4% affected other parts of the leg). Dr. Rowe asserted that both the preliminary data that had 
been gathered and his experience made clear that preventing knee and ankle injuries “in a 
running, heavy contact sport like football” would be very difficult. He regretted that complete 
data were not yet available from either his smaller scale study or the larger study of knee and 
ankle injuries supported by the NYSPHSAA. Yet Dr. Rowe emphasized his appreciation for the 
ability to collect such data, noting that researchers could now benefit from “a marvelous 
instrument in the continuing body of statistics contributed by the high school coaches of New 
York State to direct our attention to problem areas.”
46
 
In his own address at the symposium, Dr. Anthony J. Pisani, an orthopedic surgeon who 
served as team physician for the New York Giants, shared Dr. Rowe’s concern about the 
vulnerability of players’ knees. “It is my opinion that mechanically the human knee was not 
meant for football. . . . cleats or type [sic] of footgear variation certainly are a boon to the 
manufacturers or the sporting goods houses, but play little or no part in the prevention of knee 
injuries.” If equipment was not a promising solution to preventing knee injuries, Dr. Pisani 
instead suggested that athletes could best protect themselves with their style of play. He cited 
advice from coaches and athletes that football players should keep their legs moving at all times, 
even if they were not directly involved in action on the field. In this way, even if they received a 
blow to their legs, it would be “a glancing type of force rather than a square impact.” He added 
that college football coach Beattie Feathers had claimed that thanks to this approach, none of his 
North Carolina State players had sustained knee injuries requiring surgery. Dr. Pisani concluded: 
                                                          
46
 M. Laurens Rowe, “The Cleatless Heel,” in Medical Aspects of Sports: A Symposium Sponsored by the Medical 





“Constant movement of the legs during the actual play sets up a moving target that affords the 
best chance of survival to play another day.”
47
 
Both Dr. Rowe and Dr. Pisani communicated their concerns about the difficulty of 
preventing football injuries to the popular press. They were both quoted as sharing the view that 
“the knee is not meant for football” in a 1968 Chicago Tribune article on injuries in professional 
football. Dr. Rowe supported better officiating and leg conditioning, but concluded “that there is 
no real solution to the knee injury problem.”
48
 Their skepticism of equipment as a preventative 
strategy was similar to the conclusion of the 1969 NYSPHSAA report, which had found that 
focusing on shoes and cleats did not seem a promising route for preventing knee and ankle 
injuries.  
If better shoes or cleats were not the solution to leg injuries, two alternative options 
seemed to present themselves: recommending particular football playing techniques to athletes 
that might best protect them (and thereby making players responsible for their own safety), or 
altering some of the rules of football. Dr. Pisani’s advice that players constantly move their legs 
at all times during football matches fell into the former category. Meanwhile, the 1969 report 
NYSPHSAA advised the latter strategy based on the large study of knee and ankle injuries 
among New York State’s high school football players. The association’s researchers 
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recommended revising even the most seemingly “traditional” rules of football, and evaluating 
whether such changes could eliminate some of the most dangerous situations that occurred in the 
sport. None of these authorities suggested that tackling should be eliminated entirely or football 
banned outright. While no “real solution” was apparent to the problem of knee injuries, 
physicians and researchers nonetheless sought to identify how the hazards of football might best 
be controlled. 
Helmet Design Research 
Based on research examining youth football-related leg injuries in the late 1960s, 
protective equipment did not appear to be the most promising option for improving player safety. 
In addition, the fundamental effectiveness of football helmets as a strategy for preventing injuries 
continued to be a source of uncertainty throughout the decade. In 1969, for instance, researcher 
and Northwestern football team physician Dr. Stephen E. Reid argued that doing away with 
football helmets altogether would reduce head injuries because without helmets, players couldn’t 
use their heads as weapons. As a result, he believed, eliminating the equipment would result in 
less head contact in the game. Yet Dr. Reid acknowledged that such a change would interfere 
with the techniques of the sport as it was then played.
49
  
Despite these uncertainties over the benefits of football equipment, an increasing 
emphasis on improving equipment and equipment standards occurred during this period, most 
particularly in the context of football helmets. Suggestions to eliminate football helmets or 
otherwise “interfere” with the sport as played were largely sidelined in favor of improving 
headgear. As discussed in chapter two, both doctors and coaches had long called for 
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improvement to football helmets. By the early 1960s, several groups of researchers were testing 
various helmet designs and confronting the practical and technical challenges that modifying 
football helmet design entailed. 
Some of the impetus for initiating research on improving football helmets in the 1960s 
had its origins in automobile safety. After the 1956 death of Pete “William” Snell from a 
collision in an amateur auto racing contest in California, several physicians who were also fellow 
auto racers sought to improve head protection in his honor. The 1957 establishment of the Snell 
Memorial Foundation and the creation of the foundation’s helmet test facility at the University of 
California’s Davis campus provided the opportunity not only to study racing crash helmets, but 
also to examine football helmets. With this facility available as a resource, Dr. George Snively, a 
physician at Sacramento County Hospital, collaborated with two researchers from UC Davis’s 
physical education department who were concerned about head injuries among the players on the 
school’s football squad. With funding from the National Institutes of Health, they obtained 
eleven different models of helmets from the open market. They then compared these against a 
prototype helmet with a fiberglass outer shell that covered a foamed, non-resilient plastic lining. 
Finding that the prototype helmets with foamed plastic inner liners performed better under high 
impacts in the lab, they provided several of these prototype helmets to UC Davis football players 
for use in field trials during football practices and games.
50
 
Orthopedic surgeon and team physician Harold Fenner was similarly motivated by 
Snell’s death to improve head protection. Dr. Fenner, who had raced cars professionally in the 
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1950s and would later serve as president of the Board of Directors of the Snell Foundation, 
began to study football helmet safety in his own practice. He observed deficiencies in the 
football helmets used by student athletes at the local Hobbs High School football team in Hobbs, 
New Mexico. Due to a weakness of the then-available plastic shell helmet, he found that an 
object could make solid contact with the shell against the wearer’s head, particularly below the 
headband level of the helmet. As a result of this defect, Dr. Fenner argued that a much more rigid 
shell, such as fiberglass, was necessary. In March 1960, Dr. Fenner obtained a prototype 
fiberglass helmet from Dr. Snively, made modifications to the equipment in consultation with the 
Hobbs High School coaching staff, and began to use this redesigned headgear among the high 
schooler players at Hobbs. Despite initial concerns that the inner liner would need frequent 
replacement due to damage, Dr. Fenner stated that after four seasons of use at Hobbs High 
School, it had not been necessary to replace any of the liners.
51
  
Physicians were thus experimenting with different helmet designs among students 
playing on the school teams with which they were affiliated at the high school and college level. 
Such unsupervised experimental research took place in an era before the establishment of 
Institutional Review Boards to review the ethics of research among youth. At the time, however, 
these physicians felt they were meeting an urgent need of developing more effective equipment 
for their players. They hoped their innovations might provide a model for the type of equipment 
all football players ought to wear, and they urged the need for standardization. “It is apparent that 
the time to establish minimum standards for football helmets is not only here but has passed,” 
insisted Dr. Fenner after documenting the “alarming variance in the performance of energy 
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absorption among different brands of helmets.” Only 3 of the 16 “major brands” of football 
helmets on the market provided adequate protection, he warned. Dr. Fenner concluded his 1964 
report by recommending banning the sale of plastic helmets to small children. Such helmets were 
then used not only in football but also in soapbox derbies, go-cart racing and baseball.
52
 
In additional to Dr. Snively and Dr. Fenner’s work to identify more effective materials 
for use in the construction of football helmets, the overall design of the helmet itself was also a 
source of contention. In particular, the recently added faceguard to maximize facial protection 
could interfere with players’ vision, a problem that was the focus of 1965 study conducted by 
neuroscientist Richard Schneider and ophthalmologist Bartley Antine. In comparing several 
different helmet designs, the physicians found that face guard innovations with the potential to 
enhance the overall protection afforded by football helmets would constrain players’ visual 
fields. In grappling with this trade-off, the authors stated that even a transient limitation on 
players’ vision might not only hamper their success on the field but could in turn increase their 
risk of injuries. While they acknowledged that no design was without its limitations, the authors 
ultimately recommended face guards with “J shaped” lower bars as the most promising design 
option to protect players’ faces without overly constraining their vision (see the fourth design 
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To address some of the difficulties involved in improving protective equipment, in 1968 
several doctors, academics, sports administrators and sporting goods manufacturers organized a 
national conference on protective equipment in sports. The members of the planning committee 
included Creighton J. Hale, then the director of research and vice president of Little League 
Baseball; as well team physicians; professors of physical education, safety education, and 
engineering; and the vice president of research and engineering of sporting goods manufacturer 
Riddell.
55
   
The concerns that prompted the organization of this 1968 conference included identifying 
where protective equipment would be of value in sports, how to improve currently available 
equipment, determining which newly available materials from the decade’s “scientific 
explosion” might be incorporated into protective equipment, and addressing the problem of 
setting standards for evaluating equipment.  The introduction to the conference proceedings also 
highlighted an overarching need for a more systematic and comprehensive approach to 
developing protective equipment:  
Although manufacturers of sports protective equipment are continually attempting to 
improve the quality of those products which are now available, their efforts have been 
guided more by individual suggestions from coaches, athletes and other interested 
persons and by deficiencies or failures of existing items rather than by a planned 
approach to the problems of protection in sports as a whole or even individual sports.
56
   
Athletic team physician Dr. Allan Ryan contributed a conference session examining the 
fundamental question of what injuries might be preventable with the use of protective equipment. 
He acknowledged that there existed significant skepticism that equipment was effective in 
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protecting athletes, particularly in contact or collision sports. “Studies of the forces involved 
when today’s fast and heavy athletes collide have raised serious doubts in the minds of some as 
to whether any type of protective equipment we can provide within the limits of practicability 
can decelerate these forces rapidly enough to prevent injury.” Furthermore, he continued, if 
equipment was effective, this might cause athletes to act in “careless disregard of injury,” taking 
risks that they might not have taken otherwise. Even worse, he added, they might use their 
equipment to deliberately injure another player. In making this point, Dr. Ryan was likely 
referring to the ongoing issue of “spearing” in tackle football.
57
  
Despite these caveats, the conference attendees did not propose removing any particular 
piece of equipment from any sport, but rather focused their recommendations on how to improve 
existing equipment. They called for establishing uniform injury reporting techniques and the use 
of standard nomenclature for athletic injuries in order to improve the accuracy of injury data. 
They further recommended the formation of a “Committee for Protective Equipment in Sports” 
that would include representatives from a wide range of fields, including physical education, 
sports supervision, recreation, medicine, safety education, engineering and design, sporting 
goods manufacturers, the suppliers of basic materials for manufacturers, and others. Such a 
committee would encompass protective equipment in a variety of sports: football, ice hockey, 
baseball, wrestling, basketball, soccer, lacrosse, and rugby. While not as far-ranging as the 
committee envisioned in these recommendations, the forthcoming establishment of the American 
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)’s Committee F-8 on sports equipment and the 
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National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment (NOCSAE) in 1970 would 
in many ways resemble this description.
58
 
Consumer Product Safety  
By the late 1960s and early 1970s researchers were increasingly applying 
epidemiological methods to the study of athletic injuries,
59
 but few studies evaluated the 
effectiveness of protective equipment. As one researcher would complain, there existed a 
“paucity of published information” on the effectiveness of football equipment: 
The design and construction of protective equipment, particularly for American contact 
football but for other sports too, has unfortunately followed a general pattern of consumer 
suggestion, generational development of prototype devices, and, what for the most part 
appears to be outright “divine guidance” in lieu of controlled field testing.
60
 
Yet a shift from “divine guidance” to controlled testing of athletic equipment was 
beginning to occur during this period. Two key developments contributed to an increasing 
emphasis on the systematic study and standardization of football equipment. First, changes in 
tort law meant that a new “strict liability” standard was increasingly applied in legal cases 
involving defective products, including lawsuits related to sporting goods. Previously in 
American law, plaintiffs needed to be in a contract relationship (in “privity”) with defendants as 
a necessary condition of liability. But a number of court cases chipped away at this requirement 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s.  
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Then, in 1963 the Supreme Court of California held in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc. that manufacturers would face strict liability for injuries to human beings caused 
by defects of their products. This new standard of strict liability meant that plaintiffs would not 
need to prove negligence or intent to cause injury, only that the product made by the 
manufacturer had caused a person harm. Furthermore, the weakening of the privity requirement 
meant that courts could find manufacturers legally responsible for the harms caused by defective 
athletic equipment beyond the individuals who had purchased the product. Courts would go on to 
recognize three general types of manufacturer conduct that might make a product unsafe: 




Leading tort law scholar William Prosser would describe the fall of the privity of contract 
“citadel” as “the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the 
entire history of the law of torts.” Strict products liability quickly swept across the United States. 
One of the seminal events that highlights the national shift to strict liability occurred in 1964, 
when the American Law Institute approved the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402, which was 
published in 1965. In addition, as Kenneth Abraham has argued, by the 1960s and 1970s the 
notion that the threat of increased liability could help prevent accidents, and “thereby reduce the 
amount of liability that actually needed to be imposed, became a standard feature of tort theory.” 
The ways sporting goods manufacturers responded to these changes in products liability will be 
discussed in further detail in chapter four. Nonetheless, the shift toward strict liability motivated 
                                                          
61
 William L. Prosser, “The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),” Minnesota Law Review 50 
(1966): 791-848; Aaron Gershonowitz, “The Strict Liability Duty to Warn,” Washington and Lee Law Review 44;1 
(1987): 71-107; Kenneth S. Abraham, The Liability Century: Insurance and Tort Law from the Progressive Era to 
9/11 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Kyle Graham, “Strict Products Liability at 50: Four 





manufacturers to support equipment standards and certification that would help them reduce their 
liability for harm caused by defective products.
62
 
Secondly, greater attention to the evaluation and standardization of protective equipment 
in sports occurred in the context of broader concerns about the safety of consumer products. In 
particular, concerns about motor vehicle safety ultimately inspired efforts to establish a federal 
consumer product safety agency. The hearings leading up to the establishment of this agency 
would highlight the risks of a number of consumer products, including football helmets.  
One of the most prominent developments in injury prevention in the 1960s was more 
active federal involvement in automobile and highway safety. Following the 1965 publication of 
Ralph Nader’s landmark book Unsafe at Any Speed, in 1966 U.S. President Lyndon Johnson 
signed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. This act created the National 
Highway Safety Bureau, whose first director was Dr. William Haddon, Jr., a pioneer in the field 
of injury prevention. The bureau, which would later become the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), adopted an epidemiological approach to preventing highway 
injuries. Rather than focusing on modifying driver behavior, regulators were authorized to set 
minimum safety standards for automobiles in the United States.
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Michael Pertschuk, then consumer counsel for the U.S. Senate’s Commerce Committee, 
would later recall how this federal legislation on automobile safety influenced efforts to protect 
American consumers from the dangers of consumer products more generally. After the passage 
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, U.S. Senator Warren Magnuson and his 
staff began exploring “what seemed to be the next logical step, omnibus product-safety 
legislation covering other potentially hazardous manufactured products.” They decided that an 
independent national product safety commission was not yet politically ripe, due to a lack of 
supporting data and an absence of public mobilization around consumer product safety. Instead, 
by introducing legislation to create a temporary National Commission on Product Safety (NCPS) 
to study the issue, the senator and his staff hoped to focus public attention on product safety and 
to develop a record of evidence on the hazards of consumer products. In this way, the 
commission was intended to foster the familiarity and legitimacy that would ultimately be 
necessary for the formation of a new regulatory commission.
64
  
Following the formation of the National Commission, the U.S. House of Representatives 
held hearings that addressed the dangers of a wide variety of consumer products. Among the 
products discussed, football helmets featured prominently. At hearings held in February 1969, 
the testimony of several lawyers, members of the public, and a professional football player 
focused on youth football injuries and the effectiveness of youth helmets. Examining the 
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varieties of testimony presented at these hearings clarifies how different interested groups framed 
the issue of protective equipment and football safety, and why football helmets remained on the 
commission’s agenda as a dangerous product of public concern. 
The testimony related to football helmets began with several personal stories from 
members of the public. Larry Csonka, a fullback with the Miami Dolphins, testified that even 
with his experience as a professional football player, he would not be able to determine which of 
two helmets in a sporting goods store would provide the greatest degree of safety. While Csonka 
believed that safe helmets were available, a consumer’s ability to determine which helmets were 
and were not safe was the essential missing factor, particularly at the younger levels of play. He 




Next, two parents, Mr. and Mrs. McLelland, each testified about a catastrophic injury 
their eighth grade son had suffered despite wearing a helmet while playing football. Following a 
collision with another player during a blocking exercise overseen by two coaches, their son 
Michael collapsed, went into a coma, and ultimately required five brain surgeries. At age 20, the 
young man was partially paralyzed, had a speech disorder, and was unable to care for himself. 
Mr. McLelland indicated that he and other parents had all been aware of and would be willing to 
accept injuries such as broken arms and broken legs. But based on his son’s experience, he 
                                                          
65
 “Statement of Larry Csonka,” National Commission on Product Safety Hearings, Washington, Jan-Feb 1969, 





argued that parents around the country needed to consider whether they would be willing to 
consent to brain injuries of this nature. 
66
 
Lawyer Harry M. Philo, whom the American Association for Justice would later describe 
as “one of the giants of plaintiff trial law,” proceeded to testify that helmet makers needed to be 
held liable for the injuries that football players sustained while using their products. Philo blasted 
helmet manufacturers for their role in serious and fatal football head injuries across the United 
States. He dubbed the injury toll from tackle football “a national disgrace that has been hidden 
from the public.” Makers of football helmets, he claimed, had failed to heed calls from doctors 
and coaches for the development of adequate standards of protection. Pointing to the research 
conducted by Dr. Snively and Dr. Fenner, Philo argued that helmets with a fiberglass shell 
offered greater protection; he claimed the main reason manufacturers had not switched to 
fiberglass shell helmets was that plastic helmets could be made so cheaply.
67
  
In addition to their failures to adopt more effective materials, Philo noted that never once 
had helmet manufacturers tested the safety of the 125,000 helmets they sold each year. Instead, 
he contended, engineering executives of the helmet manufacturers had “pleaded ignorance of the 
deficiencies in their helmets” and “put their heads in the sand.” As an example of the data the 
manufacturers were ignoring, Philo cited a 1967 study on the incidence of concussions among 
football players at 63 colleges. He warned that “the new knowledge of bizarre personality 
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changes caused by microscopic brain damage from subfatal acceleration injuries should cause 
society great concern over the inadequacy of football head protection.”
68
 
David Rust, an attorney representing Rawlings, a major sporting goods manufacturer 
based in St. Louis, Missouri, disputed Philo’s claims at the hearing. Rust asserted that Philo was 
exaggerating the numbers of injuries and deaths, that the statistics had not been hidden, and that 
the industry was working to understand what impacts helmets could absorb. Not only did helmet 
manufacturers face the challenge of how to improve helmet design, Rust added, but they also had 
to grapple with the trouble of players who preferred “a light helmet because they have a severe 
sweat problem.” Rust’s argument that athletes’ sweat represented a significant hurdle to 
improving protective equipment did not appear to impress the commission; Commissioner 
Emory Crofoot drily retorted, “Well, we can put a man on the moon, it would seem to me that we 
can overcome this problem.”
69
 
As an industry lawyer, Rust sought to portray football injuries as unpredictable and 
random occurrences. Even with helmets that could ultimately protect users from any head injury, 
he noted that manufacturers could not control for all circumstances: “we might also end up 
ruining the few boys who get socked with that helmet.” He cited documents from the 1968 
Conference on Protective Equipment in Sports to demonstrate the difficulty of protecting against 
injury in football, and the progress manufacturers had nonetheless made in improving the 
equipment. He portrayed sporting goods manufacturers as providing the best possible helmets 
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given the constraints of design and technical challenges. While stating that any single player’s 
death was of course important, Rust deftly minimized the number or importance of such sports-
related deaths by adding “as well as any death in the hundreds of thousands that we are losing in 
Vietnam.” He further insisted that “it is a physical impossibility to design a football helmet in the 
state of the art now or in the foreseeable future that will totally prevent death in a football game, 
and I don’t think there is any man today that will tell you it is possible to make that design 
criteria, and if it was, we would certainly like to meet him.”
70
  
Both Philo and Rust thus drew on available medical literature to make conflicting 
arguments about the effectiveness of available football helmets. Despite Rust’s testimony 
contending that manufacturers were designing the best possible helmets while forced to 
accommodate the inconvenient sweat problems and other whims of athletes, the NCPS continued 
to include football helmets among their list of dangerous products under review. At another 1969 
hearing, Representative Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania asked whether manufacturers should 
continue to have exclusive power to set standards for “football helmets that do not prevent brain 
concussions” along an array of other dangerous products, from charcoal lighters to floor furnaces 
with grills that could burn toddlers.
71
 
In 1970, the National Commission issued its final report to the president and Congress. In 
the report, Arnold B. Elkind, Chairman of the National Commission on Product Safety, argued 
that there was no justification for exposing an entire population to risks of injury or death that 
                                                          
70
 “Statement of David Rust,” National Commission on Product Safety Hearings, 430; Morton Mintz, “Hill 
Witnesses Rap Helmet Makers for Huge Injury Toll,” The Washington Post; February 19, 1969. 
 
71
 Joshua Eilberg, “Statement of Hon. Joshua Eilberg, A Representative in Congress From the State of 
Pennsylvania,” National Commission on Product Safety Extension and Child Protection Act: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of 
Representatives, 91
st





were not apparent to consumers. “Such hazards must be controlled and limited not at the option 
of the producer but as a matter of right to the consumer.” The report specifically identified 16 
consumer products as “unreasonably hazardous,” including football and motorcycle helmets in 
the category of protective headgear. After describing the severe injury suffered by eighth grader 
Michael McClelland, the report noted that “no industry standard whatever has been developed 
for protective headgear.” Furthermore, buyers were completely dependent upon manufacturers, 




The final report described the need for government action to address many glaring needs. 
In addition to football helmets, many other household and consumer products had prompted 
extensive concern, from fireworks to infant furniture. Major newspapers reported on the 
commission’s key findings and recommendations: No government agency had general authority 
to ban dangerous products or require that consumer products meet minimum safety standards. 
Existing authority over particular categories of products was scattered across agencies and 
hampered by “bargain-basement budgets” and enormous bureaucratic hurdles. The federal 
government did not systematically collect or disseminate data on product safety and thus had no 
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“early-warning system” of potentially hazardous products, nor could it mandate the recall of 
dangerous products.
73
   
Following the National Commission’s recommendation that Congress create an 
independent federal agency with substantial power to regulate consumer products, in October 
1972, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act to create the U.S. Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (CPSC). The CPSC, an independent federal agency to protect Americans 
from dangerous or defective consumer products, was granted the authority to set mandatory 
safety standards and to recall or ban products, among its other powers. To address the absence of 
injury data, Congress also gave the CPSC a major non-regulatory responsibility: the 




The CPSC would primarily meet this responsibility through the National Electronic 
Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), a system originally designed in 1970 to obtain injury data 
from a sample of 119 representative emergency rooms in the 48 contiguous U.S. States. The 
NEISS became the core data system of the CPSC’s Bureau of Epidemiology once the agency 
was activated in 1973; the NEISS thus formed one of the major mechanisms for the CPSC to 
collect injury statistics. A 1975 CPSC brochure, “Together we can reduce injury,” emphasized 
the NEISS as a key part of CSPC’s work and a source of reliable information about product 
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safety. The development of the NEISS was hailed as part of a broader movement toward a 
scientific approach to tracking and reducing injuries.
75
  
In 1974, the CPSC published an analysis of football injuries based on NEISS data, as 
well as an assessment of the efficacy of football equipment. The report estimated that 300,000 
football injuries were treated annually in hospital emergency rooms nationwide, a figure 
extrapolated from the 14,280 injuries reported in the NEISS data set for the 1973 calendar year. 
Over 80 percent of these football injuries affected children aged 5-19 years. The majority of 
these were strains, sprains, contusions and abrasions; in fact, only 1 percent of the reported 
injuries were concussions, “a diagnosis which can be quite serious,” observed the report. It 
seems probable that concussions were vastly underreported in this data set, given that football 
players were unlikely to go to the emergency room for treatment for a concussion during this 
period unless they had been severely and obviously injured.
76
 
The CPSC also assessed the effectiveness of protective equipment by conducting in-
depth investigations of 112 of the reported injuries. This subset of injuries was not randomly 
selected; instead, investigators focused on the most severe injuries documented in the emergency 
room records. Investigators assigned an evaluation of “Protective Equipment Not Effective” to 
cases where injuries occurred underneath protective padded covering (see Figure 9).  
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15 Hit in head Victim was tackled in a high 
school game. The coach said, 
when he fell, his chin hit the 
ground and the tackler’s jaw 






13 Hit in head After he was tackled in a Jr. 
High game, victim’s helmet 









16  Elbow in 
face 
After making a tackle during 
practice, other player’s 
forearm struck victim’s nose, 
breaking it. All of the players 
were practicing in full football 
protective equipment. 








10 Hit in head Victim was tackled in Midget 
league practice. “After the 
play was over, several other 









16 Tackling This was the first day of 
contact during pre-season 
practice. During one-on-one 
tackling the victim was struck 
by the head and shoulders of 
the other player, on helmet 
and upper trunk. He was lifted 
up and back falling on his 
buttocks. He suffered a mild 
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Most of these injuries occurred after contact or tackling, and included cases of 
concussions that occurred despite athletes wearing a helmet. Investigators found that when safety 
equipment was involved in injury, the equipment tended to be ineffective rather than defective. 
Most injuries were not life-threatening, the CPSC report observed. Nonetheless, the report 
concluded that “No single act, short of prohibiting football, could have a dramatic effect in 
reducing the injury rate.”
78
 
Setting Helmet Standards: ASTM and NOCSAE 
The consumer product safety movement that led to creation of CPSC also helped foster 
the creation of several committees to set voluntary standards for football helmets as a means to 
reduce injuries. By the 1960s, longstanding criticisms about the lack of data on football helmet 
safety or equipment standards had become complementary to broader calls for government 
health and safety research and regulation. The already established American Standards 
Association and the American Society for Testing and Materials, both non-profit voluntary 
standards associations formed by engineers and scientists, would devote attention to protective 
football gear. Ultimately, however, a new standards organization dedicated specifically to 
athletic equipment would prove most influential in the development of tackle football equipment 
standards. This new organization, NOCSAE, would also prove most influential in promoting the 
view that equipment standards were effective and essential to improving player safety. 
Dr. George Snively, who had researched football helmet design with collaborators at UC 
Davis, was involved in some of the earliest efforts to set national standards for protective 
headgear with the American Standards Association (ASA). The ASA had been originally 
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established as the American Engineering Standards committee by several professional societies 
of American engineers in 1916. Reorganized and renamed the ASA in 1928, this 
nongovernmental association set voluntary national standards for a range of products. In 1961, 
ASA established its first committee on protective headgear, with a focus on road user safety. The 
membership of this group, designated the Z90 Committee, included the United States Armed 
Forces, Motor Sports Associations, the National Safety Council, insurance associations, law 
enforcement agencies, helmet manufacturers, and independent experts. Chaired by Dr. Snively, 
the committee developed its first standard for headgear for vehicular users in 1966.
79
  
In November of 1967, the ASA’s Z90 committee first considered broadening its scope to 
include the development of standards for helmets used in sports, beginning with football. At the 
1969 NCPS hearings, Dr. Snively noted that the Z90 committee was in the midst of revising a 
draft for its first football helmet standard. Yet he testified that all “voluntary standards” suffered 
from a lack of enforcement. Despite the existence of the Z90 standard on vehicular headgear, he 
continued, “many manufacturers are far from the upper limits of the present state of the art with 
respect to their product.” Dr. Snively concluded that external quality control enforced by an 
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Around this same time, the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) also 
became involved in studying football helmets. Similar to ASA, ASTM was another voluntary 
standards organization; manufacturers could determine for themselves whether or not their 
products met any standards these organizations promulgated. ASTM announced in an October 
1968 newsletter that, at the request of representatives of organized football and of the American 
College of Surgeons, they would be sponsoring a conference on ways to reduce athletic injuries. 
They invited all interested parties, from players, trainers and doctors to design experts and 
sporting goods manufacturers, with the hope that “a re-examination of the entire football contact 
environment in such a multidisciplinary organization as ASTM can achieve beneficial results”
81
  
As so many other professional organizations had done, they noted the need for more research on 
football’s health risks. The conference announcement cited Dr. James E. Nixon, the team 
physician for the Philadelphia Eagles, on the inability to evaluate theories about the causes 




In 1969, ASTM staff sent out thousands of invitations to interested individuals and 
organizations to establish a new, broad-based technical committee on sports equipment and 
facilities. Designated as the F-8 committee, this committee was approved by ASTM’s Board of 
Directors to establish standards for sports equipment and related materials in order to minimize 
injuries, “with initial emphasis on football.” Dr. Creighton Hale, vice president and director of 
research for Little League Baseball, was elected chairman of the committee. Hale, a physiologist 
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and promoter of youth sports, had previously contended that available research favored 
participation as competitive sports as being beneficial overall for young children (see chapter 
two). Now, he would chair a committee intended to write minimum standards for protective 
equipment to reduce injuries associated with such sports.
83
 
At its first meeting in September 1969, Committee F-8 met to discuss “recommended 
practices to determine how to measure fit and the energy absorbing qualities of sports equipment, 
and to test restraint devices to protect various parts of the body as well as the changes in game 
rules to reduce injuries.” With an initial focus on football helmets and preventing head and neck 
injuries, the committee’s original subcommittees were entitled “Head and Neck” and “Body and 
Extremities.” As Committee F-8 expanded its work to include a range of other sports and 
activities, such as skiing and trampoline use, the committee was restructured into subcommittees 
with foci such as header, footwear, medical aspects, biomechanics, and statistics.
84
  
In 1971, Creighton J. Hale delivered a lecture at ASTM’s annual meeting in Atlantic 
City, New Jersey, where he discussed the work of the F-8 committee he chaired and the 
challenges the committee faced. He opened his address by quoting an engineer who, upon 
learning of ASTM’s newly created committee on sports equipment, asked the society’s 
managing director, “What in blazes is ASTM doing in that business?” Hale responded to this 
question, which was potentially shared by other members of ASTM, by contending that hundreds 
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of people were being killed or seriously injured while playing sports due to inadequate 
equipment. Despite years of recommendations for improving sports equipment, no standards had 
been developed, and it was unrealistic to expect manufacturers to resolve the problem alone. 
Instead, he continued, a team including engineers, physicians, coaches, trainers, research 
specialists and others would need to be involved, “and ASTM has the background, the expertise, 
and the formula and has now assembled the team necessary to establish these standards.”
85
  
Hale emphasized that the committee faced significant barriers in their efforts to develop 
such standards: “unfortunately, sufficient knowledge of human tolerance of impacts to the head 
is not available in a form that can be applied directly to the design of helmets.” Hale further 
highlighted the difficulties of conducting experiments which would provide data that 
corresponded to how the human brain actually responded to the forces and impacts to which 
players were subjected on the field. He concluded that the primary obstacle to improving 
protective equipment was not the various sporting events in which people engaged, but the “fact 




Media characterizations of the challenge of setting football helmet standards were at 
times more sanguine than Hale’s presentation. Hale’s statement that “What F-8 must accomplish 
can be stated very simply” was apparently rephrased by one reporter to read “Basically, it’s very 
simple to set standards for football equipment.” Yet in addition to the alteration of meaning 
involved in such a translation, Hale’s portrayal of the existing evidence also contributed to 
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downplaying the potential long-term risks of tackle football. “Some claim that professional 
football players get punchy from too many blows to the head, but there is no factual evidence to 
prove that claim now,” he was quoted as saying. The absence of evidence was construed as an 
absence of harm. Despite acknowledging the engineering challenges, Hale concluded his address 
with confidence that the ASTM’s sports equipment committee would successfully set effective 
helmet standards that would minimize injuries and deaths among sports participants.
87
  
In 1974, ASTM would publish and maintain a helmet test method for “Shock Attenuation 
Characteristics of Protective Headgear for Football,” a method supported by laboratory data from 
seven laboratories, “none of which is a football helmet manufacturer.” By 1976, Committee F-8 
boasted a roster of 263 members serving on 15 administrative, activities, and resource 
subcommittees. ASTM further expanded its work on sports-related standards by developing a 
new subcommittee focused on female athletes.
88
 
Neither ASA nor ASTM would have the influence on football helmets, however, of the 
National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment (NOCSAE). NOCSAE was 
similar to the ASTM’s committee in that it was created as a multidisciplinary group with an 
initial focus on football helmets. The organizations differed in several keys ways, however, and 
these differences help explain why NOCSAE’s certification standards ultimately proved most 
influential for tackle football equipment.  
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First, leading sports organizations, notably the NCAA at the college level and the 
NFSHSAA at the high school level, joined together in the formation of NOCSAE. As exercise 
and sport science researcher J. Nadine Gelberg has observed, the NCAA and NFSHAA’s 
involvement in NOCSAE was intended to ensure that sports organizations could retain control 
over sports standards, rules and regulations. The NCAA and NFSHSAA did not pay any 
membership dues to NOCSAE; instead, all of NOCSAE’s financial support came from the 
Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association. By contrast, ASTM’s committee emphasized 
expertise in standards writing rather than experience or vested interests in sports administration 
or sporting goods manufacturing. In fact, ASTM had a rule that the committee’s chairman could 
not be an equipment producer, hence the selection of Creighton Hale of Little League Baseball as 
chair. According to the “Regulations Governing ASTM Technical Committees,” another rule 
required that the number of producers could not exceed non-producers of sports equipment on 
the committee. On the other hand, with the logistical clout and financial support of leading 
sporting goods manufacturers and organized football organizations, NOCSAE standards were 
more readily available to be adopted by the rules committees of the NFHSAA and NCAA.
89
  
Secondly, ASTM operated as a “consensus” standards organization, which was required 
to follow a set of due process standards until “substantial agreement is reached by concerned 
interests according to the judgement of a duly appointed authority.” This was “the prime 
difference between a NOCSAE Standard and an ASTM voluntary consensus standard” explained 
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William Hulse of ASTM in 1976. ASTM defined this due process as involving eight points, 
including in part the opportunity of all interested parties to participate in meetings, the 
publication and distribution of meeting minutes, adequate notices of proposed standards and 
proposed actions, reports on balloting results, and attention to minority opinions throughout the 
process. While ASTM committees were open and any interested party could participate in 
meetings, NOCSAE was composed of organizations and its membership was closed.
90
  
Sports safety researcher Dr. Kenneth S. Clarke later recalled that the formation of 
NOCSAE was prompted by the determination that ASTM’s typical lengthy “consensus” process 
for developing standards “would be too time-consuming to rely on for the earliest possible 
resolution” of the football head injury problem. But this desire to swiftly establish safety 
standards for equipment was in turn connected with a fear of potential lawsuits. In 1970, NCAA 
News described the formation of NOCSAE as part of an article announcing a jury decision—a 
victory, from the NCAA’s perspective—to clear Rawlings Sporting Goods Company of any 
legal responsibility for a catastrophic football injury. The case had involved a high school 
football player who was left quadriplegic “from a violent twisting of the head” after being 
tackled, despite having worn a Rawlings football helmet.
91
  
David Rust, counsel for Rawlings in this case and one of the lawyers who had testified at 
the 1969 NCPS hearings, explained that he and his legal team had needed to show that the 
helmet had nothing to do with the injury, because helmets could not protect players against 
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rotational forces. “The only way to protect against this is to encapsule the person—but then he 
couldn’t play football.” As Rust had successfully argued in court, the serious risks associated 
with twisting or rotational forces could not be prevented with protective gear, and limiting boys 
from playing football was seemingly not an option open for consideration. Consequently, such 




Despite this particular victory, however, sporting goods manufacturers and sports 
organizations remained concerned about the potential legal responsibility they might face down 
the road for severe sports injuries. The NCAA News warned readers that “vindication proved 
expensive for Rawlings,” with a price tag of $500,000 for legal fees and other expenses. James 
H. Wilkinson, an NCAA staffer and secretary of NOCSAE, stated, “A very grave danger to 
intercollegiate—and all other—athletics does exist concerning protective headgear and, while 
negligence per se does not exist, all organizations concerned are anxious to increase safety and to 
resolve the legal problems quickly.”
93
 Dr. William Combs, a NOCSAE committee member 
representing the American College Health Association, told NCAA News “the future of athletics 
is in jeopardy because of potential lawsuits relating to injuries received in sports.”
94
  
Although planning for NOCSAE began in 1969, the first formal meeting of the 
organization did not take place until April 8, 1970. Representatives from sporting goods 
companies (Rawlings, Wilson, MacGregor, Spaulding, and Riddell), the National Federation of 
State High School Associations, the National Junior College Athletic Association, Oklahoma 
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State University, Big Eight Conference, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), 
and the National Athletic Trainers Association attended this first formal meeting of NOCSAE. 
The committee unanimously agreed that creating NOCSAE as a permanent committee, with the 
goal of establishing minimum standards for athletic equipment, was in the best interests of 
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics.
95
   
In 1970, NOCSAE awarded its first research grant to the Department of Neurosurgery at 
Wayne State University in Detroit for a one year study of the effects of head impacts in tackle 
football. In 1971, research led by engineer Dr. Voigt Hodgson began at Wayne State’s Gurdijan-
Lissner biomechanics lab; the university had been selected to develop NOCSAE’s voluntary 
football helmet standard. Dr. Hodgson wrote that the first problem he confronted was devising a 
more realistic head model for use in testing. He used measurements from cadavers to develop a 
synthetic head model, and devised a test method based on a cerebral concussion tolerance curve 
that had been developed in 1966 by Charles Gadd of General Motors. At the Fourteenth Stapp 
Car Crash Conference in 1970, critics would urge caution in using such popular head tolerance 
criteria because it was based on translational motion instead of rotational motion. Translational 
motion, or linear motion, refers to movement in a single direction, whereas rotational motion 
refers to movement around an axis. Rotational movements of the brain are common in cases of 
“whiplash” with no direct impact to the head, for instance. Critics observed that rotational 
motion appeared to be more critical than linear motion to the production of human brain injury. 
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Nonetheless, the development of NOCSAE football helmet standards was closely connected with 
car crash safety research based on linear impacts that had been conducted in the 1960s.
96
   
In 1973, NOCSAE promulgated its first helmet standard, and leading organized tackle 
football organizations at both the youth and college levels quickly adopted the standards. In 
1975, Dr. Hodgson noted that all new helmets in high school and college football would be 
certified by the NOCSAE standard. After a “grandfather” period for older helmets, NOCSAE 
certified helmets would become mandatory in 1978 for NCAA college players and in 1980 for 
high school players playing under the auspices of the National Federation for State High School 
Associations (NFHS). Dr. Hodgson expressed confidence that the replacement of older helmets 
with NOCSAE certified helmets would significantly reduce head injuries.
97
 
As the ASTM committee developed a football helmet testing method and continued to 
work on a standard, and as the adoption of NOCSAE helmet standards got underway, football 
coaches and administrators were clearly eager to adopt the most effective equipment for their 
players. At times, they were also understandably confused and even frustrated by the apparent 
proliferation of standards without a clear indication of which specific helmets offered the most 
protection. A 1976 conference on sports safety co-sponsored by the American School and 
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Community Safety Association and the Sports Safety and Health Care Society included a session 
on sports equipment and facilities standards with extensive presentations from both NOCSAE 
and ASTM representatives. When the floor was finally opened for a question and answer period, 
the very first questioner inquired,  
We spent a lot of time and energy to improve our football program for next year. Despite 
all our efforts, we could not find anyone to tell us what was the best kind of helmet to 
buy. Is there any possibility that at some point these helmets will be ranked in order 
according to safety and/or will anybody who is in a responsible position come out and 
give us a definite answer as to what is the safest helmet to put on a youngster’s head?
98
 
In response to this question, Dr. Hodgson of NOCSAE said at the moment he did not 
want to endorse any particular helmet, and that defining the “best helmet” was difficult. Instead 
of ranking helmets, NOCSAE was offering a minimum standard for helmets to meet, and 
helmets that met this standard would be granted NOCSAE’s certification and seal of approval. In 
advance of making NOCSAE certified helmets mandatory in 1980, in 1979 the NFHS prepared a 
set of “NOSCAE Questions and Answers” to clarify the requirements for its members. As 
published in the November 1979 issue of the Kentucky High School Athlete, the handout 
indicated that referees would not be expected to specifically inspect helmets to see whether they 
carried the NOCSAE seal. Instead, each team’s head coach, along with the school’s trainers and 
equipment managers, would be responsible for ensuring their players were wearing proper 
equipment. Given that the expectation that student-athletes would need to wear NOCSAE-
certified helmets was first mentioned in 1974, NFHS schools would not be permitted any 
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waivers past the 1980. To this end, the handout reiterated the view that the adoption of the 
NOCSAE test standard was associated with fewer football head injuries and fatalities.
99
 
NOCASE’s helmet standard had been swiftly adopted amid ongoing scientific 
uncertainty about how effectively such lab-tested standards might translate into on-field 
protection, particularly with regard to preventing concussions. As Dr. Voigt Hodgson of 
NOCSAE acknowledged in response to a question about higher helmet standards, “We just don’t 
know that much and we’re kind of feeling our way along . . . . It’s not pure science that we are 
dealing with here.” In fact, in a 1977 review of NOCASE’s standards program, Dr. Hodgson 
expressed the hope that one of the more counterintuitive ways NOCSAE helmets standards 




As it turned out, the promulgation of NOCSAE standards would not only raise questions 
about equipment limitations, but also about the limits of NOCSAE’s standards themselves. In 
1984, researchers G. Rex Bryce and Ruel M. Barker at Brigham Young University would call 
into question NOCSAE’s “woefully inadequate” testing policy of sampling a single helmet in 
order to determine whether a set of refurbished helmets were acceptable. In their study, Barker 
and Bryce obtained 30 helmets from three different schools that had been furnished by three 
different manufacturers. After labeling and randomizing the helmets, they sent the helmets to 
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Don Gleisner of the All American Company, a company which reconditioned football helmets 
and shoulder pads. Gleisner in turn enlisted the help of Dr. Voigt Hodgson to test the helmets 
according to NOCSAE standard testing procedures at Dr. Hodgson’s Wayne State laboratory. 
Based on the results of these tests, Barker and Bryce found that both the testing variability and 
the helmet-to-helmet variability was much larger than expected, meaning that helmets could 
frequently be found in compliance without actually meeting the NOCSAE standard. They 
concluded that “the current recertification standard established by NOCSAE will do little to 
protect players if it is followed to the letter by refinishing firms.”
101
  
But even before later studies identified such flaws in NOCSAE’s testing methods, 
NOCSAE was not without its critics. Lawyer Harry Philo, who had testified at the 1969 NCPS 
hearings on the inadequacy of football head protection, was particularly severe in his 
characterization of NOCSAE standards and the process by which they had been created. 
According to Philo, helmet manufacturers had resisted meaningful standards, and NOCSAE was 
formed as a more “compatible” organization for the interests of the industry.  Members of the 
committee “quickly gave their NOCSAE seal of approval” to an ineffective standard which did 
not address injuries related to face guards. Furthermore, he continued: 
They just as quickly eliminated the independent scientists and critics—men such as Dr. 
George Snively and Dr. C.D. Chichester of the prestigious Snell Memorial Foundation; 
Dr. Verne Roberts and Dr. James McElhaney of the Highway Safety Research Institute; 
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Dr. Harold Fenner, pioneer in football helmet and head protection; Marshall Irving, 
helmet test engineer, and others. The resistance to meaningful criticism and the desire of 
NOCSAE to meet in secret continues today; conferences and seminars are only open to 
invitees . . . . Most (but not all) helmet manufacturers are still making tens of thousands 
of helmets each year that will not even meet the NOCSAE approval level. If coaches are 
willing to buy inferior products, then industry stands willing to participate (for profit) in 




Such biting critiques of NOCSAE were not discussed in popular media, however, and 
thus did not appear to influence public perception of the standards committee. Instead, NOCSAE 
standards were largely celebrated as scientific efforts to prevent injuries. In 1979, John Friend, a 
high school football coach, athletic director, and national football chairman of the National High 
School Athletic Coaches Association, argued in the Chicago Tribune that NOCSAE played a 
major role in football safety. He cited statistics showing a decline in catastrophic head and neck 
injuries, and told readers that football was becoming “safer and more skillful each year as 
coaching technique improves and equipment is researched and upgraded.” Sporting goods stores 
advertised their NOCSAE approved helmets. Helmet safety testing and the use of equipment 
approved by NOCSAE reassured coaches and administrators that they were appropriately 
managing the risks of youth football to the best of their abilities. As one high school football 
coach, a self-described “safety kook,” put it, “I feel that if every kid has his equipment checked 
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Many sports medicine professionals shared this confidence in protective equipment. A 
1980 article by a certified athletic trainer and a physician in the American Journal of Sports 
Medicine claimed that “today’s modern equipment provides adequate protection,” and “all 
helmets with the NOCSAE seal provide adequate protection if properly fitted.” The culprit for 
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injuries was not the equipment itself, but overconfident athletes playing with “reckless abandon” 
or using improper or ill-fitting equipment. To address the latter problem, a problem particularly 
in evidence at the high school level of play, the authors furnished a fitting guide of the different 




By 1980, equipment standards organizations, medical professionals and coaches had 
endorsed the belief that modern, standardized equipment, when properly fitted and worn, 
provided youth football players sufficient protection against injuries. NOCSAE helmet standards 
were institutionalized and mandated by the most influential organized football associations, 
notably the NCAA and the NFHS. The use of standardized equipment could even provide adults 
involved in youth football a “clear conscience”: if injuries did occur, the adults had done all that 
was possible to protect their players. But the function of equipment in providing reassurance—
and absolution in the event of injury—highlighted one of the most important ongoing tensions in 
the debates over protective football equipment: whether even the best equipment could 
effectively compensate for the limits of the human body.  
From Dr. Pisani’s opinion that “the human knee was not meant for football” to the 1974 
CPSC report’s conclusion that no act short of banning football could dramatically reduce 
injuries, a number of doctors and prominent safety organizations had pointed to the limits of 
football equipment. Some epidemiological research conducted by state athletic associations also 
suggested that equipment modifications would not significantly reduce football injuries. 
Nonetheless, a broader consumer product safety movement and concerns about football helmet 
related lawsuits, particularly in the context of a move toward strict liability in tort law, helped 
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motivate a focus on the standardization and evaluation of football equipment in football safety 
efforts.  
The work of ASTM’s Committee F-8, NOCSAE, and the CPSC on athletic equipment 
offered competing understandings of the relationship between football equipment and safety. But 
even the range of these organizations’ perspectives highlights the constraints all these 
committees face in framing the risks of youth football. Although NOCSAE in many ways 
represented the most sanguine take on the potential of football equipment, its lead researcher, Dr. 
Hodsgon, hoped his work would prevent injuries in part by highlighting the limitations of 
helmets. Meanwhile, the CPSC, despite claiming that injuries could not be dramatically reduced 
without prohibiting tackle football, nevertheless did not regard limiting youth football as a viable 
option.  As the CPSC’s 1974 report noted, “Frequently, one can seek to prevent the potentially 
hazardous event, thereby preventing the injury. In football, we must reduce the risk of injury but 
permit a potentially hazardous activity to occur.”
106
 Even where the limitations of helmets were 
most acknowledged, the perpetuation of youth football was taken as a given. Meanwhile, even 
the researcher behind NOCSAE’s first helmet standard acknowledged the uncertain science 
involved in his work and the inherent limitations of helmets as a preventative measure. 
Equipment debates were influenced by the nature of the equipment under question. The 
prevention of dental injuries was both particularly urgent and relatively easy to assess given the 
visibility of tooth damage and loss. Data on mouth guards clearly indicated their effectiveness, 
and their introduction to the sport thus proved largely uncontroversial. Whether modifying 
football shoes could effectively prevent knee and ankle injuries, however, was less clear. 
NYSPHSAA researchers suggested that considering changing the “traditional” nature of football 
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might be necessary in order to meaningfully reduce such injuries. The mechanics of human 
joints, particularly the knee, made equipment seem like a less promising avenue to preventing 
such injuries. 
Knee and ankle injuries, however, were acknowledged to be an inherent part of tackle 
football in a way that head injuries not. As the testimony of two parents about their injured son at 
the 1969 NCPS hearings indicated, parents were not willing to accept catastrophic brain injuries 
in the way that they might accept broken legs or arms. Consequently, football helmets proved to 
be the source of greatest debate and concern. Ultimately, the desire to preserve football— 
including the efforts of sporting goods manufacturers to reduce their liability (which will be 
discussed further in chapter four)—prompted investment in developing football helmet 
standards. Helmet standardization efforts were consistent with ideological beliefs about the value 
of football, as discussed in chapters one and two. They were also consistent with American faith 
in science and technology to control hazards. Coaches wanted to preserve football and protect 
their players, and furnishing athletes with the most modern equipment seemed to fulfill both 
these goals. Despite the ongoing uncertainty about the reliability and effectiveness of protective 
equipment, football gear not only remained a primary focus of football safety debates, but 




Chapter Four. “High School Football is a Costly Sport”
1
: Sporting Goods Manufacturers, 
Insurance, and Responsibility for Injury, 1950s-1980s  
“High school athletic directors and football coaches…must be as adept at handling dollars as 





 Contemporary tackle football requires a great deal of protective equipment, from helmets 
to shoulder pads to cleats. As discussed in previous chapters, this protective gear represented an 
ongoing focal point in debates over the safety of youth football.  Furthermore, the cost of this 
equipment, as well as the expenses associated with injuries sustained by athletes, made tackle 
football one of the most expensive sports programs for youth. Consequently, two industries with 
substantial financial stakes in youth football were insurance companies and sporting goods 
manufacturers. This chapter examines how these financial interests influenced debates over the 
safety of youth football, including claims manufacturers made about the efficacy of their 
equipment, as well as contention over which parties should be held legally and financially 
responsible for the costs associated with injuries. 
Sporting Goods Manufacturers and Football Equipment 
As Stephen Hardy has argued, the development and dissemination of standardized 
sporting goods contributed to the adoption of standardized behavior and values in sports, with a 
“network of expert coaches, journalists, administrators, manufacturers, and dealers” largely 
defining the boundaries of organized athletics.
3
 By extension, the makers of this protective 
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equipment shaped safety debates, as well as fundamentally influencing the very nature of 
organized football itself. In promoting their business interests, sporting goods dealers and 
manufacturers influenced understandings of youth football’s health effects, which groups should 
be considered responsible for football injuries, and the role that their various products could play 
in mitigating risks. 
In the United States, the Sports & Fitness Industry Association, originally established as 
the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association (SGMA), has long stood as the leading trade 
association of manufacturers and retailers of sports equipment. The SGMA was founded by 
manufacturers of baseball supplies in New York City, as announced in the April 1906 issue of 
the Sporting Goods Gazette. Jason Fletcher Draper of the Draper-Maynard Sporting Goods 
Company in Plymouth, New Hampshire was elected president, while Cincinnati, Ohio was 
chosen as the site of the new association’s headquarters.
4
  
Founded in 1840 by Draper’s father and uncle as a home workshop for tanning and glove 
making, by 1906, the Draper-Maynard Sporting Goods Company employed over 100 men and 
women and was engaged in factory production of sporting goods for national markets. The 
company run by SGMA’s first president thus exemplified a broader historical transition from 
handmade goods to industrially produced sporting goods equipment. By the time the SGMA was 
established, the mass factory production of sports equipment was already well under way, 
including football-specific items (see figures 11 and 12). Sporting goods manufacturers were 
operating in the context of a burgeoning sporting goods market. The 1900 U.S. Census listed 144 
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sporting goods manufacturers (excluding bicycles and billiards), including big names such as 
Spalding and Rawlings, as well as many smaller firms competing for business.
5
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Figure 12. Leather Cutting Room, Draper-Maynard Sporting Goods, c. 1900-1910
7 
 
According to the organization itself, the SGMA has been closely connected with 
concerns over the safety of youth football since its 1906 founding. In 2006, the SGMA published 
a commemorative report on the organization’s century-long history, observing that the SGMA 
was founded shortly after the creation of the NCAA in response to outcry over college football 
injuries and deaths. While noting that the gathering of athletic manufacturers was not assembled 
directly in response to the college football injury crisis, “it is significant that the SGMA and 
NCAA began working together to make football, as well as other sports, as injury-free as 
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possible.” The SGMA’s account of its own history, then, emphasizes the industry’s close 
association with efforts to prevent football-related injuries since the organization’s founding.
8
 
One of the most important football equipment manufacturers, however, was not 
established until several decades later. In 1922, John Tate Riddell, a football coach at Evanston 
High School in Illinois, tried to solve a problem his players and other football athletes were 
experiencing with their shoes: the wood or leather cleats nailed to the bottom of the shoes did not 
work in wet weather. Furthermore, the nails at the bottom of the shoes sometimes caused 
injuries. In response to these difficulties, Riddell designed the first removable screw-on cleat, 
using hard rubber cleats that could be taken on and off players’ shoes. He equipped his entire 
high school football team with these interchangeable cleats, and by 1923 Northwestern 
University’s football team was wearing them, too. In 1927, Riddell decided to quit teaching and 
coaching, and opened his own company to manufacture the equipment.
9
   
 Based in Chicago, Riddell’s company began by producing these new football cleats and 
also manufacturing the first soft-spike baseball shoe. But ultimately, Riddell’s most influential 
innovation was not in athletic footwear, but in football helmet design. In 1939, Riddell 
introduced the first plastic helmet, “the granddaddy of helmet innovations,” using tenite, a tough 
cellulosic plastic. He further developed the sling suspension, a design which provided a pocket of 
air between the player’s head and the hard outer shell of the football helmet. Improving the 
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helmet design and plastic materials required several years of additional experimentation. Gerry 
Morgan, who joined Riddell in 1945 and later became the company’s chairman, recalled that it 
took until 1950 to finally obtain the right thermoplastic that could absorb impacts and withstand 
temperature changes. He further highlighted the challenges the company faced in designing 




 In addition to the technical difficulties that required time and new materials to resolve, a 
relative hiatus in football helmet making occurred with the onset of World War II, while Riddell 
instead devoted many of its resources to military helmet production. The U.S. Army provided the 
company with business by adopting a modified version Riddell’s plastic helmets for their 
paratroopers to use. After seeing a Riddell football helmet displayed in a Georgia sporting goods 
store, an army parachute troop officer liked the greater ventilation and safety afforded by the “off 
the head” style of Riddell’s sling suspension design. In collaboration with the Army, Riddell and 
his company of 150 employees made some modifications to the helmet, such as a shortening of 
the ear guards to facilitate the ability of parachute troopers to fire their rifles from their 
shoulders. Gerry Morgan recalled, “Every GI who went through training wore one and we gave 
it [the patent] to the government for what I regret was a ridiculously low fee.”
11
  
After World War II, Riddell returned to its focus on football helmets, a product line 
which received a major boost when the company began selling its helmets to NFL teams. The 
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Chicago Rockets were their first professional customers, followed by the Cleveland Browns. In 
traveling with teams to adjust and refine helmet designs, Gerry Morgan developed a bar attached 
to the helmet to protect the face of Cleveland Browns quarterback Otto Graham. This 
development eventually led to the double bar and the face mask, which proved to be a central 
point of debate over helmet safety in the 1960s, as discussed in chapter three. By 1949, Riddell 
had the largest share of the professional football market.
12
 
Riddell’s connections with professional football and the military helped propel the 
company to the forefront of football helmet manufacturing. By the mid-1970s, virtually all NFL 
players were wearing Riddell helmets; the New England Patriots were the only NFL team still 
using a different brand. Riddell’s success contributed not only to the proliferation of its brand, 
but also to establishing plastic football helmets as essential to both football safety and to the style 
of the game itself, including the ways players used their heads as weapons. Sporting goods 
manufacturers, of course, emphasized that their product should not be considered responsible for 
such risks. In a 1976 interview with the Chicago Tribune, Gerry Morgan would blame high 
school coaches who taught dangerous strategies such as “spearing” for football injuries. He 
lamented, “the more we’ve improved the equipment, it seems it’s been to the detriment of the 
game.” Meanwhile, the majority of NFL players were modeling both the equipment and playing 
strategies for younger players. As the Chicago Tribune reporter noted, “The Riddell name is 
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clearly emblazoned on the front of the helmets millions of American see slamming and banging 
into each other on television every weekend from September through January.”
13
 
Riddell was unique in its prominence and specialization in football equipment, but far 
from alone in its growth and success in the market for sporting goods. Both football participation 
and equipment sales grew in the decades after World War II. In his 1963 examination of sports in 
American life, writer Robert Boyle compiled sports participation estimates from the Athletic 
Institute, the Athletic Goods Manufacturers and Triangle Publications. These organizations 
estimated that football had grown from 1,500,000 participants in 1946 to 2,000,000 participants 
in 1961. Their data also indicated that total U.S. consumer purchases of sporting goods 




Indeed, a 1958 analysis of sports sales in the Wall Street Journal reported that sporting 
goods industry seemed to be “one of the most sturdily recession-resistant industries in the United 
States” that year. Reporting that the three big producers of sports equipment—A.G. Spalding & 
Co., Wilson and MacGregor—all saw sales in 1958 greater or equal to those of the previous 
year, the Wall Street Journal’s staff reporters speculated that the industry might be aided by the 
country’s youthful demographics. There were five million more American teenagers than even 
just five years prior, and school athletic programs were expanding as a result. The sporting goods 
boom continued through the 1960s; economist Richard Synder found that total sporting goods 
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sales in the United States more than doubled from 1958 to 1969, from $1,872,600,000 to 
$4,077,500,000. He dubbed the sales of sporting goods to be “a vast, record-breaking human 
endeavor” (see Figure 13).
15
 




The popularity of tackle football and the amount of equipment required for the sport 
presented a particularly promising business opportunity. According to the Athletic Goods 
Manufacturer’s Association, in the fall 1958 season, 11,500 high schools would be fielding 
football teams, an increase of 1,000 schools from the previous year. Meanwhile, 100,000 
younger boys were playing with the Pop Warner and National Boys Football leagues. Even at the 
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Pop Warner level of play, the range of required equipment included helmets, pads, uniforms, and 
face and teeth protectors, at an estimated cost of $30 per player in 1961.
17
  
Perhaps once of the most straightforward ways to estimate football participation was 
through the sales of footballs. According to this measure, too, the sport’s popularity continued to 
climb past the 1950s and through the 1960s. In 1966, according to the Sporting Goods 
Manufacturers Association, retail sales of footballs increased to a larger extent than any other 
common sporting goods item from 1960 to 1965. Football retail sales increased over 60% during 
this period, from $10,208,000 in 1960 to $16,372,000 in 1965. Furthermore, sporting goods 
retailers’ percent of total retail trade in the United States rose from 2.4% in 1954 to 3.4% in 




 One of the key ways in which sporting goods manufacturers influenced public 
understandings of youth football safety was through advertising their equipment. In the late 
nineteenth century, emerging sporting goods equipment powerhouses such as Spalding not only 
promoted their own brands, but emphasized the need for their new industry’s very existence. For 
example, Stephen Hardy has drawn attention to a series of 1893 Spalding advertisements in the 
Sporting News that depicted equipment produced by independent craftsman as undermining 
players’ performance. One such ad portrayed a baseball player struggling to round the bases in 
shoes produced by “some inexperienced cobbler.” In these early advertisements, manufacturing 
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firms argued that handcrafted gear would no longer suffice; only manufacturing firms could 




Sports marketing and management researchers Lawrence W. Fielding and Lori K. Miller 
have argued that in the 1920s, sporting goods advertisements shifted from promoting product 
quality to more intangible appeals and promises. Their findings were consistent with Theodore 
Levitt’s analysis of intangible appeals in marketing.  Levitt noted, for instance, that Kodak did 
not emphasize the superior luminescence of it photographic film in advertisements to prospective 
buyers, but rather the promise and satisfaction of memories preserved. Similarly, sports 
advertisements increasingly emphasized how sports equipment and participation could enhance 
personal style, identity, fulfillment and personality development.
20
  
Advertisements for protective sports equipment, however, inherently signaled to 
consumers that sports activities carried a certain element of risk. The importance of 
communicating that their equipment could effectively minimize those risks thus interacted with 
the emphasis on personal fulfilment and achievements. For decades, sporting goods 
manufacturers consistently promoted their equipment to athletes and coaches as both protecting 
players against injuries as well as improving athletic performance.  
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For example, a 1935 advertisement for Rawlings football equipment entitled “Banish fear 
of injuries” was published in Athletic Journal, a trade journal aimed at coaches. The subsequent 
text emphasized that without fear of injuries, coaches’ athletes could play harder and tougher. 
“Your men can smash through and play their hardest when outfitted with Rawlings equipment…. 
They’ll buck, tackle and block with that air of confidence born only through banishment of 
injury fears.” The Wilson Sporting Goods Company told coaches that “the ability of your team to 
win” depended on the action, protection and comfort afforded by their varsity and more 
popularly priced lines of football equipment. Their protective gear included saddle seat football 
pants, cantilever shoulder pads, corset-back helmets, thigh guards, and kidney pads that were 
built to cover players’ hip bones, kidneys, pelvic bones and lower ribs. The J.A. Dubow 
Manufacturing Company observed that while good football equipment alone couldn’t win 
championships, by preventing injuries and giving players assurance, quality equipment was a key 
part of the “victory complex.” Such advertisements not only communicated that football 
equipment could eliminate concerns about injuries, but that the elimination of such concerns was 
crucial to athletic achievements.
21
  
Advertisements aimed both at coaches and at young prospective players promulgated 
remarkably similar claims through the decades. Yet sales pitches to younger players included the 
additional appeal that child athletes could emulate their older role models. In 1959, a Rawlings 
advertisement featuring NFL coach Buddy Parker published in Boys Life, the official youth 
magazine of the Boy Scouts of America, was evidently aimed at young prospective football 
players. Pictured next to a young boy wearing a football helmet, Buddy Parker recommended 
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Rawlings equipment, explaining that the manufacturer’s helmets and shoulder pads not only 
protected against injury, “but they give the confidence and freedom of action needed for good 
blocking and tackling.” The ad further noted that Buddy Parker and players named in the 
advertisement were members of Rawlings’ Advisory Staff. An additional portion of the ad 
promoted a “Tobin Rote helmet” and a “Bobby Layne official youth football,” both named for 
professional football stars of the day (see figure 14).
22
 
Figure 14. Rawlings Advertisement for Football Equipment, 1959 
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Even when they did not include the explicit sponsorship of professional coaches or 
football players, advertisements targeted at younger children emphasized that the equipment 
would afford youth athletes the same protection as their older football heroes. In the September 
1960 issue of Boys’ Life, for example, MacGregor depicted a boy wearing a football helmet and 
a reproduction of a Baltimore Colts’ uniform, “just like the pros wear!” Meanwhile, in 
September 1962, Wilson asked young readers if they were ready for big-time football, stating 
that “Wilson gives you the same type of protective equipment worn by leading high school, 
college and professional teams. You get the same helmet and pads worn by top gridiron stars, 
scaled to your size to give you maximum protection.” Football equipment was a means by which 
children in youth leagues could aspire to future high school, college and even professional 
football stardom. Football equipment was thus imbued with many meanings, from eliminating 
fear of injuries to enabling boys to identify with football heroes and allowing them to see 
themselves on the path to similar athletic achievements.
23
 
In addition to linking their equipment with athletic stars and role models, sporting goods 
manufacturers studied how to make the best use of boys’ relationships with their family, 
particularly their fathers, in advertising their equipment. A 1958 study examining sales, 
advertising, and merchandising challenges confronted by the Rawlings Sporting Goods 
Company devoted much space to developing a “typology of paternal participants” and the ways 
the company could crafts its appeals accordingly. Although the study was primarily focused on 
baseball gloves, the report suggested that its findings could be applied to Rawlings’ other 
product lines, and even that the company should emphasize “the continuity of sports in all 
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The Institute for Motivational Research’s report identified three types of fathers, each of 
whom could provide a particular target for advertising appeals. The first type was the “vicarious 
athlete,” who sought to recapture his own athletic past and participated in athletics through his 
son. The vicarious athlete perceived the best equipment as enabling his son to perform well. 
Secondly, the “genuine athlete” believed in the value of sports participation as an integral part of 
a “healthy life.” Finally, the “indifferent athlete” was a father whose primary interest was in 
developing a strong relationship with his child. He was thus drawn to sports not as a good itself, 
but as an instrument to strengthening a father-child relationship. Identifying these father-son 
relationships as key to sporting goods purchases, the report recommended that Rawlings craft 
appeals to each of these types of fathers. For example, to appeal to the “indifferent athlete” 
father, the report recommended that Rawlings produce advertisements that depicted fathers and 
sons in action, enjoying sports together.
25
 
The October 1955 cover of Boys’ Life magazine depicted this idealized relationship 
between fathers and sons playing football, with an added twist: the two sons and father on the 
cover were mirroring the positions of the professional football players seen on the television in 
their living room (see Figure 15). Interestingly, the two sons are wearing football headgear, but 
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not their father, perhaps indicating how youth football was already associated with the organized 
version of the game that required protective equipment, while fathers were merely 
“roughhousing” with their sons. This imagery evident in both equipment advertisements and 
boys’ magazines illustrated how male role models, from professional players to fathers, could 
and should promote the desirability of participation in youth football. 
Figure 15. October 1955 Cover of Boys’ Life Magazine 
 
Yet mothers were not wholly absent from the youth sports advertising picture. They 
could be also vicarious athletes, the pilot study of Rawlings’ marketing techniques noted, 




it. I realize that I missed so much.”
26
 To acknowledge the interest of women in sports, and 
especially their role in purchasing equipment for sons or nephews as gifts, the report suggested 
that Rawlings stress the “whole family” appeal of youth sports, including mothers. Such 
advertising techniques reinforced popular beliefs about women’s involvement in athletics, 
particularly tackle football, as being relegated to supplying their sons with equipment, rides to 
games, snacks, and other types of assistance from the sidelines. As discussed in chapter one, 
tackle football was portrayed as providing a role for each member of a heterosexual nuclear 
family that conformed to prevailing gender norms. 
Advertisements also featured numerous claims about protective equipment being 
scientifically designed. Such claims were widely promulgated although no standards for football 
helmets or other protective football equipment existed before the 1970s, and protective football 
gear was not systematically evaluated for its effectiveness on the field. For example, in 1932, the 
Witchell Sheill Company advertised its “scientific football shoes” featuring “eleven points of 
superiority.” In 1946, Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Company promoted its “scientifically 
constructed shoes” which would “positively” prevent football injuries.
27
 In 1947, MacGregor 
Goldsmith described its new plastic football helmet as “the product of many years’ painstaking 
research and experimentation.” In 1950, Spalding advertised its “scientifically padded” helmet to 
provide the “utmost protection.” In 1954, Rawlings asserted that its football helmet could 
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dissipate “over 75% of sharp and sudden impact,” providing “the Safest, Surest Head Protection 
ever developed for football.”
28
  
The basis of the claim that a Rawlings helmet could dissipate the impact of more than 
75% of blows to players’ heads is unclear. Yet many unsourced but scientific sounding 
statements persisted in decades of football equipment advertising. Such techniques were 
certainly not limited to sports equipment; claims promoting “scientific design,” undocumented 
statistics about product effectiveness, or endorsements from experts were common features of 
many forms of American advertising in the twentieth century. Perhaps the most notorious 
examples of such claims come from the tobacco industry, where cigarette ads used images of 
physicians in claiming that their products would improve consumer health. While the tobacco 
industry exploited the positive place doctors held in American culture to market cigarettes, many 
football advertisements drew on American confidence in scientific research and laboratory 
design to promote their products. In making such claims, manufacturers invoked the prestige of 
scientific research as well as the stature of medical science to sell products that addressed a broad 
range of health and safety concerns outside the control of organized medicine.
29
   
Unlike tobacco manufacturers, whose advertisements masked the risks of an unhealthy 
product associated with chronic disease, sporting goods manufacturers were promoting products 
intended to prevent injuries. Their advertisements thus implicitly, and often explicitly, 
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acknowledged that football could be dangerous activity. Advertisers of protective gear thus had 
to portray a nuanced portrait of the injury hazards associated with collision sports: they needed to 
depict youth football as sufficiently risky to require the purchase of extensive equipment, but not 
so risky as to be inappropriate for young children. Protective equipment ads communicated that 
technology and engineering were effective in mitigating risks, and often specifically emphasized 
manufacturers’ alliances with coaches and doctors in working to protect children. For instance, a 
1951 Rawlings ad for rubber-plastic football helmets highlighted that the headgear “complies 
fully with the safety recommendations of the American Football Coaches Association, doctors 
and trainers, AND is built with Rawlings [sic] half-century of “know-how.”” Such claims 
indicated that a combination of medical, training, engineering and manufacturing expertise 




For their part, educators and sports administrators were divided on the ability of 
protective equipment to prevent youth injuries, and about the overall influence of sporting goods 
manufacturers on the sport’s safety. In a 1954 round-up of debates over the value of athletic 
competition for children, the Athletic Journal noted that Delbert Oberteuffer, who chaired the 
Men’s Department of Physical Education at The Ohio State University for 25 years, was highly 
critical of youth football. In particular, he was cynical about the role that sporting goods 
manufacturers had played in developing and promoting equipment aimed at youth, thereby 
contributing to the extension of football programs for younger players. He argued that “the 
American public should know there are really only two reasons why football has been pushed 
down into the lower grades where it does not belong! One, so that lower grade teams can be used 
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as a farm system for high school and college varsities; and second, so that more expensive 
football gear can be sold by the commercial sport goods houses.”
31
  
In 1964, Clifford Fagan, the executive secretary of the National Federation of State High 
School Associations, refuted such complaints. Fagan argued that no group had made greater 
contributions toward the goal of eliminating sports-related injuries than equipment 
manufacturers. “They maintain and staff laboratories which devote their entire efforts to the 
development and construction of better equipment. Today’s helmets, shoes, pants and pads are so 
much better in every respect that they cannot be compared with those used even a decade ago.” 
Fagan appealed to the scientific design and technological advancements underlying equipment 
development as fundamental to increasing safety. He further contested the belief that low cost 
equipment could provide an adequate level of protection, emphasizing that such a misconception 
caused the most damage in youth sports. “You pay for what you get in athletic equipment, the 
same as you do for any other commodity . . . . It is false economy to attempt to buy protection on 
the basis of cost.”
32
 
As a leading sports administrator, Fagan promulgated the view that sporting goods 
advertisements communicated both implicitly and explicitly: safety could be bought, and 
protective equipment was fundamental to safety in tackle football. While acknowledging that the 
added cost of colors, stripes, or other decorations did not “add one iota” to the protection 
afforded by a piece of equipment, Fagan nonetheless contended that apart from such unnecessary 
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frills, “the price determines the quality. Price determines the protection.” Fagan further warned 
against the practice of schools “handing down” equipment from one squad to another, typically 
from a varsity level team to a lower level team. He decried the practice of relying on gate receipt 
sales to fund equipment purchases. All players were entitled to the best equipment, regardless of 
their skill level or monies obtained through ticket admissions. If funds were insufficient, schools 
needed to use tax funds to obtain equipment for their athletes. If such a policy was unacceptable, 
schools ought to drop athletic programs that they could not adequately support.
33
 
The sharp differences between Fagan and Oberteuffer’s attitudes toward the influence of 
sporting goods manufacturers on sports safety highlighted fundamental tensions in debates over 
protective equipment. Fagan praised manufacturers for developing and improving quality 
equipment that was essential to protecting players, and argued that schools were responsible for 
ensuring that all students had access to this equipment. On this view, the protective function of 
equipment was democratic and visible: all athletes deserved access to same protection, and 
investment in top quality equipment clearly signified a program’s commitment to safety. On the 
other hand, Oberteuffer portrayed protective equipment as a moneymaking scheme for sporting 
goods manufacturers in conflict with the best interests of children. To him, investment in 
equipment did not represent safety, but instead was a means by which business could promote 
and profit from the inappropriate extension of tackle football into younger age groups.  
Both these perspectives on the role of sporting goods manufacturers would persist in 
debates over the safety of youth football. Yet the embrace of manufacturers’ contributions to 
enhancing safety equipment was far more widespread than skepticism about the influence of 
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financial motives. Advertisements for equipment as well as substantial technological 
developments, notably the transition from leather to plastic helmets, contributed to a broad 
public understanding of protective equipment, particularly helmets, as essential to youth football 
safety.  
Consequently, outfitting teams with protective gear remained an essential and substantial 
investment for virtually all high school football programs throughout the decades following 
World War II. For example, a 1982 Baltimore Sun article, “High school football is a costly 
sport,” contrasted the “glitter” of Anne Arundel county’s football program, including marching 
bands, stadium lights and filming school games, with Baltimore county’s relative lack of frills. 
Both programs, however, had expended thousands of dollars on equipment; in 1981, Baltimore 
purchased $43,368 worth of new equipment, and spent $24,887 reconditioning nearly every 
football helmet. Mildred Murray, Baltimore County’s coordinator of athletics, told the Sun, “One 
of the things we should never have to cut costs on is protective equipment. That is more 
important than anywhere else we can put our money.”
34
  
Financial Responsibility for Injuries 
In addition to the expense of outfitting teams with equipment, participants in football 
programs also faced the potential for medical bills for injuries associated with the sport. In the 
early decades of the twentieth century, largely without insurance coverage, coaches, parents and 
families typically shouldered the burden of these expenses. In 1936, two university physical 
education faculty members sent out letters to 25 insurance companies and learned that only four 
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of these companies offered athletic insurance. While finding that athletic insurance was still 
limited and in its experimental stages, the authors concluded by recommending that state high 
school athletic associations and college conferences take full charge of athletic insurance for 
member schools. Not only was group insurance less expensive than individual insurance, they 
argued, but such an approach would eliminate the unfairness of donated services by medical 
professionals, and would substantially relieve parents and coaches of the financial burden of 
caring for sports-related injuries.
35
  
This recommendation was consistent with a newly emerging trend toward insurance for 
high school athletes that was already underway. Beginning in the 1930s, a number of state 
athletic associations began developing athletic insurance programs to cover medical bills for 
injuries that students sustained while playing high school sports. Wisconsin and New York State 
were among the first states to develop such an athletic protection plan. In 1932, the New York 
Herald Tribune described Wisconsin’s “unusual plan for providing financial aid to the injured” 
administered by the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA) under the 
supervision of the State Insurance Commission. The commission had first approached insurance 
companies about the possibility of coverage for athletic injuries, but insurers were reluctant, 
believing the costs to be prohibitive. One company reportedly indicated that $14 per participant 
would be necessary to provide coverage of football alone.
36
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The WIAA thus developed its own athletic accident plan in the 1930-1931 school year, 
becoming the first state athletic association to inaugurate a self-administered insurance program. 
Wisconsin schools were offered the choice of two possible benefits plans, as well as two 
payment options: either purchasing blanket coverage based on student enrollment, or offering 
policies to individual student athletes at a higher cost per student. Notably, in either case the 
policy premium more than doubled if football coverage was included. In 1930-1931, the 
WIAA’s benefit plan paid out $5,330 to cover 101 claims, including broken legs, arms and 




In fall 1932, the New York State Health School Athletic Association Athletic similarly 
put an experimental athletic protection plan into effect.  In the 1932 season, 66 schools registered 
for football, with the fund covering 1,255 student athletes. The program was a success and was 
thus extended to include other sports. As with Wisconsin’s plan, New York’s athletic protection 
program continued to grow in the ensuing decades. In the 1949-1950 academic year, the 
association’s executive secretary reported that the athletic protection plan covered over 48,000 
student athletes and had paid over $65,000 in claims.
38
     
State athletic associations across the country began adopting similar programs in the 
1930s and 1940s, often modelled after the plans developed by Wisconsin, New York or other 
“mother states.” Texas, for instance, adopted a schedule of benefits similar to New York’s 
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protection plan in 1940. Often, schools contributed half the cost while parents of players put up 
the other half in individual payments. The risk of injury was typically considered to be higher in 
contact sports, such as tackle football or wrestling, as compared to non-contact sports, and fees 
were set accordingly. In 1945, for instance, New York charged $2.50 per player for football and 
wrestling, $2.00 for hockey, lacrosse and skiing, $1.00 for basketball and soccer, and $0.50 for 
track, tennis, baseball, golf and cross country.
39
 
While state athletic protection programs became increasingly widespread, they did not 
necessarily cover all potential football-related injuries, and many programs continued to rely on 
“self-insurance” rather than purchasing a broad-based, external plan. A 1951 Scholastic Coach 
article warned coaches and administrators that interscholastic programs did not provide 
unlimited funds to defray the expenses of treating injuries, and that they could not rely on the 
goodwill, pro bono work of neighborhood doctors to make up any potential difference. The 
article advised coaches and athletic directors on factors to consider in choosing accident benefit 
options, such as non-profit versus commercial plans, and whether plans included coverage for 
extras such as transportation to and from out-of-town games. Furthermore, coaches were 
reminded that parents, especially parents in lower income brackets, were concerned about the 
economic risks of football. The fact that financial protection was available was frequently the 
key to boys’ ability to obtain parental permission to participate, the article claimed. A coach who 
could clearly inform parents what insurance plans covered “is sometimes able to add extremely 
valuable manpower to his varsities and various intramural sports.”
40
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Both the cost of insurance and the newly available documentation of injuries from 
insurance claims focused attention on safety concerns and injury prevention. Consequently, the 
adoption of such insurance plans often prompted coaches and administrators to re-evaluate safety 
strategies in order to most effectively reduce injuries and expenses. After Texas’s Interscholastic 
League adopted its benefits plan, the Texas High School Football Coaches Association met over 
the summer of 1940 to discuss the causes of injuries and possible prevention strategies. Their 
recommendations were consistent with the longstanding emphasis on adult supervision discussed 
in chapter two. They urged complete medical examinations for all players, three weeks’ of 
conditioning before boys were permitted to play in games, enhancing the availability of first aid, 
ensuring proper equipment, scheduling interschool contests with institutions of a similar size to 




Although insurance claims forms were designed to collect data for the primary purpose of 
providing insurance coverage, such data also provided some of the earliest and most extensive 
available information on causes and rates of morbidity and mortality.
42
 This included data on 
sports-related injuries among large populations of Americans. Indeed, in the absence of large-
scale epidemiological studies, insurance companies represented one of the only available sources 
of such data. For example, chapter two described how, despite the limited nature of this data, in 
1948 the NFHS published simple injury counts derived from the Security Life and Accident Co. 
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Once state athletic associations developed their own athletic benefit plans, school 
administrators were able to use this information to compare the rates of injuries among the 
different sports offered through schools. For instance, New York State’s Education Department, 
in collaboration with an education professor at New York University, used data from New York 
State’s Athletic Protection Plan to study accidents among schoolboys. From February 1958 to 
January 1959 when schools were in session, they collected data from 96 secondary schools in 
New York State, excluding New York City. The study found that interscholastic athletic 
competition accounted for two-thirds of all accidents. Of the sports included in the study, tackle 
football represented both the highest gross number of accidents as well as the highest incidence 








                                                          
43
 C. Frazier Damron, “Accident Surveillance Systems for Sports,” (Washington, DC: American Alliance for Health, 
Physical Education, and Recreation, 1977).  
 
44
 New York State Bureau of Physical Education, Safety in Physical Education for Junior and Senior High School 





Figure 16. Top 5 Activities by Gross Accidents, New York State, 1958-1959
45
 
Activity Number of 
Accidents 
Percentage of Total 
Accidents 
Exposures Incidence Per 1,000 
Exposures 
Football 542 38.5 258,453 2.1 
Basketball 224 15.9 515,300 0.43 
Wrestling 108 7.7 216,567 0.5 
Soccer 85 6.0 175,975 0.48 
Track and 
Field 
79 5.6 310,986 0.25 
 
Examining the description of the causes of injury identified in insurance claims, the 
researchers found that “tackling in football was the skill or activity most frequently engaged in at 
the time of the accident.” Football injuries also represented the highest amount of claims paid, 
accounting for over half of all interscholastic athletic claims paid in 1961-1962 ($95,360.98 out 
of $151,718.58 in 1961-1962). Given that football was clearly the most hazardous sport based on 
insurance claims data, the study concluded by questioning whether football should continue to be 
considered “a desirable educational offering in the secondary school athletic program.” The New 
York State Public High School Athletic Association did not drop football in response to this 
study, but initiated a voluntary injury prevention and conditioning program in August 1963, and 
began to conduct its own studies of injuries, some of which are described in chapter 3.
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Yet the cost of insurance for youth football continued to rise, partially due to an increase 
in cost for medical treatment. In the Phoenix Union High School System in Arizona, for 
example, the cost for athletic insurance including football was $17 per boy in the fall of 1962. By 
the fall of 1968, the cost had risen to $25 per boy, a price far above the pace of inflation 
(inflation alone would have placed the cost of insurance at $19.59 in fall 1968). Coaches 
complained that football insurance was becoming prohibitive in cost, a complaint that would 
persist in the ensuing decades and reach a particular moment of perceived crisis in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, the source and level of coverage was far from standardized across schools. A 1970 
analysis of insurance in Arizona high schools found that fewer than half of high school 




Despite these substantial challenges, large insurance programs offered families and 
schools some degree of financial protection against the risk of football injuries, offered a source 
of large scale data on injury rates, even if limited by the design of claims forms, and further 
motivated coaches and administrators to consider how to prevent injuries and minimize costs. 
Athletic insurance coverage policies were also intricately related to product liability law, the area 
of tort law that determines legal responsibility for injuries. As American law scholar Kenneth 
Abraham has argued, the tort liability and insurance systems constantly interact “like the two 
suns in a binary star, dependent on each other for their position in our legal system.” 
Understanding how product liability law changed in the second half of the twentieth century is 
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therefore essential to understanding how insurance companies, school districts, and sporting 
goods manufacturers all sought to minimize their financial responsibility for injury.
48
  
Legal Responsibility for Injuries 
Sports injury lawsuits had not always been a common occurrence for potentially 
vulnerable parties such as coaches, school districts, and sporting goods manufacturers. School 
boards, for instance, typically protected themselves legally by requiring parents of prospective 
student football players to sign release forms. For example, in the early 1960s, the Houston 
Independent School District’s approval slip for participation in competitive sports asked parents 
to sign “with the distinct understanding that the Houston Board of Education and the employees 
of the Houston Board of Education assume no responsibility for any accident or injury as a result 
thereof.” Furthermore, in addition to such release forms, courts typically applied a legal doctrine 
known as “assumption of risk,” which held that athletes playing competitive sports knowingly 




As a result, the limited lawsuits resulting from sports injuries prior to the mid-1960s 
typically found plaintiffs responsible for assuming the risks of injury, as exemplified by the case 
of Vendrell v. School District No. 26C, Malheur County. In this case, Louis Vendrell, a 15 year 
old high school football player at the time of injury, had suffered a broken neck resulting in 
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permanent paraplegia after being tackled by two members of the opposing football team. In his 
testimony, he recalled that after he saw the other team’s players in front of him, “I knew I 
couldn’t go any further so I put my head down and just ran into em [sic] and that is when I heard 
my neck snap.” In his suit against the school district, Vendrell claimed that he had not received 
“proper or sufficient instructions” in the techniques of football, nor had he been provided “the 
necessary and proper protective equipment.”
50
   
Vendrell’s case reached the Supreme Court of Oregon, but ultimately the court did not 
find Vendrell’s football coaches negligent, nor the school district responsible for his injury. In its 
reasoning, the court explained that no prospective football players, including children, needed to 
be warned that they might sustain an injury. While not explicitly characterizing permanent 
paralysis itself as an inherent part of the game, the court nonetheless indicated that coaches did 
not have a duty to warn athletes of potential injuries, because no warning should be necessary:  
Body contact, bruises, and clashes are inherent in the game. There is no other way to play 
it. No prospective player need be told that a participant in the game of football may 
sustain injury. That fact is self-evident. It draws to the game the manly; they accept its 
risks, blows, clashes and injuries without whimper. No one expects a football coach to 
extract from the game the body clashes that cause bruises, jolts and hard falls. To remove 
them would end the sport.
51
   
 The court’s reasoning reframed boys as adults; indeed, the court’s very language 
suggested that the essence of football was to attract “the manly” and transform boys into men. 
The risks of football, and the willingness to sustain these injuries “without whimper,” were 
treated as inherent components of this vision of masculinity. The court further dispensed with 
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Vendrell’s argument that his coaches had not taught him that he should not use his head as a 
battering ram, stating that “one of the first lessons that an infant learns when he begins to toddle 
about on his feet is not to permit his head to collide with anything.” Vendrell was thus found to 
have assumed all the risks of tackling. These risks were so obvious, the court indicated, that even 
infants ought to be aware of the potential dangers of subjecting one’s head to blows. 
Several years later, the Supreme Court of Oregon’s reasoning was quite similar in ruling 
against the plaintiff of another football injury case. In 1972, the court heard the case of Robert 
Whipple, a 15 year old boy who had played with the Salvation Army Boys Club youth program 
in Medford, Oregon. Whipple sustained a knee injury after being tackled immediately after he 
had jumped and caught a ball; his allegations against the Salvation Army included inadequate 
supervision and allowing untrained boys at an “excessively early age” to participate in tackle 
football. The court stated that it held “as a matter of law, that a 15-year-old boy, without 
evidence of mental deficiency or untoward seclusion from life's experiences common to boys of 
that age, sufficiently appreciates the dangers inherent in the game of football so that he assumes 
the risk thereof when he plays.”
52
   
Such rulings meant that even catastrophically injured youth athletes were unlikely to find 
success in the courtroom. As lawyer Samuel Langerman observed in 1964, “Litigation seldom 
arises from a sports injury.” He explained that many schools and institutions involved were 
exempted from tort liability under legal doctrines of sovereign immunity or charitable immunity. 
These doctrines exempted from private suit most public schools, universities, non-profit groups 
(such as the YMCA) and other types of organizations that typically sponsored youth athletic 
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programs. Beyond the legal challenges, many injured players or their families had a “natural 
hesitancy” to sue their own coaches or schools. Given the reluctance of many injured parties to 
bring suit and the obstacles to succeeding if they did, sports injury lawsuits were relatively rare.
53
 
Yet just a decade later, Langerman, a law partner of the law firm Langerman and Begam 
and noted for his experience in handling sports injury litigation, would revise this opinion. In 
1977, writing for Trial magazine, Langerman and his colleague Noel Fidel argued that new legal 
trends were clearing the traditional roadblocks to such lawsuits. As a result, Langerman’s 1964 
observation about the rarity of sports injury litigation was no longer appropriate.
54
 The move 
toward strict liability, as discussed in chapter 3, was one of the legal developments that made 
school districts and sporting manufacturers increasingly vulnerable to product liability lawsuits 
after 1965 and into the 1970s. In 1977, Langerman and Field further argued that the duty to warn 
players in the products liability field established basic legal principles that were equally 
applicable in the sports arena. They described the ways this duty applied to coaches, teachers, 
and athletic program managers, stating:  
Does the football player who makes a head-down charge with an ill-fitting helmet, or the 
trampolinist who works out with a headache or cold, comprehend and appreciate the 




 In contrast to the 1962 court ruling in the Vendrell case, then, Langerman and Field 
argued that courts might no longer consider the risks of permanent paralysis to be obvious to 
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prospective football players. Adult coaches and trainers were increasingly treated as having a 
“duty to warn” prospective players, especially youth players, of the potentially devastating risks. 
This transition toward a coach’s duty to warn players about the risks of athletic participation was 
connected to a broader rejection of assumption of risk in occupational as well as recreational 
settings. By mid-twentieth century, many industry leaders acknowledged that they had a 
responsibility to inform their workers of the dangers associated with their work, and that 
strategies such as the use of warning labels could protect industry from lawsuits in the event of 
harm.
56
 Administrators of youth football programs similarly increasingly saw themselves as 
vulnerable to such lawsuits. A 1974 reference manual for Pop Warner coaches warned that even 




The landmark 1982 case of Thompson v. Seattle Public School District indicated this 
changing legal landscape. In this unpublished decision, a King County jury in Seattle, 
Washington awarded Christopher Thompson $6.3 million for a 1975 high school football injury 
that had left him quadriplegic. Thompson had argued that his coach had not warned him of the 
dangers of putting his head down while tackling. Meanwhile, the school district had sought to 
characterize the injury as a freak accident, arguing that students must assume the risk when 
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choosing to play football. Following the verdict, the school district’s athletic supervisor warned 
that the case could potentially affect athletic programs nationwide. He stated, “if we’re doing it 
wrong, all districts in the country are doing it wrong.”
58
  
In 1983, Samuel H. Adams and Mary Ann Bayless, professors of physical education at 
Washington State University, pointed to Thompson v. Seattle Public School District as a sentinel 
case. They argued that the court appeared to be “placing all responsibility for the prevention of 
injuries and therefore, blame for injuries, on the coach or supervisor of an activity. . . . The fact 
that a participant may be injured in a sport is no longer considered self-evident.” In shifting the 
responsibility for the inherent risks of football and other sports from players to coaches and 
administrators, this precedent setting case weakened the longstanding “assumption of risk” 
doctrine. Courts were increasingly limiting the amount of risk that a sports participant should be 
expected to assume, particularly when athletes were young and had less extensive athletic 
experience prior to their injury. A 1986 article in Athletic Business claimed that with the 
Thompson decision, the concepts of “failure to warn” and “failure to instruct” had become 
“enshrined in the legal lexicon, adding new definitions to the definition of negligence.”
59
 
Following the Thompson case, the Los Angeles Times reported that the Seattle school 
board considered a resolution suggesting the elimination of football. The injured student had 
been awarded over $6 million in damages, while the district had been insured for $5.5 million. 
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Ultimately, the Seattle School District developed a lengthy list of recommendations, including 
that students and their parents be required to sign an assumption of risk form, that coaches be 
required to have CPR training, and that coaches inform participants of the types of catastrophic 
injuries that could occur and how to avoid them.
60
 
Sports programs across the country similarly responded to this decision and related legal 
concerns by reading additional warnings to players and placing warnings on helmets. In 1986, 
the Football Rules Committee of the National Federation of State High School Associations 
stated that beginning the following season, “each player’s helmet must have a visible exterior 
warning label regarding the risk of injury. Although most schools complied previously, the label 
will now be required.”
61
 Dr. Thomas Appenzeller, a professor of sport management who was a 
high school football coach in North Carolina in the 1980s, recalled,  
in the mid-season my principal called me in there. He said “We just got these stickers and 
you’ve got to put one on every helmet and you’ve got to read this statement before every 
football game.” And it was a warning and it resulted from a lawsuit out in Seattle, 
Washington where a high-school player had broken his neck and had sued the coaches 
because they didn't warn him about the dangers of using his head to lead with a—I think 
he was making a tackle.   
And the helmet, they actually sent us a little sticker. I remember putting them on one 
night. Me and a couple assistant coaches put stickers on there. I remember for the next 
game I actually read it and before every game that year I read it. Then after that we just 
had to read it before the season started as a warning that you weren't supposed to use your 
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head to ram or to lead with it and that there was a danger of serious injury with head and 
neck injuries.
62
   
In addition to such “duty to warn” lawsuits against school districts and coaches, sporting 
goods manufacturers were also increasingly vulnerable to lawsuits related to football injuries in 
the 1970s. Plaintiffs contended that helmet makers also had a duty to warn prospective 
consumers, specifically that consumers should be informed that helmets could not protect against 
particular head and brain injuries. For instance, in 1974, a Texas high school football quarterback 
named Mark Daniels collided with a teammate, sustaining a head injury that resulted in an 
indentation in his helmet from the force of the impact. Daniels was subsequently diagnosed with 
a subdural hematoma that left him with severe and permanent brain damage, and sued Rawlings 
Sporting Goods for damages. The 20
th
 Judicial District Court of Robertson County, Texas 
awarded Daniels a $1.5 million judgment, a decision which Rawlings unsuccessfully appealed. 
In upholding this ruling, the court of appeals of Texas’s 10
th
 district explained that while all 
evidence suggested that the primary purpose of a helmet was to protect its wearer against head 
and brain injuries, nonetheless: 
Defendant [Rawlings] admitted that it never made any attempt to warn potential users of 
the limitations of its helmets; that it had known for a long time that helmets will not 
protect against brain injuries; that it made the “conscious decision” not to tell people the 
helmet would not protect against subdural hematomas; that the company “elected” not to 
warn that the helmets would not protect against head injuries, in spite of the knowledge 
that laymen believe that the purpose of the helmet is to protect the head.
63
 
In addition to arguing that manufacturers needed to warn of the inherent limitations of 
helmets, plaintiffs also contended that manufacturers should be held liable for defective helmet 
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designs. In 1975, the successful suit of Greg Stead against Riddell, Inc., one of the most 
prominent football helmet manufacturers, was based on the argument that the improper design of 
the Riddell helmet had contributed to Stead’s catastrophic injury. More broadly, Stead v. Riddell 
emerged as a landmark case to which both manufacturers and lawyers would point as 
representing trends in product liability law. In numerous settings, from congressional hearings to 
medical journals, these groups deployed Stead v. Riddell to advance their preferred framing of 
the legal responsibility for youth football injuries. 
Stead, a high school football player at the time of his injury, had been paralyzed from the 
neck down due to a neck injury he sustained on the opening kickoff of a high school football 
game on September 30, 1971. Stead’s attorney, Carl Rentz, argued that after a player on the 
opposing team kicked Stead, causing Stead’s head to jerk backward, his client’s neck was broken 
between the fourth and fifth vertebrae by the unpadded back of the Riddell helmet he was 
wearing. By the time of the trial, Stead was 20 years old, and sat through the five-week 




Sporting goods manufacturers and their lawyers depicted Stead v. Riddell as heralding an 
impending wave of lawsuits threatening their ability to do business. Riddell lawyer Richard 
Lester would later characterize this 1975 case as the beginning of an “onslaught” of damage suits 
filed against helmet manufacturers. Although the multi-million dollar award was unusual, Stead 
v. Riddell was certainly consistent with a broader legal trend toward courts increasingly imposing 
liability on manufacturers for defective product design. Examining products liability law through 
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1990, two legal scholars remarked that beginning in the mid-1970s through the early 1980s, 
courts “seemed to compete with each other to see who could make it easiest for plaintiffs to 
reach juries with claims of defective product design.”
65
 
Manufacturers turned to Stead v. Riddell as the perfect example of litigation run amok in 
their policy advocacy efforts to minimize their susceptibility to such suits. Notably, in 1976, the 
SGMA formed the Multi Association Action Committee (MAAC) to address product liability. 
The committee included 119 leaders from a range of industries beyond sporting goods 
manufacturing, such as aircraft, cast metals, recreation vehicles, and small farm implements. The 
stated goals of MAAC included: “to call attention to the plight of industry manufacturers in 
product liability suits and costs for defense” and “to notify Americans that we have unleashed a 
wave of unfounded suits and attendant unprecedented awards that guarantee inflation for the next 
decade” (underline in original).
66
 
At MAAC’s SMGA-sponsored conference on liability reform in 1976, Harold J. Bruns, 
the president of SGMA, referenced the Stead case in his statement on product liability. “Did you 
know that a football helmet manufacturer lost a $5.3 million lawsuit to an injured player while 
the defendant’s attorney contended there was no proof that the injured party was even wearing 
the defendant’s helmet?” Bruns asked. He further alluded to Stead’s presence in the courtroom 
throughout the trial as unjustly swaying the jurors against the manufacturers, stating that 
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although jurors were charged to render decisions based on fact and fairness, they “instead must 
view a paraplegic in a wheelchair which conjurs [sic] irresistible emotion and remorse.” 
Consequently, “a sports equipment manufacturer is made to pay a fortune out of sympathy rather 
than neglect.” Depicting such cases as frivolous and opportunistic, Bruns suggested that justice 
was being “outwitted by lucid trial lawyers” who were requiring manufacturers to pay 
extravagant sums as “a sacrifice to ease the social conscience.” Bruns hastened to clarify that he 
was certainly not blaming “the paraplegic doomed to a life of thinking,” nor the judges and juries 
doing what they believed to be right. Instead, he contended that the legal system was at fault.
67
  
Bruns thus urged reform of the tort system as the ultimate solution. In 1977, he explained 
to the Chicago Tribune that the SGMA’s goal was to return the law of the land “back to where it 
was prior to 1964, when the doctrine of strict liability was adopted.” In the testimony he 
submitted to the U.S. Senate’s Select Committee on Small Business, Bruns laid out specific 
actions and reforms the SGMA sought: public awareness of the problem, statute of limitations on 
manufactured products, limitation of awards, plaintiff to assume responsibility for all defendant’s 
costs related to unfounded suits, limitation on contingency fees, state of the art at time of 
manufacture as a defense, and elimination of punitive damages. He threatened that if the product 
liability crisis were not abated, “next year may well be the last year for the Super Bowl.” This 
notion, that the very existence of football as a fundamental element of American life was under 
threat from product liability lawsuits, would persist in policy arguments made by the SGMA 
through the 1980s and early 1990s.
68
  
                                                          
67
 Howard J. Bruns, “Statement on Product Liability,” Proceedings of the MAAC Liability Reform Conference, 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7-8, 1976): 95-97. 
 
68
 Howard J. Bruns, “Testimony for Select Committee on Small Business, U.S. Senate,” Proceedings of the MAAC 




The vision of lawsuits putting an end to football was also repeatedly disseminated at 
medical conferences and in medical journals aimed at sports medicine specialists. “The whole 
existence of contact sports as we know them is being threatened,” said one speaker at the 1977 
annual meeting of the American College of Sports Medicine. A 1985 Physician and 
Sportsmedicine article promulgated the view that football helmet manufacturers had made 
football helmets safer, and in “reward,” they had become subjected to increasing legal liability 
for football injuries. This analysis highlighted the toll such lawsuits were taking on 
manufacturers, casting the sporting goods manufacturers as victims of multimillion dollar 
lawsuits. A 1987 article in the Physician and Sportsmedicine, whose very title signaled the 
dangers to “the American way of sport,” opened with the image of a high school football game 
under way in “Anytown, United States.” The author, a contributing editor of the journal, 
suggested that this scene, “as American as apple pie,” might be in danger of disappearing, and 
cited sporting goods manufacturers as a source of the concern. Sports medicine physicians, 
whose work was fundamentally tied to contact sports, were thus encouraged to share the 
SGMA’s framing of product liability law as posing an existential threat to sports.
69
 
The example of Stead v. Riddell, as well as liability concerns faced by sporting goods 
manufacturers more generally, would also feature prominently in debates over federal legislation 
to address the issue. In April 1976, President Gerald Ford established a Federal Interagency Task 
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Force on Product Liability to study product liability law and ways to stabilize recoveries and 
insurance premiums. The task force continued its work under President Carter and ultimately 
recommended the drafting of a model uniform product liability law for use by all states. The task 
force also recommended the enactment of federal legislation to allow small businesses to form 
self-insurance pools; such legislation would ultimately become law in 1981 as the Product 
Liability Risk Retention Act.
70
 
But before the passage of this act, in 1977, the U.S. Senate held hearings to consider the 
National Product Liability Insurance Act. This earlier version of product liability legislation, 
proposed by senators John C. Culver (D-Iowa) and Gaylord Nelson (D-Wisconsin), would have 
established a national product liability insurance administration and arbitration program, as well 
as a product liability insurance pool to increase the availability of insurance coverage. The 
perspective of manufacturers on Stead v. Riddell featured in these hearings in the form of letters 
submitted by William C. Merritt, who defended Riddell against the lawsuits brought by Stead. 
Merritt’s arguments exemplify the ways that sports manufacturers sought to frame the issue of 




Merritt drew on social prejudices to argue that the Florida jury that had ruled against Riddell 
was largely composed of “middle class people of not high intelligence.” He noted the inclusion 
of a black maid, the wife of a civil servant, an Italian terrazzo & tile man, a Cuban postal clerk, 
and a retired man on the jury. Not only did the judge ask questions during the voir dire to play 
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upon the sympathies of these purportedly simple minded jurors, Merritt suggested, but the judge 
also failed to understand the suspension system of Riddell’s helmet and its complete irrelevance 
to a neck injury case. He emphasized the testimony of the assistant football coach at the high 
school where Greg Stead had played; the coach had stated that he had specifically and repeatedly 




Merritt further questioned the credibility of Dr. Harold Fenner, who had been brought in as a 
witness for the plaintiff and who had testified that the ability of the helmet to attenuate the 
impact of blows to the head could contribute to the plaintiff’s neck injury. Merritt repeatedly 
emphasized that Dr. Fenner was not board certified as an orthopedic surgeon, and that other 
experts disagreed with Fenner’s assessment. “Medical research has shown that the helmet has no 
relationship to the injury,” Merritt would continue to insist in the following years. Lawyers and 
the sporting goods manufacturers they represented thus argued that well-meaning but relatively 
uneducated jurors were unduly swayed by the sympathy-inducing presence of catastrophically 
injured athletes; that these athletes had been sufficiently warned by their own coaches of the risk 
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Beginning in the 1970s, a number of manufacturers ceased making football helmets, and 
remaining manufacturers claimed that helmet lawsuits were driving them out of the business. In 
1970, there were eighteen manufacturers of football helmets in the United States; by 1994, there 
were only two. In 1977, Frank Gordon, the president of Riddell, told the Chicago Tribune that 
manufacturers were toying, half seriously, with the notion of “going on strike” and not producing 
helmets for a year or two, to draw public attention to the legal crisis. While such a strategy was 
not particularly realistic, suggesting the threat of a football helmet manufacturing strike to a 
major American newspaper was in itself a means of raising public concern. A 1979 Los Angeles 
Times article claimed that “making football helmets can be as potentially risky as playing the 
game without any.”
74
   
While manufacturers blamed product liability laws, consumer groups including the National 
Insurance Consumer Organization, the Consumer Federation of America, and Public Citizen 
contended that insurers were charging exorbitant premiums to compensate for poor risk 
judgments in previous years. Robert Hunter, the president of the National Insurance Consumer 
Organization, told the New York Times that while the courts had expanded the concept of 
liability, that had nothing to do with insurance rates. “The insurance problem shouldn’t be used 
as an excuse to take away victims’ rights to sue.”
75
  
Despite—or perhaps thanks to— the emphatic alarm that sporting goods manufacturers 
continued to sound in the press, in legislative hearings, and in medical journals, ultimately not 
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many multimillion dollar cases were settled in favor of plaintiffs. In fact, in 1979, the chief 
financial officer of Wynn’s International Inc., which had recently acquired Riddell, observed that 
despite a spate of lawsuits following Stead v. Riddell, “since then, we have not had any large 
adverse jury awards or large settlements.” He characterized Stead v. Riddell as an “anomaly” that 
had prompted concern. In fact, by the late 1980s, the legal trend was moving away from 
expanding the boundaries of product liability, and toward limiting plaintiffs’ rights to recover 
damages for product-related injuries. Two legal scholars suggested that this “quiet revolution in 
products liability” might be attributed to the success of tort reformers in linking product liability 
cases to the insurance crisis of the mid-1980s. In the area of athletic equipment, they found that 
plaintiffs had a success rate in two-thirds of cases from 1979-1984, which decreased to less than 
half of cases in 1985-1989.
76
 
But perhaps the manufacturers’ most notable strategy was their argument that the 
fundamental responsibility for football injuries should rest with the players and their parents and 
coaches. This argument fit in with broader, prevailing American beliefs about individual 
responsibility as the key to addressing health problems. For instance, in a widely cited 1977 
article, physician and president of the Rockefeller Foundation John Knowles argued that 
educating individuals about health risks, from cigarettes to lack of exercise, and promoting a 
culture which encouraged individuals to assume responsibility for their behaviors, were the key 
to improving health. By making legal arguments that emphasized the personal responsibility of 
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individual child athletes and parents to assume the risks of football, sporting goods 
manufacturers drew on these beliefs about who should be held responsible for health problems.
77
 
An SGMA-funded coalition advanced this perspective in a strategy reminiscent of other 
industry-sponsored front groups. In 1990 hearings before the U.S. Senate, the SGMA described 
their public education operation, the Coalition of Americans to Protect Sports (CAPS), as being 
founded in 1986 as “a grassroots organization whose purpose is to inform coaches, schools, and 
the general public about the detrimental impact liability is having on manufacturers of sports 
equipment and programs across the United States.” Rather than a broad-based grassroots 
movement, however, CAPS was primarily an arm of the SGMA. Lobbyist Richard Feldman 
recalled that in 1988, he and other SGMA leaders renamed the group CAPS in order to make it 
sound more like a united national organization.
78
  
As part of its goal to minimize the potential for liability litigation, CAPS asserted that 
better equipment and personal responsibility would address the issue of safety in sports. For 
instance, Sharon Lincoln, the communications director of CAPS, argued that lawsuits 
discouraged people “from accepting the rational, logical, and foreseeable risks of their own 
behavior.” She singled out football as being essential to American culture and education, arguing 
that although football was particularly vulnerable to liability lawsuits and thus more costly to 
play and to insure, “many school administrators would laugh at the idea of doing away with it. 
Football is financially critical to schools.” Instead of filing lawsuits, players and coaches needed 
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to accept the risks and take responsibility for preventing them. CAPS developed a risk education 
program aimed at administrators and coaches of sports programs that emphasized the ways such 
“nonsensical” lawsuits could be avoided.
79
  
In the Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance, Lincoln promoted the CAPS 
Sports Injury Risk Management Manual and other CAPS materials “to help the sports 
community maximize athlete safety while minimizing the potential for litigation . . . . CAPS 
provides a checklist of safety precautions for coaches to follow and can update them on some of 
the most common types of sports accidents resulting in litigation, as well as the frivolous, 
nonsensical cases that pull coaches and school districts away from their teams and into the 
courtrooms.” CAPS artwork included an image of a dejected youth baseball player sitting under 
a sign that read, “Field closed due to lack of insurance.” These materials were disseminated in 
manuals, videos, and clinics.
80
   
Similar to the public relations strategy of big tobacco companies and fast-food industry 
groups of shifting responsibility for risk away from themselves and onto consumers, CAPS thus 
sponsored a vision of individual responsibility for the health risks of competitive sports. CAPS 
framed their safety promotion materials as essential strategies for avoiding lawsuits and high 
insurance premiums that threatened the existence of youth sports. In the form of educational 
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resources to protect sports and the health of players, the SGMA also shared a message of 




Sporting goods manufacturers marketed their protective equipment as central to attaining 
athletic success as well as to preventing injuries. In their advertisements they highlighted the 
efficacy of helmets and the scientific design of their goods. Yet in defending themselves against 
product liability lawsuits, they emphasized the lack of relationship between helmets and the 
injuries of individual plaintiffs. Manufacturers further argued that individual coaches, parents 
and children should take responsibility for preventing football-related injuries because they had 
voluntarily chosen to assume the risks of the sport. They also threatened that lawsuits would 
doom football by rendering sports equipment manufacturing and insurance prohibitively costly. 
Ultimately, they largely succeeded in framing the issue of football safety as a matter of 
individual responsibility.  
The success rate of plaintiffs in product liability lawsuits related to athletics declined in 
the 1980s, and athletic administrators, coaches and the general public largely maintained their 
beliefs in the importance and efficacy of protective equipment as essential to football safety. 
School football programs prioritized investing in equipment above other potential football-
related expenses. If anything, buying the latest and best equipment became an even higher 
priority. As an athletic director told the Los Angeles Times in 1990, “the way lawyers are today, 
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Despite the expense of equipment, insurance, and potential lawsuits, the majority of 
school districts continued to offer high school football, and younger children continued to play in 
the youth leagues such as Pop Warner. Understanding the enduring popularity of football despite 
the significant financial costs and health risks involves understanding the cultural importance of 
the sport in communities, as will be examined in the following chapter.
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Chapter Five. “It’s All We’ve Got”: Community, Education, and Youth Football 
Football is “the pretty girls, the gay flags and that awesome, incomparable sound of roaring 
thousands in some Saturday stadium. Football is a spectacle as much as it is a contest; an 
occasion of social and community importance apart from its sporting significance. For many of 
those concerned with the game it is an enthralling year-round occupation, rather than the 





In 1958, Henry Steele Commager, a well-known American historian, wrote an analytical 
essay published by The School Review examining historical trends in American high school 
education. Commager sharply critiqued an overemphasis on competitive athletics in high schools 
as failing to meet, or even hindering, the purported educational goals of sports. He singled out 
tackle football as an example of how competitive athletic programs failed to offer all students the 
opportunity to improve their physical health. “A system where a handful of boys devote most of 
their energy to football, while five thousand students sit in stands and watch them, is not 
designed to provide sound bodies to go with sound minds.”
2
  
Commager further argued that the most dangerous aspect of embedding competitive 
sports, particularly football, in high schools was the relationship between youth athletics and 
community interest and support. Child athletes, he said, were being exploited at night-time 
athletic contests:  
for the convenience, the entertainment, or the profit of adults. We would not expect or 
permit our high-school daughters to entertain the community in a night-club or burlesque 
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show; there is no reason why we should permit our high-school sons to entertain the 
community by what are, in effect, burlesque performances on the playing field.
3
 
 Commager homed in on a longstanding, fundamental source of debate about the health 
consequences of football: whether football’s association with education and its function as a 
major community event benefited young players. Over the twentieth century, as the 
demographics, tactics, equipment, and many other aspects of youth football changed, the 
relationship between youth football, schools and local communities persisted as a key feature of 
American life and as an ongoing source of concern. Examining some of the social benefits 
associated with the sport is essential to understanding how communities perceived both the 
advantages and risks of the sport for their children. 
 How did football in particular become so strongly associated with school and community 
identity in many American locales? In his examination of the importance of high school sports in 
northeastern Pennsylvania, historian Paul Zbiek suggests several factors that may have 
contributed to the prominence of tackle football. As a fall sport played in a large open field, in a 
setting that could accommodate crowds of thousands (unlike an indoor gym), football was well 
suited to mass spectatorship. The sport’s hard hitting, rough play appealed to both coal miners 
and to elite families who associated the sport with their alma maters, combining “a working class 
attitude with the trappings of academia.” 
4
 
Zbiek further argued that the geography of regions such as the Wyoming Valley fostered athletic 
rivalries and excitement. The proximity of small towns, their links with particular ethnic and 
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socioeconomic identities, and the ability of boys to play team sports such as football together 
from grade school through high school, all contributed to a broader sense of community 
investment in the outcome of a match. In addition to the individual character-building, moral 
virtues related to the political culture of the Cold War that were discussed in chapter one, youth 
football was perceived to offer improved social status to athletes and success to their larger 
communities. Indeed, sociologist Gerhard Falk has observed that American football was not only 
a sport, but became “an alternative status system.”
5
   
Ideas about the risks and benefits of youth football circulated among adult organizers of 
the sport through different levels of play. This chapter examines how broader community values 
and concerns shaped some of these beliefs. The importance attributed to high school football in 
schools and communities contributed to the expansion of football at the little league level. 
Football among pre-high school aged children increasingly served as a “feeder system” for future 
high school play. Yet little league football also acquired particular meanings of its own, as 
examined here in a case study of the King of Prussia Indians, a local youth football organization 
in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.  
In addition, the appeal of future access to social and financial resources, including the 
hope of landing a college football scholarship, influenced how parents and players weighed the 
risks and benefits of the sport at the high school level and younger. The ways football improved 
perceived access to higher social standing and higher education contributed in part to the 
changing demographics of tackle football. The face of football changed enormously after the 
early 1900s, a period when it was associated primarily with the white Anglo-Saxon protestant 
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college students of elite schools such as Harvard and Yale. By the end of the twentieth century, 
tackle football was predominantly associated with working-class and disproportionately minority 
youths, particularly African-American boys. Debates over the risks and benefits of football thus 
became debates over the safety of a different, and largely more economically and socially 
vulnerable, set of young bodies.  
While physical activity was certainly valued, the primary advantages of tackle football 
were above all framed as social benefits: both in teaching boys desired community and social 
values, and also in enhancing their future social success. Although the perceived social benefits 
of youth football outweighed or even masked its physical risks for many American boys, these 
social advantages carried particular meaning for vulnerable, marginalized groups. The racial and 
ethnic composition of youth football, and the geographic and economic conditions of 
communities where school football rose to greatest prominence, raise the question of whose 
bodies were at risk, and for which athletes and communities the social benefits of football carried 
the greatest significance.  
The “Feeder System” of Football from Cradle  
 In 1961, Sports Illustrated profiled the town of Massillon, “a rugged steel town in 
northeastern Ohio.” The immense popularity of Massillon’s high school football team had 
already gained substantial national media coverage in the late 1940s and 1950s; the city was 
dubbed “Touchdown Town” in a 1951 newsreel.
6
 This 1961 article emphasized that football 
dominated the lives of boys in the town even from their births. The local Booster club presented 
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boys born in area hospitals with footballs, and young boys were encouraged to begin playing the 
sport in anticipation of a potential high school career: 
By fifth grade he is playing organized football. When he enters one of Massillon's 
three junior high schools, he learns the formations and plays that the high school 
varsity uses. . . . There's no time for tears in Massillon's football program. The 
young boy with the professional-looking helmet may privately wonder if football 
is really for him, but in Massillon he has little choice. He is expected to want to 
play football, just as Massillon always is expected to win—the bigger the score, 
the better. With his mother and father and the Boosters shouting encouragement 
from the sidelines, with a small army of coaches studying his actions and with a 
large mechanical board to suggest what play he should run, there is nothing the 
boy need decide for himself. 
7
 
This profile illustrates a number of recurrent themes in organized youth football: the 
dominance of adults, including coaches, parents and the community booster club; the 
organization of programs of elementary and junior high school aged children in preparation for 
future high school careers; the use of equipment that mimicked the gear used by professionals; 
and the promotion of a tough, unemotional form of masculinity (“there’s no time for tears”). The 
profile expressed ambivalence over whether the boys themselves were necessarily willing 
participants in organized athletics, but made clear the immense value the broader community 
placed on football. Beyond the players’ parents and coaches on the sidelines, other adults 
throughout Massillon were deeply involved, including a group of “Side-liners” who “adopted” 
players each season and treated them to dinner and the movies each night before games.  
Community booster clubs and other local football supporters were often instrumental in 
lending necessary material and financial support to local high school football programs. In a 
1967 examination of high school football in Ohio, author and coach Carl Benhase recounted that 
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when he took over as high school football coach at Circleville, Ohio, the athletic department was 
$10,000 in debt. Because the football team lacked the funds and the approval of the athletic 
board to purchase the football equipment they wished to obtain, the team improvised equipment 
and saved money on laundry with the help of local businesses and parents. For example, local 
merchants donated old mattresses to be used as fillers for standup blocking dummies, the 
equipment used to help players practice blocking techniques. Benhase also noted that he helped 
reactivate the local booster club, which in his first year of coaching at Circleville “raised enough 
money to purchase new varsity football game uniforms, sponsor a post-season banquet, and 
finance several other athletic activities.”
8
  
Similarly, a 1979 examination of Texas football highlighted the wide range of financial 
support such clubs offered athletic programs:  
Calling themselves the Bobcat Boosters or the Bay City Quarterback Club, they organize 
caravans to out-of-town games, welcoming committees for home games, team banquets 
with guest speakers; they pay for tutors or surgeons for dull or injured players, for various 
kinds of fancy equipment—prostyle Riddell helmets, say, or sideline headphones for the 
coaching staff—things the local school board can’t find any way to finance or justify.”
9
 
Booster clubs also served to reinforce coaches’ efforts to instill particular values in 
players. These often emphasized particular ideals of aggression and masculinity. In Benhase’s 
chapter examining the “psychological approach to football,” he detailed how the booster club of 
Sandusky, Ohio, assisted the coach in “the subtle art of ‘needling’” the football team. On one 
occasion, the town’s club sent a flock of chickens to the high school team’s locker room just 
                                                          
8
 Carl K. Benhase, Ohio High School Football (West Nyack, N.Y.: Parker Publishing Co., 1967), 185.  Benhase 
coached high school football at Portsmouth High School and Circleville High School, both located in towns in 
southern Ohio. Benhase was inducted into the Ohio High School Football Coaches Association Hall of Fame in 




 Geoff Winningham and Al Reinert, Rites of Fall: High School Football in Texas (Austin: University of Texas 





prior to a game. As Benhase explained, “There had been some uncomplimentary talk about 
several players being ‘chicken.’ Rather than single out those individuals, the chickens were sent 




In many communities, then, parents, business owners, and other local residents were 
deeply involved in furnishing needed resources for football teams as well as defining broader 
community expectations that young athletes were expected to meet. High school football was a 
major community event in many regions of the United States, particularly in the Midwest and the 
South. Several towns in northeastern Ohio, such as Massillon, drew media attention in the 1960s 
for demonstrating particularly strong community interest in the sport. Noting that the Massillon 
community claimed to be the high school football capitol of the world, Carl Benhase estimated 
that during a single season, approximately 100,000 spectators attended the team’s home games.
11
 
A 1962 LIFE Magazine profile of Martins Ferry, Ohio reported that on each Friday night in the 
fall sports season, about 8,000 people out of the town’s population of 12,000 enjoyed the 
entertainment provided by the town’s high school football team. LIFE reported that Gene 
Minder, a millworker, stated: “I told my two boys that if they wanted to amount to something 
better than their dad they would have to play football.”
12
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This LIFE Magazine depiction of an Ohio football town proved highly controversial 
among locals. On the fiftieth anniversary of the LIFE profile, the managing editor of the Martins 
Ferry Times Leader described the article’s original impact. He observed that many residents 
were proud of their town’s football heritage and dismayed that LIFE seemingly portrayed their 
town in an unflattering light. As one Martins Ferry native recalled, “people took exception to 
LIFE's selection of pictures to use in the issue as well as some of the quotes depicting Ferry and 




 Indeed, several weeks after the profile’s 1962 publication, the magazine published a 
number of letters from residents of Martins Ferry registering their objections to the portrayal of 
their town. John Laslo, then the mayor of Martins Ferry, declared that residents were shocked 
and hurt. John C. Vargo of Martins Ferry dubbed the profile in LIFE to be “the most slanted, 
distorted and disgusting article I’ve ever read . . . . There is no depressing atmosphere in our 
town. And above all, football isn’t the only means for a person to leave his home town.” Despite 
controversy over how national media portrayed towns such as Martins Ferry, and whether 
football success was truly considered the only option for boys to seek a future elsewhere, the 
immense popularity of football was unquestioned. To many locals, this popularity ought to have 
been portrayed in a more positive light by LIFE. To them, high school football was a source of 
strength, achievement and unity in their community regardless of whether their team won or lost. 
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They disagreed with the implication that large-scale community involvement in high school 
football was an indicator of blight or a lack of other options in a “grimy mill town.”
14
  
Perhaps one of the most eloquent examinations of youth football in this Ohio town is a 
poem by Pulitzer Prize winning poet James Wright, “Autumn Begins in Martins, Ferry,” 
capturing the connection between the sport’s social and community power and its serious 
physical dangers:  
In the Shreve High football stadium, 
I think of Polacks nursing long beers in Tiltonsville, 
And gray faces of Negroes in the blast furnace at Benwood, 
And the ruptured night watchman of Wheeling Steel, 
Dreaming of heroes. 
 
All the proud fathers are ashamed to go home. 
Their women cluck like starved pullets, 
Dying for love. 
 
Therefore, 
Their sons grow suicidally beautiful 
At the beginning of October, 
And gallop terribly against each other's bodies.
15
 
Sportswriter Taylor Bell’s examination of the history of high school football in 
communities across Illinois similarly depicts locales where the sport represented a major focus of 
community life and aspirations. Particularly in small towns and rural areas, local high school 
football matches emerged as a source of large-scale entertainment. Al Martin, who began 
coaching high school football in Du Quion, Illinois in 1988, stated, “The streets are decorated 
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with jerseys hanging on telephone poles. Everyone is at the game. You might not appreciate it as 
much as we do if you are from a big suburban school in Chicago. But it’s a big deal in Du Quoin. 
It’s all we’ve got.” Martin further observed that in their rural community, where some children 
were homeless and some of their parents were unemployed, football represented a particular 
source of pride and motivation for youth living in adverse circumstances.
16
 
High school football players were often heroes to younger children aspiring to one day 
receive similar acclamation for their exploits on the field. Denny Diericx, a former coach in 
Geneseo, Illinois, another small town of several thousand people, recalled that each Friday night, 
“as we waited for the sophomore game to end, a number of little kids would be standing around 
the back door of our locker room.”
17
 A 1979 examination of high school football in Texas 
meditated on the burden such expectations from adults and young children alike placed upon the 
high school athletes: “The prospective heroes are mostly fifteen and sixteen years old, unused to 




Not all community members, of course, readily embraced football as beneficial for 
children and the broader community. A 1967 examination of high school football coaching in 
Ohio describes some of this skepticism and the strategies that coaches employed in response. 
The book detailed, for instance, the challenges that Ron Jones faced when taking over a 
relatively new football program at the local high school in Piketon, Ohio. As head coach, Jones 
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faced difficulties in recruiting players: “Coach Jones’ problem was typical of that in a new 
school where football has not been previously played. Most of the parents felt that football was a 
brutal sport, and there was little or very limited value of a boy participating in it.” The 
community’s embrace of football was far from assured; it would need to be fostered by the 
intervention of coaches and administrators.
19
  
Jones responded to parental reluctance by arranging home visits with prospective players 
and their parents in order to “sell” the program to them. Other coaches took different approaches 
to promoting their programs among potential objectors. As discussed in chapter one, mothers 
were often perceived as the barrier to their sons’ ability to participate in the sport. Thus, Coach 
Tony Mason at Niles-McKinley High School in Niles, Ohio, initiated a football class for women 
in the community to teach them the rules and strategies of football. With attendance reportedly 
often numbering over 100, this class resulted in a Mothers’ Club to aid in preparing the team 
banquet as well as raising money for other team needs. Building football programs involved 
reassuring parents that the risks of the sport were minimal and that football participation would 
confer valuable physical and social benefits.
20
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Overall, the intensity with which many American communities embraced high school 
interscholastic athletics generally, and football particularly, influenced the expansion of the sport 
at the junior high school level at mid-twentieth century. This trend prompted concerns about 
tackle football’s impact on student well-being, as evidenced by comments by educators and 
several school health and recreation reports. A 1958 survey of interscholastic programs in junior 
high schools, conducted by the Committee on Junior High School Education of the National 
Association of Secondary-School Principals, found a pronounced trend in some states toward 
formalized football for eighth and ninth graders. A common complaint was that senior high 
schools composed of tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades were at a competitive disadvantage if 
their students were not exposed to organized football while enrolled in junior high. Furthermore, 
the report noted that youth football leagues outside the jurisdiction of state athletic associations 
(such as Pop Warner league teams) were making inroads in a number of states. Out of 1,968 
junior high schools across the United States responding to the survey, 1,384 schools reported 
having tackle football teams. This made tackle football the third most commonly reported sport 
on offer, after basketball and track.
21
  
The report’s authors compared the number of principals who responded saying they 
favored interscholastic athletics with the number of junior high schools that actually offered 
these activities, and concluded that “it is evident that a greater number of schools have 
interscholastic athletics than the number that favor them” (italics in original). This suggested the 
possibility that broader community pressures and values, not merely administrators’ views, were 
influencing the growing prominence of interscholastic athletics among younger students. The 
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report noted the danger that sports “which promote a high degree of spectator interest” would 
dominate physical education programs to the exclusion of other, more appropriate activities. 
“Even in the earlier grades the influence of the high-school interscholastic program may be so 
great that the physical education instruction becomes primarily a ‘feeder’ for high-school 
athletics and thereby neglects activities more suitable to the growth and development of the 
younger children.”
22
 As discussed in chapter two, these medical concerns about the physical 
risks of football for pre-pubescent children were particularly focused on how injuries might harm 
bone growth and physical development.  
In 1963, a committee of representatives of medical, educational and recreational 
associations similarly cautioned that the relationship between social pressures and the physical 
risks of tackle football at the junior high school level were potentially harmful. They argued that 
the dangers of physical contact, the relatively high injury rate in the sport, and the emotions 
associated with intense competition were all 
intensified in communities where there are pressures to use junior high school athletics as 
a farm system for the intensive development of high school prospects. Unless these 
factors can be controlled—and the kind of equipment, facilities, health supervision, 
coaching, and officiating that are necessary for the optimum safety of the participants can 




Yet prominent, successful high school football programs more commonly inspired 
increased participation in football programs for younger children in junior high or grade school. 
One such example occurred with a string of high school football victories and state 
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championships under Bob Reade, the head football coach at J.D. Darnall High School in 
Genesco, Illinois from 1962 to 1978. The program’s success “really gave the community 
something to hang its hat on” recalled Ted McAvoy, who served as Reade’s statistician and later 
served as principal of the high school. Moreover, the victories “trickled down to the youth 




Bob Reade would later write a book entitled Coaching Football Successfully, with a 
foreword contributed by famed Penn State coach Joe Paterno. Reade emphasized the importance 
of promoting participation at the younger levels before high school: “the real key is that the kids 
coming into the program have all had an opportunity to play.” He further recommended that head 
high school football coaches building their school programs attend as many games at lower 
levels of play as possible. “The head coach must show the young people participating in the 
program he is interested in them.”
25
 
By the 1950s and 1960s, the extent to which high school football was entrenched as part 
of school and community life shaped understandings of the sport’s effects on student well-being. 
In seeking to prevent youth athletic injuries in interscholastic high school programs, leading 
educators took as a given that the sport conferred social and educational benefits to students. Yet 
at the same time, they expressed concern about the increasing use of youth football as a “feeder 
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system” and uncertainty about what precisely constituted the educational value of contact sports 
such as football. In a 1967 interview, the supervisor of athletics for the New York State 
Department of Education stated that the education department believed strongly in the benefits of 
contact sports; “they have special values that other activities don’t.” “Yet he also asked, “What’s 
education? Are eighteen games more educational than twelve? Where do you reach the limit? . . . 
. We don’t know what is soundest educationally in terms of boys’ learning a sport and milking it 
to its maximum for his own educational use and use after graduation.”
26
 
At the pre-high school level, a 1969 master’s thesis in education by Richard Stuetz, who 
would later go on to coach football at Saddleback College, is a particularly instructive example 
of efforts to evaluate the educational benefits of youth football. Stuetz examined the Pop Warner 
youth football league in Orange County, California, which at the time had about 1200 boys 
enrolled in the league, playing on around 60 teams. Stuetz remarked that one of the greatest 
selling points of the Pop Warner program was its “amazing lack of injuries” and its use of safety 
equipment. Yet whether such youth football leagues promoted values consistent with the broader 
objectives of secondary education was unclear, he argued, and needed to be assessed.
27
 
Stuetz’s chosen methodology to answer this question—asking several coaches to fill out a 
questionnaire indicating whether they believed each of their players had evinced particular 
values—appears to be highly subjective and susceptible to individual bias. The questionnaires 
Stuetz devised and his analysis of the coaches’ responses nonetheless reveal the types of 
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community and educational values that physical educators associated with football. The 
objectives Stuetz evaluated and compared at the Pop Warner and high school levels of play 
included loyalty, living and working with others, appreciating “the significance of the family as 




Stuetz reported that high school football was more effective overall at imparting these 
desirable values to young athletes. Based on the coaches’ responses, “the high school is doing 
the best job here of promoting both pride in the community and promoting fair play.” Stuetz 
identified two major negative factors at the Pop Warner level: parental pressures, and untrained 
coaches. Addressing these two factors, he argued, was not only important for improving the 
experience of the youngest players, but also for ensuring that they would continue to play the 
sport. A successful experience at the Pop Warner level “will give a boy the desire to continue on 
in the high school program and remain involved in healthy activity.”
29
  Thus, high school 
football was in many ways treated as the “gold standard” of how football could impart 
community and educational values to young players. Where pre-high school, little league 
football organizations fell short, Stuetz argued that they needed to adopt the positive aspects of 
high school football.  
In addition, the high standing of high school football likely influenced medical 
understandings of football’s physical risks. As discussed in chapter two, professional medical 
organizations in the 1950s and 1960s expressed specific concerns about bone growth in pre-
pubescent children, but offered relatively few objections to the physical risks of high school 
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football in older teenagers. It may have been more culturally feasible—or even merely 
conceivable—for doctors and educators to contest the expansion of football to younger ages, 
rather than challenging the widely accepted place of football in high schools. Consistent with the 
Cold War ideologies discussed in chapter one that helped promote competitive sports such as 
football, many communities, coaches and parents believed participation in youth football was 
crucial to boys’ future success in school and in life. Such justifications for high school football, 
the explicit involvement of high school football coaches in encouraging and motivating younger 
players, and the belief that participating at younger ages would increase young players’ chances 
of playing for their high school teams, further pushed younger children to participate in football 
in leagues not associated with schools.   
King of Prussia Indians, Pennsylvania 
Little league football teams operated not only as feeder systems for high school football, 
but also acquired their own particular status as prominent centers of community life. The growth 
of the King of Prussia (KoP) Indians youth football team in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 
exemplifies the transition from informal sand lot games to adult-organized league play. The 
heavy involvement of adult leaders in supervising boy football players and girl cheerleaders also 
illustrates the importance that youth football for even elementary school aged players could 
attain in local communities.  
In 1956, starting with 22 young boys, Alan Richter founded the KoP youth football team 
in the small Pennsylvania town, with practices taking place in a local cow pasture. Shortly 
thereafter, Dave and Mary Vannicelli joined as adult volunteers and would remain prominent 




Widener University, then known as the Pennsylvania Military Academy, before transitioning to 
coaching after seeing an advertisement seeking an assistant coach (see Figure 17). In 1958, the 
KoP Indians became charter members of the Bux-Mont League of southeastern Pennsylvania, 
and in 1959 the KoP team came in third place in the nationwide Pop Warner Conference Little 
Scholars program, losing to an All-Star team in Cape Canaveral. A 30 year retrospective on the 
team kept by the Vannicellis proudly noted that the KoP team had thus gone “from cow pasture 
to Cape Canaveral” in the space of three years.
30
 
Figure 17. Coach Dave Vannicelli with King of Prussia Indians
31 
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The KoP Indians became formally organized as the King of Prussia Football Association 
(KPFA) in 1960, and in 1963 they were legally incorporated. The Vannicellis’ daughter Sandy 
recalled that Mary Vannicelli was named as one of the three incorporators, because her husband 
Dave was a team coach. The couple wished to avoid a possible conflict of interest if Dave was 
both a coach of a particular team as well as incorporating the association, a worry which 
suggested the great seriousness with which the adult supervisors treated organized football. 
32
 
By this time, the KoP Indians were already well organized with uniforms, equipment, 
fund raisers, and local media coverage. For example, in 1963 the Valley Forge Sentinel covered 
the team’s games, fundraising efforts, and the ways parents and community members supported 
the league. One issue included a photo of the football players and the team’s cheerleaders at a 
fund drive. The original caption read: “The King of Prussia Indians and their cheerleaders 
boarded a fire truck Sunday and toured Upper Merion on a house-to-house fund drive. The 
players’ fathers, mothers and sisters pitched in for sideline and grandstand chores. The Indians 
open Sunday at 2 p.m. when Lower Southampton visits at Walker Field” (see figure 18).  The 
Vannicellis submitted the results of the team’s games to local newspapers, and area newspapers 
reported on the scores of the matches of even elementary school aged players.
33
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In 1964, Dave Vannicelli wrote a letter to the National Pop Warner Office describing the 
amount of volunteer time he and his wife had dedicated to the KPFA in the previous year. Tasks 
included “coaching, committee work such as equipment, banquet, trophies” as well as “meetings, 
mailing of information, preparing and reproduction of all paper work, establishing and 
maintaining a League player registration file, correspondence, etc.” He estimated that throughout 
the year, he had devoted about 700 hours of his time to KPFA, while his wife had given about 
350-400 hours of her time. While the Vannicellis may have been particularly dedicated 
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volunteers, these estimates nonetheless suggest the level of involvement that running an 
organized youth football association entailed.35 
The adult leadership of the KoP Indians emphasized that their primary objective was 
fostering moral character in young athletes and shaping future adults according to community 
values. This mission was made clear in Article II of the KPFA’s constitution, which stated that 
the association’s goal was “to implant firmly in the boys and girls of our community, the 
principles of good character development, i.e. courage, responsibility, sportsmanship, fair play, 
leadership, and respect for rules and regulation, as well as to foster higher achievement in 
scholastic activities.” The constitution further stated that these goals “shall be achieved by 
providing supervised competitive football games and related activities within a program that 
fosters favorable character development. The elected officers shall bear in mind that the molding 
of future men and women is of prime importance, and that winning is secondary.”
36
  
An undated Q&A on the history of the KPFA from Dave and Mary Vannicelli, estimated 
to be from the late 1980s or early 1990s, noted that at the time of its writing, the league had 12 
football coaches, 95 “young men” aged 6 to 13 years old playing football in four different weight 
class teams, 56 cheerleaders, 3 adult sponsors, and 45 adults “engaged in administration 
including officers, board members, team mothers, business managers, and equipment personnel.” 
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It is also notable that the division of labor among these numerous adult supervisors 
remained heavily gendered throughout the final decades of the twentieth century. A 1999 KoP 
information packet for new and returning members distinguished between the responsibilities of 
“team moms” and “business managers (team dads).” The duties of the team moms included 
keeping the children orderly on the bench; arranging snacks for game days; signing up parents on 
practice nights and home game days to work in the teen activity center [“TAC house”]; working 
to promote fundraisers; relaying organization communications to the parents; and arranging the 
team party. Meanwhile, business managers, identified in parentheses as the team dads, were 
expected to “help to keep order on practice nights and games days; assist in relaying organization 
communications to parents; conduct weigh-ins prior to the start of each game; check that players 
have necessary protective equipment; carry medical cards at all times; provide write-ups of 




Team fathers’ duties thus explicitly encompassed oversight of youth football safety by 
assisting with practices and games and checking player equipment and medical cards, whereas 
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mothers managed communications and social events and oversaw player behavior on the 
sidelines. Identifying fathers as “business managers” also had the effect of distancing fathers 
from their more personal, parental role as dads. Their contribution as adult supervisors was 
instead framed as contributing professional, managerial and athletic skills rather than nurturing, 
social or communication skills. 
The Q&A response to a question on how the league ensured the safety of its players 
emphasized the kind of adult supervision that was primarily furnished by coaches and fathers as 
business managers. Adult organizers matched players according to their age and weight so that 
players would not be overmatched physically. They also ensured that all athletes received high 
quality protective equipment, including helmets whose design was approved by NOCSAE and 
which were regularly inspected by an outside agency. In addition to overseeing physical 
conditioning and training, the youth football league required game day medical coverage, which 




The supervisory imperative, as described in chapter two, is clearly evident in the structure 
of the KPFA league and the strategies the league employed to provide for its players’ safety. The 
belief that organized competitive football was an ideal means to foster desirable values and 
moral character in children influenced these strategies and shaped perceptions of the sport’s 
potential harm. With coaches in charge, fathers directly involved on the field, and mothers 
assisting on the sidelines, the adults overseeing the sport believed that youth football offered 
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significant social and moral benefits to children, and that their involvement minimized the 
sports’ physical risks. 
In fact, the community’s response to those youth football injuries that did occur was 
characterized as exemplifying the virtues of teamwork and caring. In a 1996 letter to the 
president of the KPFA, a board member noted that families from the 55 pound team and others 
within the KPFA organization had expressed concern about a knee injury that a young player, 
Robert, had sustained. She noted that her phone had been ringing off the hook with inquiries. 
Young Robert had received several visitors at the hospital as well as follow-up phone calls 
asking how his orthopedic exam had gone. She requested that the KPFA president convey to the 
board “that even if nothing else we are teaching these kids what a team is and what it means to 
be part of that team including caring enough to show it when someone is hurt.” Despite the best 
efforts of adult supervisors to prevent football injuries, it was understood that some injuries 
would nonetheless occur. Yet provided they were not too serious, the football injuries that 
players sustained carried redeeming moral value: the response to those injuries could be the 




The available board meeting minutes from the KPFA archive document significant 
attention by the league’s leadership to how to best ensure medical supervision of youth games. 
For instance, on October 1997, the board noted that providing football coaches with CPR 
training would be less expensive than paying emergency medical technicians to cover home 
games. In November 1997, three parents from the 55 pound team attended the meeting to discuss 
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apparently inadequate medical coverage at games. When a KPFA representative asked a 
“medical person” to provide identification, they were given a blank form. Without identification 
of the attendant’s medical training, they did not let the game continue. In addition, the opposing 
team “introduced a man who never came on field when a boy was hurt. Parents questioned 
leagues [sic] ability to enforce coverage.” The KPFA board decided that they should not play 
against this team given this failure, and that the following year team coaches and dads would 
enforce this policy. Ensuring trained medical supervision was evidently an ongoing challenge, 
and the adult men associated with the league were tasked with overseeing this problem.
41
   
KPFA’s leadership also included a groundskeeper and equipment director who 
supervised the fields used by the team, as well as the provision and recertification of protective 
equipment for players. In 2000 KPFA member Bob Gray held this position, and his detailed 
notes on the status of the association’s helmets indicate the logistical and legal complexity of 
maintaining this single piece of equipment. Gray kept a detailed list of helmet sizes and dates 
purchased, noting that two-thirds of the association’s inventory had been purchased between 
1990 and 1992, making most of the helmets nearly a decade old. While other helmet models had 
a mandatory discontinuance of use policy after the eighth year from date of manufacture, this 
was not the case for the helmets in use by KPFA. Additionally, at the high school level, Gray 
noted, all football helmets were required to be re-certified annually, but this was not mandatory 
at the youth level. Unlike the high school level of play which was overseen by the National 
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Federation of State High School Athletic Associations, youth leagues for younger children were 
overseen by a variety of private organizations that set their own policies.
42
  
While particular policies differed at different youth levels of play, it is clear that the 
institutionalization and standardization of football safety practices in little leagues, junior high 
schools, and high schools resulted in an emphasis on a large number of technical requirements 
and safety boxes to check. These ranged from documenting the presence of medical personnel at 
games when required, to notifying football league commissioners that all the players’ helmets 
had been certified by NOCSAE.  
Despite these forms of oversight, parents nonetheless remained concerned about injuries 
through the latter decades of the twentieth century, as suggested by the efforts that leagues and 
sports organizations invested in reassuring parents that tackle football was indeed safe for 
children to play. The KoP football archives include a 1996 article by reporter Kent Hannon 
entitled “Is Football Safe for Kids?” Published as part of a special supplement of Sports 
Illustrated for Kids, this issue was intended for parents, advising them on “how to help your kids 
get the most out of sports.” KoP football organizers, then, had most likely saved this article for 
use as a reference for coaches and parents about the safety of football.
43
  
The article opened by illustrating concerns which purportedly proved to be unfounded 
over an apparent head injury. It recounted the story of Brent McEwan, then 10, who was playing 
linebacker when he experienced a helmet-to-helmet collision with another child. His father 
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recalled, “Both kids went down and didn’t move. I remember someone saying, ‘Those kids are 
really hurt.’” Brent’s helmet had split in half. Yet the boy himself was not injured according to 
Hannon, who added that Brent “never suffered a serious injury while playing” the sport from his 
youth through his college football days. In other words, a collision where a young player went 
down and did not move was ultimately not considered to be a serious injury.
44
  
The Sports Illustrated for Kids examination of football safety listed three key safety 
factors: proper equipment; teaching of correct football technique, specifically never leading with 
the helmet to make a tackle; and the small size of the young children matched against other 
children of a similar age and weight (“FORCE=mass x acceleration, and kids don’t generate 
much force”). In addition to the emphasis on safety factors associated with adult supervision, the 
article also quoted coaches who made familiar comparisons about the relative safety of football 
as compared to other popular childhood activities. One youth football coach, who was in his 
eleventh year of coaching Pop Warner teams, stated that “Frankly, many more of our kids get 
hurt riding bikes, climbing trees, or in-line skating than they do playing football.”
45
 
Despite these reassurances, the appropriate age at which to begin participation in 
organized youth football, whether tackle or flag, remained a source of uncertainty. The archive 
of KoP material includes a flurry of 1996 letters between parents and league officials related to 
whether two flag football coaches were appropriately and safely conducting their team’s games 
and practices. Some parents expressed concerns that there was inadequate practice time that was 
spread too thin among too many players, while other parents wrote letters of support for the 
coaches in response to these complaints. The series of letters illustrates parental perceptions of 
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the benefits of organized sports as well as safety concerns. Notably, parent Robert B. Leahy sent 
a letter to Fran Littlewood, the KoP Indians Flag Football Representative, to communicate his 
view that the coaches were not fundamentally to blame for his safety concerns, and that they had 
performed their coaching duties well. Instead, he argued,  
The real problem is the age level that you are dealing with. Five year old children are not 
mentally and physically prepared to play football. That is just the plain truth. State it any 
other way you like, they are too young. The program should start at the age of six thru 
eight, provided weight is a concideration [sic]. One real test for the board members will 




Mr. Leahy’s letter suggested the view that children who were too young to consistently 
pay attention to adult coaches and follow directions were too young to sufficiently benefit from 
adult supervision, and thus too young to play football. Some parents thus expressed uncertainty 
whether children as young as five should be playing any form of organized football, including 
flag football. The fact that by the 1990s, the source of debate was over whether 5 year olds 
should be playing organized sports, indicates the extent to which earlier debates about the 
extension of competitive youth sports to younger ages had moved. By this time, it was largely 
taken as a given that older children, even those as young as 9 or 10, could play organized 
football. With football framed as safe for grade school children given the proper adult 
supervision, the debate had instead shifted to identifying at which age children were old enough 
to understand and take advantage of such supervision. 
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Education, Race and Youth Football 
Parents and coaches attributed significant educational and character-building value to 
football for young children. Tackle football was also perceived to carry the potential to enable 
children to access greater social status, recognition, and even future resources, particularly access 
to higher education. Race and socioeconomic status significantly influenced the value of these 
perceived benefits. Consequently, examining racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic transitions in the 
demographics of youth football is critical to understanding debates over the sport’s safety. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, football was most prominently 
associated with the elite, Anglo-Saxon, protestant college students of Harvard and Yale. Indeed, 
at the turn of the century, coaches at Ivy League institutions explicitly characterized the sport as 
an exemplar of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and upper-class masculinity. In 1900, 
Harvard’s football coach stated that “football is the expression of the strength of the Anglo-
Saxon. It is the dominant spirit of a dominant race, and to this it owes its popularity and its hopes 
of permanence.”
47
 Opposition to football as entertainment during this period centered on 
objections to the participation of elite, educated men in such an unseemly activity. As an 1897 
New York Times editorial argued, “A young gentleman engaged in getting an education ought not 
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While players of European descent represented by far the majority on football fields at 
the turn of the twentieth century, participation in tackle football by members of minority 
American racial and ethnic groups dates to the sport’s earliest days. In the 1890s, for example, 
several predominately white college football teams in northern U.S. states included a limited 
number of black players. Participation in football by minority racial groups was often, among 
other functions, intended to counter prevailing racial stereotypes. Success at football had the 
potential to demonstrate that young boys and men typically considered inferior were in fact 
civilized “gentlemen” entitled to the same regard as their white peers.
49
  
Nowhere is this aspiration more evident than in the development of the youth football 
program at the Carlisle Indian School, where Pop Warner, the namesake of the Pop Warner Little 
League, achieved much of his coaching fame. As Sally Jenkins has observed in her examination 
of the Carlisle football team, the white administrators of the Carlisle Indian School realized that 
football was “a stage on which Carlisle could exhibit a different kind of ‘show Indian’ to the 
public, one who was every bit as intelligent and civilized as the elite college boys.” A number of 
Native American leaders similarly acknowledged the potential of football as an avenue to fuller 
participation in American life. In 1906, Dr. Carlos Montezuma, a Yavapai doctor who served as 
resident physician at the Carlisle Indian School for several years, clarified his perspective on 




 For instance, “William H. Lewis and William Tecumseh Sherman Jackson were teammates at Amherst in 1889, 
1890, and 1891 and Lewis served as team captain in the second year. Lewis then played the 1892 and 1893 seasons 
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football for Native Americans in The Indian’s Friend. “Let us get into civilization. If there is no 
other way but by kicking the pigskin, then let us get in that way.”
50
 
The administrators of the Carlisle Indian School fervently sought to convince the 
American public that the assimilation of Native Americans into white Christian culture was 
possible through the type of education they offered. Football matches in which teenage Native 
American students challenged Harvard and Yale athletes on the gridiron appeared to be the most 
effective means to reach the public. Richard Henry Pratt, the founder and superintendent of the 
Carlisle School, may have been initially concerned about injuries, but reportedly rationalized the 
introduction of the sport into his school by noting that students could just as easily suffer injuries 
while doing farm work. He remarked that no other program or activity in the school’s history had 
“attracted the attention and comment” of the school’s fall football season. His decision to support 
the athletic program was seemingly based on the calculus that the social benefits of football to 
the students and the school outweighed the potential risk of injury.
51
  
Much of the broader public attention the Carlisle Indians team attracted, unsurprisingly, 
did not result in the hoped-for recognition of Native students as intelligent and civilized, but 
rather reinforced prevailing stereotypes. “It is an unusual thing to see an Indian bestir himself 
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sufficiently to take part in any sort of amusement which is liable to disturb his peaceful serenity, 
but in the Carlisle Indian School they have a set of young bucks who have taken up the American 
game of football” opened an 1894 article in the Washington Post. In his examination of the 
connections between beliefs about white manhood and the Carlisle Indian School’s football 
team, American studies researcher Matthew Bentley concluded that with the widespread media 
and public attention that the students’ “performance of civilization” on the football fall received, 
the players were constantly reminded of their second-status status as Native Americans.
52
   
The remarkable contributions of the Carlisle Indian players themselves to the 
development of modern football have to a significant extent been overshadowed by celebrations 
of the achievements of their white coach, Pop Warner. Yet the players’ experiences are also 
important to understanding debates about the safety of the sport for children. The Carlisle 
Indians represent an early and prominent exemplar of how the health risks of football were 
eclipsed by benefits associated with the sport’s spectacle nature in a particular, racialized 
context. Furthermore, the racial meanings of youth football intersected with ideas about 
masculinity. Historian Michael Oriard has observed that the issue of what it meant to be a “man” 
has underlain “virtually every narrative of football.” At stake in the Carlisle Indians’ matches 
against white teams was the question of who could be considered civilized gentlemen.
53
  
In different ways among various ethnics groups at different periods, tackle football 
continued to represent a means by which boys from marginalized groups could hope to attain 
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certain ideals of masculinity and to be assimilated into the prevailing American culture. Notably, 
at mid-twentieth century, it was believed that football could help “Americanize” children of 
diverse ethnic backgrounds, as historian Russ Crawford has described in his study of the use of 
sports such as football to promote an “American Way of Life” during the Cold War. For 
instance, in 1946, the Saturday Evening Post ran a cartoon depicting a football coach telling his 
players: “Zablotskiwizc, play left half, Karenoftski, right half, Polkontowicz, quarterback, and 
you, Smith, Smythe, Smitt, however you pronounce it, fullback.” This image humorously 
illustrated the perception that children of a variety of ethnic backgrounds were increasingly 
playing football.
54
 Furthermore, the implied Eastern European background of players’ names 
suggested that football could help bring children into the American mainstream who might 
otherwise be associated with the “Communist threat.” At the college level of play, sociologist 
Jeffrey Montez de Oca has argued that “college football in the early Cold War was most 




Team sports even represented an institutional path to racially integrated activities in high 
schools where other academic paths remained segregated. For example, an examination of the 
racial dynamics of high school football programs in South Texas notes a policy of tracking 
Anglo and Mexican students into different academic curricula (with Mexican Americans placed 
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in remedial and vocational courses) at mid-twentieth century. Consequently, entertainment and 
extracurricular activities such as football often proved one of the limited venues available where 
racial and ethnic mixing occurred in high schools.
56
  
Even in integrated athletic programs, however, students of diverse backgrounds often 
“stood together but apart.” For example, while yearbook photos and rosters depicted racially 
mixed sports teams, a 1952 shot of spectators at a high school game depicts the Anglo students 
occupying the front rows together, with the Mexican students immediately behind them. The 
different groups of students observed the game together while keeping their distance. 
Furthermore, the time involved in attending games and practices, as well as the expenses 
associated with participation, still deterred many of the poorest students, including 
predominantly Mexican migrant workers, from playing football. One man who attended 
Edinburg High School in Edinburg, Texas, in the late 1960s told researcher Joel Huerta that the 
inability to afford the cost of student health insurance had prevented him and some of his friends 
from participating in school athletics. “I just couldn’t come up with the twelve bucks or whatever 
it was. Coach said, ‘I’m really sorry, but I just can’t let you go on.’”
57
  
In the latter half of the twentieth century and into the early twenty-first century, the most 
dramatic racial shift in youth football has been the increasing participation and visibility of 
African American youth. Michael Oriard has noted that the transformation of college and 
professional football to “a multiracial, ultimately black-dominated sport was only beginning by 
the end of the 1950s.” Prior to the integration of school systems in the South and of the NFL, 
many African American children did play football, but in segregated “Negro” leagues that did 
                                                          
56
 Joel Huerta, “Red, Brown, and Blue: A History and Cultural Poetics of High School Football in Mexican 







not attract the public attention that their white counterparts received. They also received less 
financial support and were often far less formally organized. For example, Pat Paterson, a high 
school coach whose career spanned from 1939 through 1967 and who founded the Negro 
Interscholastic League, recalled that in the early period of his career, “players were recruited off 
the sandlots by both players and coaches. It was a common practice back then.” After taking over 
as head coach, Paterson sought to make the program more rigorous and to ensure that only boys 
who attended school could play.
58
 
 The desegregation of schools beginning with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 and 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s had a profound influence on the racial demographics of 
youth football. To the extent that schools and communities remained segregated, their youth 
football teams remained segregated, too (see Figure 19 for an example of a relatively racially 
homogenous youth football team). Furthermore, as historian Lane Demas has observed of 
football at the college level, the integration and “acceptance of black athletes on the playing field 
did not translate into equal and adequate opportunities for African American students at 
integrated colleges.” The same can undoubtedly be said for black athletes at the high school 
level. Nonetheless, these social changes, including the increasing prominence of black football 




Football increasingly became a means by which black boys could “prove” or legitimize 
themselves to white-dominated communities and institutions. In 1986, Nand Hart-Nibbrig, a 
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professor of political science and public administration, co-authored an examination of the 
political economy of college sports in which he recalled his own experiences with football. As a 
black student at a Catholic high school, he felt heavy pressure from both the coaching staff and 
several priests to play football for the school. When he decided to cease playing the sport in 
order to focus on his academic studies at age 16, the head football coach reportedly berated him 
in front of the student body, stating that “the school did not need or want” a person like him 
representing it. Hart-Nibbrig reflected that he was, to use Ralph Ellison’s term, an “invisible 
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Interviews with other black men who played football in their youth suggest the 
importance the sport represented as a means to status and success in racially marginalized 
communities. Journalist Robert Andrew Powell interviewed a number of coaches, players and 
former players in his examination of Pop Warner football in predominantly black, poor areas of 
Miami, Florida. Powell noted that although he had originally intended to spend most of his time 
speaking with the children who played the game, after reviewing his notes, “I realized that in 
talking to the people most invested in Pop Warner football, I’d spent most of my time talking to 
adults.” The title of his book came from an interview with Miami area rapper Luther Campbell 
who described the importance of football in this community. “We own this game. I mean, you 
can take whatever you want to take—our land, our housing, our jobs, whatever. But we got our 
dignity and our pride.
62
 
The observations of former youth football player George Knox are also particularly 
revealing. Born in Jacksonville, Florida, in 1943, Knox grew up in a segregated housing project 
where he began playing football. He recalled that  
Football was the most popular sport when I was growing up. When it came to following 
football, blacks in the community knew everything there was to know about the white 
high schools: who the players were, who the star was, who the mascot was, what the team 
colors were. We’d read the newspaper and we’d know what [all-white] Landon High 
School and Jackson High School were doing. On the other side of the Florida Times-
Union newspaper was all the news ‘for and about colored people.’ We knew the white 




As such, George Knox recalled that black players yearned “to demonstrate their skills to 
the larger population—first to gain respect for their skills, and also to have some recognition of 
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the very existence of the black community.” He acknowledged that this desire for recognition 
and respect went beyond football, but given the deep association between football, schools and 
broader American culture, youth football became a foremost arena for these aspirations. Knox 
further emphasized that athletic competition in many respects represented “the only direct 




In examining the complex relationship between sport participation in boyhood and 
masculine identity, sociologists Kevin Young and Philip White have suggested that “to 
relinquish the opportunity to participate in the sporting rite of passage, or at the very least to 
identify with sports heroes or teams, is to risk estrangement from other boys.” In racially and 
otherwise marginalized communities, it seems probable that participation in football not only 
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It is also notable that the integration of college and professional football teams converged 
with the emergence of televised football as the most widely view sport on American television. 
In his examination of the NFL from 1920 to 1967, historian Craig Coenen observed that by 1960,  
televised Sunday football games were viewed by as many as 30 million to 50 million Americans 
watched, “far outpacing the weekly average for any other sport.” Coenen further observed that 
“football seemed to be made for television. In the course of play all twenty-two players were 
compressed into a small area that could easily be captured by a single camera. In fact, the game 
proved easier to follow on television than at the stadium.” As football became the most popular 
professional sport in the United States, among other changes, the spectacle nature of the sport 
moved far beyond local communities. Tackle football became an immensely prominent arena in 




Quantifying the history of racial and ethnic shifts in youth football is challenging due to 
the lack of systematic, comparable national data on participation in youth football and race. The 
National Federation of State High School Athletic Association, which oversees football in the 
majority of American high schools, has not collected historical data on race in its statistics on 
participation in high school sports. Neither has USA Football, the national governing body for 
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Furthermore, the demographic racial and ethnic shifts in youth football likely occurred at 
different times in different regions, and the changing racial demographics of particular 
communities must also be accounted for. For example, in his analysis of high school football in 
the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania, historian Paul Zbiek observed based on team rosters 
printed in the Wilkes-Barre Record, “The number of “New Immigrant” children who embraced 
the sport in the 1920s is obvious when the team rosters are compared to the lists of the early 
1900s. While the first Slavic-Americans did not play until 1908 by the mid-1920s they constitute 
over forty percent of the players.” Nonetheless, Zbiek further cautions that Slavic-Americans did 
not participate in football in numbers disproportionate to their share of the population, but rather, 
“the percentage of players from a particular ethnic group was usually equal to the percentage of 
the group population in the Valley as a whole.”
68
  
Despite these significant challenges in documenting racial shifts in youth football 
participation, some available state and local studies suggest high levels of participation of racial 
minorities, particularly African Americans, in youth football. In 1975, two Michigan state 
representatives, Senators Carl Pursell and Joseph Snyder, initiated a legislative inquiry into youth 
sports programs in the state. The special six-member committee was tasked with examining in 
particular “the actual educational benefits that youth receive from these programs,” as well as the 
medical and legal problems associated with youth sports. The first phase of the study sought to 
characterize the extent of sports participation by Michigan youth, including free play or 
recreational sports, school sponsored sports, and agency-sponsored sports (competition between 
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teams, clubs or individuals not sponsored by schools). The study included 89 randomly sampled 
Michigan school districts from across the state. A combined total of nearly 100,000 student and 
parent questionnaires were ultimately returned to the researchers from both private and public 
schools in these districts.
69
 
The large sample size in conjunction with the random sampling procedures used meant 
that researchers considered the study to be representative of children from kindergarten through 
eleventh grades in the state of Michigan. The researchers also included categories for race as 
well as other key variables such as age, sex, and community type. While acknowledging that the 
incidence of participation by race was the most difficult variable to obtain, the researchers 
reported finding that black participants had the highest percent of participation of all agency-
sponsored team sports, with the exception of soccer and ice hockey. Furthermore, the researchers 
found that participation in agency-sponsored sports among all youth was much higher than they 
had anticipated. Approximately one of every eight Michigan boys participated in agency 
sponsored football. The study’s findings thus suggested extensive youth participation in football 
programs outside of schools, particularly high rates of participation among black youth, and very 
little external oversight of safety in these sports programs. “Clearly, the extent of participation is 
very large with no control except that of sponsoring agencies.”
70
 
College demographic data, too, are at least suggestive of a racial shift in which boys were 
playing youth football as a means to access a college education, a college football career, or 
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both. Black college football players at top athletic programs became substantially 
overrepresented in relation to the racial composition of the student body as well as the overall 
American population. According to available NCAA data from the turn of the twenty-first 
century, in the 1999-2000 school year, 51.3 percent of NCAA Division I college football players 
were white, while 39.5 percent were black. By the 2014-15 school year, a minority (40.2 percent) 
of Division I football players were white, while 47.1 percent were black.
71
 
The increasing value and attraction of a college scholarship was related to the increasing 
cost of college, as well as the growing corporatization of college athletics. In 1957, the NCAA 
adopted athletic scholarships, which would enable colleges to bind student-athletes to one-year 
renewable contracts that depended upon their athletic performance. Success in football was 
increasingly a means by which otherwise marginalized youth might be able to access a college 
education. Yet as historian John Sayle Watterson has noted, while colleges depicted their athletic 
policies as supporting affirmative action for minority groups, the institutions benefited 
enormously by profiting from athletes’ low-paid (or arguably unpaid) labor. Sociologist Robert 
Turner has observed that this feeling of exploitation on predominantly white college campuses 
has contributed to black students leaving college early for the NFL. Furthermore, “though 
athletes are viewed as ambassadors of the college, the demands of big time college football 
rarely offer time to benefit from school resources in the same fashion as the rest of the student 
body.” Although hopes of a college scholarship heightened the perceived value of football for 
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boys of high school and even younger ages, the increased exposure to the physical risks of 
football for many students did not result in full access to the benefits of higher education.
72
  
Football is not the only American sport which has been intimately tied to school or 
community identity, in which intensive feeder systems have developed, or in which racially and 
ethnically marginalized communities have perceived potential opportunities for social status and 
resources denied to them in other aspects of American life. Yet these have all been key features 
of youth football in the twentieth and early twenty-first century to a remarkable extent, and these 
factors are crucial to understanding the broader context in which doctors, educators, coaches and 
parents have understood and weighted the risks and benefits of youth football for young children.  
Demographic data as well as testimony from former players and coaches suggest the 
extent to which the social position of children and their communities shaped debates over the 
risks and benefits of football, including the sport’s spectator nature. Adult-sanctioned play 
carries particular resonance in an era where children, most especially black children, can be 
vulnerable to violence while playing on their own. The worst case scenario is exemplified by the 
2014 death of Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old black boy killed by a police officer while playing in a 
playground with an air gun. When unsupervised children can be perceived as suspicious and 
dangerous, supervised play in a socially valued sport such as football affords a substantial level 
of social protection. Tackle football can legitimize stereotypes of male aggression and 
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physicality as a healthy, socially sanctioned activity. This function of youth football carries 
particular importance for black boys and men who are particularly subject to these stereotypes. 
Henry Steele Commager’s 1958 depiction of youth football as “burlesque performances” 
does not account for the extent to which parents and communities believed that participation in 
youth football conferred serious and substantial benefits to their boys. Nonetheless, it is 
undeniable that the risks and benefits of youth football were relevant not only to the players 
themselves, but also to their wider communities. This aspect of youth football was perhaps most 
compellingly and famously depicted in Friday Night Lights, a work of non-fiction that followed 
the story of a 1988 high school football team in Odessa, Texas. Bob Rutherford, a local realtor in 
town, casually told the author, “Life really wouldn’t be worth livin’ if you didn’t have a high 
school football team to support.”
73
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Chapter Six. This Is Your Brain on Football: The Framing of a Concussion Crisis 
 
“I hope another player doesn't have to die before all this is taken seriously.” 




“Football is supposed to build a sense of community, and true communities look out for 






From Getting “Dinged” to Second Impact Syndrome 
 
In 1976, the NFHS and NCAA both adopted rules prohibiting “spearing,” or the 
deliberate use of the helmet to strike another player. Medical and public health reports attributed 
subsequent reductions in cervical spinal cord injuries and quadriplegia among high school and 
college football players to this rule change.
3
 Additionally, football-related fatalities largely 
declined in the 1980s and 1990s; in fact, 1990 was the first and only year since 1931 when the 
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Although doctors and educators celebrated these trends, many remained concerned about 
the prevalence of head and neck injuries. The decline in severe football injuries and fatalities 
helped make it possible for another concern to come into focus: that trauma to players’ brains, 
even if it did not result in death or catastrophic injuries such as paralysis, might still constitute a 
serious medical problem. 
In 1973, Neurology, the journal of the American Academy of Neurology, published an 
article describing several cases of college football players getting “dinged” while playing the 
sport. Getting “dinged” or “getting your bell rung” were commonly used expressions in tackle 
football and other contact sports to describe sustaining a hit to the head that might result in 
temporary confusion or even memory loss, but not loss of consciousness.
5
 The article’s co-
authors, a neurologist and an educational psychologist, cited former professional football player 
Dave Meggyesy’s explanation of getting “dinged” as 
getting hit in the head so hard that your memory is affected, although you can still walk 
around and sometimes even continue playing. You don’t feel pain, and the only way 
other players or the coaches know you’ve been dinged is when they realize you can’t 
remember the plays.
6
     
The researchers reported on four cases of players experiencing short-term memory loss, 
as well as six cases of “delayed retrograde amnesia.” This referred to instances where players 
were initially able to recall recent events upon examination immediately after their injury, but 
they permanently lost the information within minutes of being examined. This suggested that 
despite retaining consciousness and demonstrating immediate recall ability, a consequence of 
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getting “dinged” might include impairment of short-term memory consolidation. Based on their 
findings, the authors of this article recommended that in order to assess “mild concussions,” 
physicians should not ask players questions that evaluated their immediate memory or cognition, 
such as asking how many fingers they were holding up. Instead, they should ask athletes several 
questions related to recently experienced events, such as “Where did you go after you left the 
playing field? What are some of your plays and assignments for this game?”
7
 
Although physicians recognized that players could sustain a concussion while retaining 
consciousness, such concussions were considered mild, and athletes very rarely sought medical 
attention for getting “dinged.” Consequently, studying the incidence of concussions was 
challenging. Simply relying on hospital data would result in a serious underestimate. Another 
significant problem for epidemiologists was that there was no universally agreed upon definition 
of concussion, let alone how to categorize different degrees or “grades” of concussion.  
There had been efforts at standardization. For example, in 1966, the American Medical 
Association’s first standard nomenclature of athletic injuries defined an acute cerebral 
concussion as a clinical syndrome characterized by immediate “impairment of neural function” 
that was caused by a “direct blow to head or helmet.” The AMA further characterized three 
degrees of concussion: mild, moderate, and severe. According to this classification system, mild 
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and moderate concussions resulted in only transient impairment, whereas a severe concussion 
might cause protracted impairment.
8
  
Yet these definitions were repeatedly contested. In 1969, two neurosurgeons, including 
Dr. Richard Schneider, whose research had suggested important limitations to football helmet 
design (see chapter three), noted that for years most neurosurgeons had used the term concussion 
to involve a state of unconsciousness. Yet loss of consciousness was not necessary for a 
concussion to occur, these doctors observed, and other symptoms could be equally important. 
They granted that the AMA’s 1966 classification system sought to enhance physicians’ ability to 
make practical decisions about treating injuries to football players, but stated that its categories 
were arbitrary. In fact, they added, “the diagnosis of concussion has been so confusing that the 
British neurosurgeons recently have recommended abandoning its use.” The confusion did not 
abate over the ensuing decades. A 2001 review article described eight different grading systems 
of concussions that had been proposed over the previous several decades. The range of 
definitions in use through the end of the twentieth century made evaluating or comparing data 
across different epidemiological studies difficult.
9
 
In 1983, public health researcher Dr. Susan Goodwin Gerberich led one of the first large-
scale studies of concussions in high school football players, in an effort to estimate the incidence 
of concussion at this level of play. To address the problem that hospital records would not 
capture most cases of football concussions, her team instead mailed questionnaires to head 
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coaches and players associated with over 100 varsity high school football teams in Minnesota. 
The questionnaire asked players if they had lost consciousness as a result of a blow to their head, 
or experienced other symptoms such as brief loss of awareness, headaches, dizziness, or blurred 
vision during the fall 1977 football season.
10
  
Gerberich and her colleagues found that while only about two percent of players reported 
having diagnosed concussions in conjunction with a head injury, nearly seven times as many 
players reported experiencing loss of consciousness or loss of awareness. Including these latter 
symptoms to indicate probable concussions resulted in an estimated rate of about one in five 
players sustaining at least one probable concussion over the course of one football season. They 
also reported that players with a prior history of losing consciousness had a four times higher risk 
of losing consciousness as compared to players without such a history. While differences in 
players’ activity levels or willingness to report symptoms may have accounted for some of this 
difference, Gerberich’s team concluded that this result also implied the need to devote care to 
identifying previous concussions when taking players’ pre-season medical histories.
11
 
The use of questionnaires in this study likely facilitated reporting by offering respondents 
confidentiality. Yet, as the researchers noted, the true incidence and severity of concussions 
would probably remain unknown without actual observation and examination of participants in 
sports who experienced symptoms of a possible concussion by trained health professionals. 
Furthermore, over two-thirds of the players who had experienced loss of consciousness returned 
to play the same day. Many respondents reported that they had wanted to continue playing, so 
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they did not tell anybody about their symptoms. “Better understanding of risks, by both players 
and coaches, is clearly in order,” the researchers concluded.
12
  
In addition to epidemiological research suggesting that concussions were far more 
common than the number of hospital diagnoses would indicate, new medical reports were also 
sounding alarms about previously unappreciated risks of football-related head trauma. A 1984 
case report in the Journal of the American Medical Association suggested that a concussion 
might make athletes far more vulnerable to potentially severe consequences of a second brain 
injury. In this article, a neurologist and a neurosurgeon reported on the death of an otherwise 
healthy 19 year-old college freshman football player. The student had collapsed “despite 
accounts of no unusual head trauma” after being involved as a blocker in a running play. He 
went into a coma and was placed on a ventilator. Despite an operation that sought to reduce the 
swelling in his brain, he never regained consciousness and died several days later.
13
 
Disturbed by this seemingly inexplicable death, doctors made inquiries with the deceased 
player’s family, teammates and coaches. Four days prior to his collapse on the field, they 
learned, the young athlete had briefly lost consciousness following a hit to the head sustained 
during a fistfight. He claimed to have only a mild headache several days following the hit, and 
had thus been given permission to return to play. The doctors suggested that this previous head 
trauma might have made the football player far more susceptible to brain injury in the following 
days than he would have been otherwise. As such, they warned that even seemingly “ordinary 
sports violence might precipitate catastrophic brain swelling.” The doctors wrote that this 
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“second impact” phenomenon, while apparently rare, nonetheless raised serious questions about 
the safety of football, and the risks warranted “a more critical view of the adequacy of clinical 
assessment after minor head injuries in contact sports.” Furthermore, if some players could be 
identified as being at increased risk, they might need to be instructed to avoid further impact to 
protect them from harm.
14
 
One of the readers of this article was Dr. Robert Cantu, a neurosurgeon involved in 
football as a parent and as a doctor. He had a young son who played in the Pop Warner league, 
and he also served as a sideline physician for high school football team in and around Concord, 
Massachusetts. As writers Linda Carroll and David Rosner would dramatically recount in their 
2010 book The Concussion Crisis, reading about this “second impact” syndrome greatly affected 
Dr. Cantu. “Cantu realized that if he missed a concussion today, some kid might get bumped 
next week and die.” Dr. Cantu was particularly concerned about the many youth football games 
where neither a physician nor an athletic trainer was present to watch out for head trauma on the 
field. In 1986, only five percent of American high schools employed athletic trainers, according 
to the National Athletic Trainers Association, and many were uncertified. As the chairman of the 
New York State Athletic Trainers’ Association colorfully observed, “In New York, we’re talking 
Joe service-station attendant who goes to games on Saturday and calls himself the trainer.”
15
  
To address the dangers, Cantu believed that coaches as well as medical personnel needed 
guidelines they could rely on to determine when players could safely return to participating in 
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sports. Although there were no formal, standardized guidelines at the time, many physicians 
already discouraged players from continuing to play in football after sustaining three 
concussions. Dr. Augustus Thorndike, a leader in the development of sports medicine (see 
chapter two), had proposed this policy in a 1952 article describing contraindications to further 
participation in sport. Dr. Thorndike had further advised that patients “with more than 
momentary loss of consciousness at any one time should not be exposed to further body-contact 
trauma.” The selection of three concussions as a cut-off point was arbitrary. Nonetheless, this 
informal policy proved influential: it was adopted by many physicians, and was promulgated and 
debated in medical journals in the ensuing decades.
16
 
Some specialists considered Thorndike’s recommendations to be unduly conservative. 
For example, in a 1959 symposium issue on sports injuries, two neurosurgeons disagreed with 
Thorndike that three or more concussions should necessarily represent a contraindication to 
further participation in contact sports, because the severity of brain trauma was a “highly 
individualized matter” that needed to be decided on a case by case basis. After careful study of 
an individual patient, “if no evidence of damage to the brain is found, we do not believe that they 
would take any greater risk in engaging in contact sports than other athletes who have not had 
such injuries.” By contrast, other experts emphasized a more conservative approach. While they 
agreed that three concussions should result in a player being removed from play for a season, 
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By 1980, a review of football head and neck injuries observed that while no hard-and-fast 
rules could be made, it was “generally agreed upon” that “three severe concussions sustained in 
football automatically should prohibit the player from participating in football again.” Cantu 
would agree with all these specialists that ultimately a physician’s clinical judgment, rather than 
strict adherence to any particular guideline, would need to determine the management of any 
individual player’s concussion. Yet he also believed that easy, practical guidelines that could be 
applied on-the-field were necessary to improve the management of concussions, and that the 
issue was urgent. He depicted concussions as a serious medical and public health concern. Citing 
Gerberich and her colleagues’ research, Cantu observed that one in five high school football 
players experienced a concussion every year, that some studies suggested that the effects of 
concussions might be cumulative, and that the discovery of “second impact syndrome” in 
particular should make physicians wary.
18
 
Thus, in 1986, Cantu published the first written guidelines on when athletes could return 
to play after a concussion, based on the degree and number of concussions they had sustained. 
For example, Cantu proposed that after one mild concussion, athletes could return to play if they 
were asymptomatic after one week, but after a severe concussion, they would need to wait a 
minimum of one month. His guidelines were influenced by Thorndike’s initial proposal, which 
Cantu cited when explaining his recommendation that three mild concussions should terminate 
an athlete’s season. Published in The Physician and Sportsmedicine, these guidelines were above 
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all intended to highlight the need to take concussions seriously. Yet there were no research 
studies supporting any of the particular return-to-play timelines that Cantu described. In fact, Dr. 




A Silent Epidemic 
In addition to the emerging literature on “second impact” syndrome that concerned Dr. 
Cantu, scientists were accumulating evidence that even minor or moderate head injuries could 
cause structural changes in the brain. In 1968, a British neuropathologist had reported 
microscopic lesions to the brain in several patients who had sustained head trauma but died of 
non-neurological causes. Notably, five of these patients had sustained concussions, described as 
“clinically trivial” brain injuries. Yet it was impossible to examine these changes in the brains of 
living people, and because patients did not typically die of minor head injuries, it was not 
feasible to conduct routine postmortem studies of these structural changes.
20
  
In the 1980s, however, studies of concussions in monkeys provided substantiating 
evidence that the rotational forces associated with even “mild” head trauma could induce 
microscopic damage in primates’ brains (see Figure 20). In addition to these findings in animal 
research, epidemiological studies of minor head trauma in humans were also raising concerns. 
Notably, a 1981 study of over 400 patients who had sustained minor head trauma (defined as a 
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history of unconsciousness of 20 minutes or less in this study) found a high incidence of 
symptoms and difficulties on follow-up three months after injury. Over three-quarters of the 
patients reported persistent headaches, and over half described problems with memory. 
Furthermore, of those who had been gainfully employed, one-third were unemployed three 
months later. Although many of these patients had experienced significant life stress prior to 
their head injury, these findings were nonetheless disturbing. The authors concluded that “the 
most striking observations of these studies are the high rates of morbidity and unemployment in 
patients 3 months after a seemingly insignificant head injury and the evidence that many of these 
patients may have, in fact, suffered organic brain damage.”
21
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The Wall Street Journal reported on this research in a front page article dubbing head 
injuries a “silent epidemic.” The write-up noted that new technologies such as CAT scanners 
were able to detect brain damage that had previously gone unrecognized, but that the frequent 
absence of obvious symptoms continued to pose a challenge. One physician was quoted as 
saying, “For the most part, we’re dealing with people who look and act pretty much all right. 
This leads a lot of physicians to write off their complaints as psychosomatic, and insurance 
companies and government-medical bureaucrats to look askance at their requests for benefits.” 
The article concluded by observing that most research for rehabilitation programs for patients 
with head injuries was of recent origin and had focused on Vietnam veterans, but that a few 
small, intensive, and costly programs for head-injured patients were beginning to be developed.
23
 
Yet these studies and early media coverage of a “silent epidemic” did not immediately 
translate into changes in clinical practice. In fact, Dr. Jeffrey Barth, a neuropsychologist who was 
a co-author on the 1981 study of patients with mild head trauma, would later recall the day he 
presented those findings at a conference as one of his worst professional experiences. His 
audience was skeptical of the results he shared. They peppered him with many possible 
alternative explanations: perhaps the patients he was testing were not very smart to begin with, or 
maybe they didn’t return to work because they had an excuse from their doctor. Barth recalled, “I 
thought to myself: How can I get out of this? Maybe I can fake a seizure.”
24
  
As two ESPN reporters would later put it, at the time, concussions were still regarded “as 
the neurological equivalent of a stubbed toe.” In a 2005, a clinical neuropsychologist recalled 
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that through the 1980s, trauma physicians were still primarily focused on severe brain trauma. 
They typically discharged patients with minor head injuries within an hour, with no 
recommendation for follow-up. He thus dubbed the 1980s “the decade of the severe TBIs,” with 
the 1990s as the period when seemingly minor forms of brain injury gained greater attention 
from clinicians. In 1989, Dr. Barth contributed a chapter on head injuries in sports in the first 
published book devoted specifically to mild brain injury. He and his colleagues observed that 
given the relatively limited and controversial state of scientific knowledge about mild head 
trauma, and the reluctance of athletes to report seemingly minor injuries, “it is not surprising that 




Yet these emerging scientific findings and the introduction of Cantu’s preliminary return-
to-play guidelines contributed to the beginnings of a shift in attitude to head injuries that had 
previously been considered of little importance. Another factor that may have added to the 
increasing awareness among trainers and physicians of non-fatal injuries in the 1990s was an 
increase in the number of children playing youth sports generally, including tackle football. 
Much of the rise in youth sports participation in the final decades of the twentieth century was 
due to more girls playing sports following changes to school athletic programs required by Title 
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IX. But the numbers of boys participating in high school athletics also increased, with football 
consistently remaining one of the most popular sports for boys.
26
  
Historian Howard Chudacoff has argued that the expansion of organized sports was part 
of a broader trend toward adult-organized activities for children, such as language programs, 
music lessons, and math and science after-school clubs. Sociologist Hilary Levey Friedman has 
dubbed the period from the 1980s to the present as an “explosion of hypercompetitiveness” with 
the professionalization of youth sports. Friedman identified three key ways in which this 
professionalization was manifested: the development of elite programs such as travel leagues and 
Olympic development programs; the rise of paid youth coaches and specialized trainers; and the 
emergence of the year-round season with children playing the same sport throughout the year.
27
  
In 1991, two sports medicine specialists reported that they had both witnessed an increase 
in sports-related injuries among children in their practice along with this increasing participation 
in adult-organized athletics. Furthermore, they had observed a changing pattern of injuries, with 
an increased number of overuse injuries related to the repetitive trauma experienced by children 
training in a single sport discipline. With more participants in team sports, often playing in more 
intensely competitive programs, changes in scientific and medical understandings of head trauma 
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By the 1990s, a number of physicians and athletic trainers increasingly questioned the 
common practice of returning players to the field shortly after they had gotten their “bell rung.” 
In 1991, a team of physicians observed that repeated concussions could lead to cumulative 
neurological deficits and even death in rare cases, and warned against the common 
misconception that forces strong enough to cause loss of consciousness were necessary to 
produce a concussion. They described the case of a 17 year-old high school football player who 
died of brain swelling after sustaining multiple concussions, although he had not lost 
consciousness in conjunction with his previous brain injuries. This case report was consistent 
with previously documented cases of “second impact” syndrome. The doctors thus recommended 
that players experiencing confusion and amnesia after a head injury, even if they did not lose 
consciousness, should be removed from play for at least a day. They should then be re-examined 
the following day, and permitted to return only after one full week without symptoms.
29
 
Eric Zemper, a researcher who helped design the NCAA’s Injury Surveillance System in 
the 1980s, also urged a more cautious approach to even minor head injuries. In his 1994 study of 
concussions among college football players, he reported that athletes with any history of 
concussions in the previous five years were six times more likely to sustain a concussion than 
those without such a history. This was an even higher increased risk than Gerberich’s team had 
found among high school students with a history of concussion, likely due to methodological 
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differences between the studies, particularly differences in how they defined concussions. As a 
result of this risk, Zemper argued that a more conservative approach to concussion management 
was necessary, and that athletic trainers would likely need to bear the burden of resisting 
pressure to return athletes to play as quickly as possible. Zemper would later recall, “For about 
15 years, every paper I published ended with a statement that we really need to seriously rethink 
this practice of sending players back into the game as soon as they can see straight.”
30
 
Yet physicians’ and trainers’ beliefs about what constituted “serious” versus “minor” 
concussions, let alone how to manage them, remained in flux throughout the 1990s. In a 
discussion of changing attitudes toward these injuries, one pediatric neurologist told the New 
York Times in 1997 that even just a few years earlier, 
if a high school athlete had a collision and a minor concussion, he passed out for two or 
three minutes and was dizzy for just a few days, we’d say, ‘No big deal,’ and let him 
return to play ball. We never thought there would be a problem. But now it has come to 
the forefront that there is a cumulative effect from repetitive concussions, and at the same 
time a problem within the medical community developing a consensus on managing 
athletes with these injuries.
31
 
These remarks indicate growing appreciation of the cumulative risks of repeated head 
injuries, yet the neurologist nonetheless continued to describe as “minor” a concussion where an 
athlete had lost consciousness and experienced persistent symptoms for several days thereafter. 
Meanwhile, that same year, the American Academy of Neurology (AAN) issued its first 
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guidelines for the management of concussion in sports, in which loss of consciousness was 
explicitly associated with the most severe form of concussion (grade 3).
32
 
The AAN’s 1997 practice parameters categorized concussions into three grades with a 
number of similarities to Dr. Cantu’s 1986 guidelines. Indeed, Dr. Cantu was one of the 
physicians who reviewed these AAN guidelines for when athletes ought to be withheld from play 
according to the severity of the concussion. After a grade 1 concussion, where players 
experienced transient symptoms such as temporary confusion, athletes could be returned to play 
within 15 minutes if their symptoms cleared. After a grade 2 concussion, which did not involve 
loss of consciousness but where symptoms did not resolve after 15 minutes, players needed to be 
removed from play and could return only after one asymptomatic week. Players with multiple 
grade 2 concussions could return to play after two asymptomatic weeks, while players with 
multiple grade 3 concussions involving loss of consciousness would need to wait one month or 
longer, depending on the physician’s clinical judgment.
33
  
The development of the AAN guidelines was based upon a process of consensus building 
among experts in sports-related concussions, including physicians, research faculty, athletic 
trainers, and paramedics. These specialists recognized, however, that there was very little 
scientific evidence on which to base their medical guidelines for determining if or when athletes 
should be allowed to return to play. As a review of the process acknowledged, “there is still no 
consensus or data to guide the decision with regard to the question, ‘how many concussions are 
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too many?’” In the absence of data, the guidelines promulgated by both Cantu and the AAN 
signified increased awareness that repeated head trauma might cause cumulative harm. But these 
recommendations were put forward with great uncertainty on how to minimize that potential 
harm on the ground, and emphasized the need for future research.
34
  
Moreover, some educators noted that enforcing the guidelines would prove far more 
difficult than proposing them. The concerns of researchers were difficult to translate into 
changing attitudes and practices on the gridiron, particularly without personnel available to 
enforce adherence to the guidelines. As John Laurine, a high school director of athletics, 
observed in a New York Times article, many high schools still lacked a medical trainer or other 
trained health professional to evaluate students who experienced a possible concussion. 
Furthermore, many players and their parents prioritized keeping athletes on the field. Parents, 
according to Laurine, were concerned about their child losing their spot on the team or the 
potential for a college scholarship or financial aid. High school athletes, meanwhile, wanted to 
be “tough” and not admit to injury. They were thus were reluctant to report concussions to team 
coaches, and were inclined to minimize such injuries as “just another bang on the head.”
35
 
NFL and Youth Football 
While doctors and athletic trainers increasingly worried about how to protect child 
athletes from head injuries, their young charges were watching their sports heroes repeatedly 
bang their heads on TV. By the late twentieth century, NFL matches were one of the most 
popular sources of entertainment in the United States. The league dominated American 
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televisions; since 1990, Monday Night Football games ranked among the highest-rated prime-
time television programs every year. By 2005, the NFL was grossing nearly $5 billion a year, 
with its teams on average worth more than double the average value of clubs in other major 
professional sports leagues such as the NBA, NHL and MLB. In 2006, a sports economist would 
observe that “football stands like a colossus across the landscape of American sports.”
36
  
The NFL juggernaut strongly influenced debates over the safety of youth football in 
several ways. Injuries among NFL players were frequently the most visible and dramatic 
examples of the most serious dangers of football. Because NFL players were role models to 
youth football players, their attitude toward their injuries and decisions about when to return to 
play were held up as worthy of emulation. Indeed, major sports media celebrated the concept of 
athletes playing through pain and injuries. In 1993, a sociologist analyzed such articles in Sports 
Illustrated, and contended that when athletes were pressured or socialized to view injuries as an 
inevitable or even attractive part of the game, the players themselves could be among the 
strongest opponents of safety measures. “Athletes may find it difficult to escape the hold of the 
culture of risk and related structural influences . . . . and even take pride in their pain threshold as 




The NFL reinforced this culture of risk. The league’s responses to these injuries—from 
the ways they described them to the press, to the common practice of cutting away from shots of 
                                                          
36
 Craig R. Coenen, From Sandlots to the Super Bowl: The National Football League, 1920-1967 (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 2005): 232; Michael Leeds, “American Football,” in Handbook on the Economics of 




 Howard L. Nixon, “Accepting the Risks of Pain and Injury in Sport: Mediated Cultural Influences on Playing 





injured players during televised matches for commercial breaks, to the glorification of violent 
collisions with promotional videos such as “The N.F.L.’s Greatest Hits”—were seen and read by 
millions of Americans. In 1998, former NFL linebacker Harry Carson wrote a letter to the New 
York Times warning that “the glorification of the Big Hit by television networks and periodicals 




In addition to its celebrations of collisions that were featured across the American media 
landscape, the NFL’s research on brain injuries in football would influence understandings of the 
sport’s risks at all levels. In the early 1990s, the NFL found itself under scrutiny after a spate of 
high-profile head injuries among its prominent athletes, making concussions “the most highly-
publicized injury of the 1994 season.” A 1994 story in Time Magazine explained that at least 40 
concussions had occurred among NFL players that year,  
and in the past six weeks the casualties have included an unusually large number of 
highly paid stars. Even in a sport long admired and abhorred for its body-crunching 
brutality, concern about the carnage is rising. Players, coaches and fans may never forget 
some of this season's scariest images: the vacant, confused stare of Dallas Cowboys 
quarterback Troy Aikman after he collided chin-first with a blitzing Phoenix Cardinal; 
the sight of Buffalo Bills receiver Don Beebe lying, out cold, on the field, with one 
forearm pointed stiffly into the air; the awful stillness of New York Giants quarterback 
Dave Brown after his head was slammed to the turf by a Houston Oilers linebacker.
39
 
Perhaps most notably of all, in October 1994, Merril Hoge retired from the NFL at age 29 
after sustaining multiple concussions that left him experiencing a range of symptoms, including 
headaches, dizziness, numbness, and memory problems. Time Magazine highlighted that Hoge’s 
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departure from the game had focused attention not only on the risks to players’ careers, but also 
on the threat to their long-term health. The story cited experts who warned that concussions 
could result in serious consequences. “The brain is shaken in the cranium much like Jell-O in a 
bowl,” explained Dr. Cantu.
40
 In other news stories on football head injuries that season, several 
brain injury specialists sounded similar warnings. The director of a brain injury rehabilitation 
program told Sports Illustrated that head injuries in football were not treated with the seriousness 
they warranted: 
It isn't just cataclysmic injury or death from brain injuries that should concern people. 
The core of the person can change from repeated blows to the head. I get furious every 
time I watch a game and hear the announcers say, ‘Wow, he really got his bell rung on 




In response to the flurry of concern and unflattering media attention, in 1994, the 
commissioner of the NFL appointed a committee to study mild traumatic brain injuries (mTBI). 
As one essayist would later observe on the formation of this committee, “we might pause here a 
moment to linger upon the spooky propagandistic frisson produced by the juxtaposition of those 
two words: mild, traumatic.” Most of the committee was composed of NFL insiders, including 
team doctors, trainers, a consulting engineer, and an equipment manager. The appointed 
chairman of the committee, New York Jets team doctor Dr. Elliot Pellman, was a rheumatologist 
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with no expertise in neurology or head trauma. In 1994, he told Sports Illustrated that 
“concussions are part of the profession, an occupational risk.” Pellman further claimed that 
veteran players could be cleared to play after a concussion more quickly than rookies. “They can 
unscramble their brains a little faster, maybe because they're not afraid after being dinged.” 
Former players for the Jets would later recall how Pellman often allowed athletes back onto the 
field after they had received concussions.
42
  
As extensively documented by ESPN reporters in a 2013 exposé, League of Denial, the 
NFL’s mTBI committee would largely minimize the severity of concussions among NFL 
players. But the committee would also explicitly apply its research and framing of football 
injuries to youth tackle football. In 2003, when the committee first began to publish studies in 
peer-reviewed medical journals, NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue expressed confidence that 
NFL-supported research on concussions would “advance the cause of improving the safety of 
professional and amateur athletes on all levels.”
43
 
The NFL proceeded to publish a series of articles in Neurosurgery claiming that NFL 
players did not show evidence of brain damage after multiple concussions. These articles further 
claimed that the NFL’s team doctors were perhaps overly conservative in their decisions about 
when to allow players back on the field. Although the NFL committee had done no research on 
high school and college football players, they extrapolated their findings to these age groups. “It 
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might be safe for college/high school football players to be cleared to return to play on the same 
day as their injury. The authors suggest that, rather than blindly adhering to arbitrary, rigid 
guidelines, physicians keep an open mind to the possibility that the present analysis of 
professional football players may have relevance to college and high school players.” Several 
peer reviewers, including Dr. Cantu, were so frustrated by the unsupported claims in these 
papers, and Neurosurgery’s apparent willingness to continue publishing these articles despite 
their fundamental flaws, that they eventually stopped reviewing the NFL committee’s articles.
44
 
While the NFL minimized the potential risks of football-related concussions in respected 
scholarly journals, youth athletes continued to shake off symptoms of head trauma in order to 
continue competing. As a 16 year-old high school student would explain, 
I’ve never had a concussion. I probably get my “bell rung” or get “dinged” once every 
game or every other game. I’ve never told a trainer because it doesn’t really cause 
problems, it’s just a short little bang. It’s pounded in your head that you can play through 




Even news stories that expressed concern about the potential dangers ultimately indicated 
that youth players were very rarely removed from play following head trauma. For example, a 
1998 article told the story of a high school quarterback, Mac Mansavage, who shrugged off 
dizziness and a headache after a tackle, and continued to play and receive hits. Mansavage was 
ultimately rushed to the emergency room once his symptoms became obvious: he began slurring 
his speech and his teammates observed his eyes roll back in his head. Mansavage was diagnosed 
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with a concussion.  His parents insisted that he promise to report any symptoms in the future, but 
Mansavage admitted to a reporter that he wondered whether, when back on the field with the 




Mansavage’s attitude was certainly not unusual for a high school football player at the 
end of the twentieth century. The description of his team’s response to his concussion illustrates 
the extent to which the burden of addressing concussions was placed upon children themselves. 
Only when his symptoms were impossible to ignore might an athlete be removed from the field. 
But in many cases, the symptoms of a concussion, such as dizziness or headaches, were far less 
obvious to parents, referees and coaches. And given that many youth football programs did not 
even have trained observers such as doctors or athletic trainers on the sidelines, the chances of 
adult supervisors detecting the symptoms of a concussion were even smaller.  
Furthermore, many adults modeled not treating concussions seriously. Boys strove to 
emulate their heroes in the NFL and to display a particular “tough” form of masculinity to their 
coaches and peers. They were thus unlikely to report symptoms that were still considered minor 
from locker rooms to the pages of Neurosurgery. And after their child was rushed to the 
emergency room for brain trauma, their parents might not require them to cease playing. The 
risks were perceived as minor relative to the benefits of participating in youth football. 
Yet this pattern—recurrent pockets of media and medical concern about the dangers of 
youth football that largely remained on the sidelines of a football loving culture—began to be 
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disrupted in the mid-2000s. Several key factors contributed to making concerns about football-
related brain injuries at all levels of the sport a topic of national debate. These included former 
athletes speaking out about their symptoms and the risks of football; new medical findings 
including the identification of a degenerative brain disease in former football players; a series of 
over 100 articles in the New York Times on the subject that would be nominated for a Pulitzer 
Prize; and an emerging framing of football-related brain damage as a public health concern that 
had been covered up by the NFL, akin to the tobacco industry’s response to the health risks of 
smoking. 
Football and Chronic Brain Disease 
The NFL had by far the largest budget available to spend on studies of football-related 
brain trauma. In fact, the league would become the main sponsor of research on the topic.
47
 Yet 
in the early 2000s, several key studies by researchers independent of the NFL, while initially 
inspiring little change, contributed to ultimately challenging the NFL’s narrative that football did 
not cause long-term harm to athletes’ brains. This independent research included epidemiological 
studies that highlighted the cumulative impact of concussions, as well as neuropathological 
examinations of brain issue that identified a disturbing new disease associated with repetitive 
head trauma. 
The lead author of a 2003 study on the cumulative effects of concussions among NCAA 
college football players was motivated to conduct this research in part by the injuries he had seen 
at the NFL level. Before becoming director of the University of North Carolina’s education 
program for certified athletic trainers, Kevin Guskiewicz had worked for the Pittsburgh Steelers 
as an assistant trainer. There, he befriended Merril Hoge, the professional football player who 
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had retired from the NFL in 1994 due to concussion-related symptoms. After speaking with 
Hoge by phone several years later, Guskiewicz would recall being disturbed that Hoge did not 
seem to sound like himself. Convinced that Hoge’s symptoms were due to the head trauma he 
had sustained playing football, Guskiewicz decided to set up a large-scale study of concussions 
at the college level to systematically study the issue.
48
 
Guskiewicz assembled a team of experts, including Dr. Cantu, to follow nearly 3,000 
college football players over the course of three seasons. The athletes were given 
neuropsychological exams at the beginning of each season to be used as a baseline. Those 
athletes who sustained concussions were given the exam again after their injury, and they were 
monitored until their symptoms resolved. Published in 2003, this study found that players with 
three or more concussions were three times more likely to sustain a new concussion. 
Furthermore, athletes who sustained multiple concussions experienced slower recovery times. 
The authors concluded that even just one previous concussion could have a cumulative effect, 
and that concussions caused physiological changes that left athletes vulnerable to slower 
recovery of their neurological function following a subsequent concussion.
49
 
This study proved influential in the medical literature as providing documentation of the 
cumulative effects of concussions, and it would be cited by hundreds of additional studies. Yet 
when it was originally published, the research did not have a dramatic effect on broader debates 
over the safety of youth football. A brief write-up in the New York Times, for instance, noted the 
research suggested that stricter return-to-play guidelines that kept players off the field, waiting 
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until a week after concussion symptoms disappeared, would help protect athletes. Although it 
received brief mention in the news with its takeaway message that return-to-play policies should 
be more conservative, at the time, this epidemiological research did not translate into widespread 
concern about fundamental risks of the sport for children.
50
  
Another scientific finding that would influence debates over the safety of youth 
football— and that would ultimately form the basis of a major feature film in 2015—also did not 
originally make a substantial splash outside the confines of the medical literature. This 
development was the discovery of a long-term degenerative disease among former NFL players. 
In 2002, Dr. Bennet Omalu, a neuropathologist based in Pittsburgh, identified clear evidence of 
brain damage on autopsy of Mike Webster, a former NFL star who played for the Pittsburgh 
Steelers. Several years later Dr. Omalu would discover similar degenerative changes in the brain 
of another deceased Steelers player, Terry Long. The build-up of proteins and plaques he 
observed in these players resembled other brain diseases such as Alzheimer’s and dementia 
pugilistica in some ways. Yet the pattern of deterioration appeared to be sufficiently different 




Dr. Omalu termed this degenerative brain disease “chronic traumatic encephalopathy,” or 
CTE. Dr. Omalu would later explain how he chose this name for the form of brain damage he 
had discovered in these retired football players: 
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Chronic means long-term, traumatic is associated with trauma, and encephalopathy refers 
to brain damage, disease or malfunction. The acronym, CTE, seemed easy to grasp and 
remember. The name sounded intellectually sophisticated. The name was sufficiently 
generic that if I were proven wrong and this was not a newly discovered brain disease, it 
still referred to a bad brain associated with trauma.
52
 
Dr. Omalu first shared his finding with a mentor, neuropathologist Dr. Ronald Hamilton. 
Hamilton agreed with Omalu’s diagnosis, and further realized that linking such extensive brain 
damage to football-related head trauma was groundbreaking. “I knew this was a billion-dollar 
kind of finding when I saw it,” Hamilton would later recall. They approached several other 
experts who agreed. In 2005 and 2006, Dr. Omalu, Dr. Hamilton, and their colleagues published 
the results of the autopsies on Webster and Long’s brains in the journal Neurosurgery. In the 
2005 paper, they described their finding of brain damage associated with repetitive football head 
injuries as a “sentinel case that draws attention to a possibly more prevalent yet unrecognized 




The autopsy findings on Webster and Long and the resulting medical case reports 
received relatively limited attention in the national media at the time they were published. For 
example, in 2005 the New York Times published a brief note on the death of Terry Long noting 
that he had died of brain inflammation according to the coroner with “chronic traumatic 
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encephalopathy” as a contributing factor, but the article contained no mention of the possible 
broader implications of this finding for any other players at any level of football.
54
 
But the Neurosurgery articles on CTE did attract the attention and emphatic 
condemnation of the NFL and its doctors. Three doctors on the NFL’s mTBI committee, 
including committee chairman Dr. Elliot Pellman, demanded that Omalu’s 2005 Neurosurgery 
be retracted after it was published. They wrote a lengthy and scathing letter in response, refuting 
the suggestion that the damage to Mike Webster’s brain was related to his experience playing 
football. Without identifying their connection with the NFL, these doctors insisted that Dr. 
Omalu and his colleagues’ claims were “based on a complete misunderstanding of the relevant 
medical literature.” The bulk of their letter was devoted to describing CTE in boxers and 
suggesting that such damage was not evident in NFL players. Mike Webster had “no known 
history of brain trauma inside professional football,” the NFL doctors asserted. They suggested 
instead that Webster’s brain may have been damaged by his alcohol, steroid, or illicit drug use.
55
 
The NFL similarly denied that the brain damage evident on Terry Long’s autopsy was the 
result of playing football. The controversy received some coverage in the local Pittsburgh papers, 
the town where Webster and Long had played for the Steelers, and where Dr. Omalu was based. 
In 2005, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette quoted the Steelers’ team neurologist as saying, “Given Mr. 
Long's history of drug abuse and suicide attempts or whatever altercations may have contributed 
to his demise, I think it's just bad science to conclude that football caused his death.” The debate 
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was framed as a scientific controversy about the deaths of several individual NFL players, not as 
an indication of a larger health problem in football.
56
 
Despite the NFL’s efforts to discredit Dr. Omalu’s work, the discovery of CTE would 
move from the sidelines to center field several years later. The reporting of New York Times 
journalist Alan Schwarz proved instrumental in communicating Omalu’s findings to a broader 
public and in drawing sustained national attention to concussions in football at all levels. 
Schwarz later explained to the Columbia Journalism Review that he latched onto the story 
through a mutual friend who had put him in touch with Chris Nowinski. Nowinski was a 
professional wrestler who had sustained several concussions both in his wrestling career as well 
as during his days playing college football at Harvard. Prompted by his personal experiences, 
Nowinski was working on a manuscript on concussions and sought the advice of a professional 
writer. Schwarz, impressed with what he read, introduced Nowinski to several publishers. Most, 
however, did not consider the topic of sufficient commercial interest to succeed as a book.
57
 
Then, “basically out of the blue,” Nowinski contacted Schwartz again, this time about the 
2006 suicide of former NFL player Andre Waters. Nowinski believed Waters’s tragic death at 
the age of 44 might have something to do with football-related brain damage. He persuaded 
Waters’s family to donate the athlete’s brain tissue. Mr. Waters’s niece, Kwana Pittman, would 
explain that the family’s decision to donate the tissue of their loved one was connected to their 
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concern about the health of other football players, particularly children. “The young kids need to 
understand; the parents need to be taught.”
58
 
Dr. Omalu agreed to examine Waters’s brain, and again, he discovered signs of brain 
tissue degeneration. Schwartz realized that the sports section of the New York Times would be 
interested in this story. In January 2007, he began his coverage of football-related brain damage 
for the Times with an article announcing that Dr. Omalu had linked Waters’s suicide to signs of 
brain damage he suspected were linked to successive concussions Waters had sustained. He 
likened the damage to Waters’s brain to the characteristics of a brain of an 85-year old man in 
the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease.
59
 
Schwarz initially thought his 2007 article on Waters would be a “one-off story,” 
particularly given that he was a career baseball writer who did not typically cover football 
stories. But shortly thereafter he was contacted by a former NFL player who wanted to go public 
with the terrible symptoms he was experiencing after his own concussions. The New York Times 
ultimately assigned Schwarz to provide long-term, ongoing coverage of the issue, “with no 
responsibilities other than to broaden his new beat’s focus beyond the N.F.L. to the more than 
four million amateur athletes who play organized football.” Schwarz would proceed to write a 
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Schwarz highlighted the public health implications of concussions in youth football from 
the first year he began reporting on the subject. For instance, a 2007 article on the reluctance of 
high school football players to report symptoms of concussion emphasized that this was a health 
concern affecting over a million teenagers. Schwarz further noted that children were particularly 
vulnerable to the harms of head injury because their brain tissue was still developing. In a 2009 
article summarizing a study that found that rates of dementia were significantly higher among 
retired NFL players than among the general population, Schwarz discussed the possible 
implications for younger athletes. “Could some players who stop playing football in high school 
or college face the same latent risks as professionals who lasted six more years in the N.F.L.? It 
is one equation that doctors of all affiliations have yet to solve.”
61
   
In October 2009 and January 2010, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee held a series of 
hearings on football head injuries. These hearings were prompted in large part by the results of a 
University of Michigan study of over 1,000 retired NFL players which found that the former 
players were much more likely to be diagnosed with dementia and Alzheimer’s disease 
compared to men in the national population. Yet increasing media and public attention had also 
contributed to placing the topic on the congressional agenda. Representative Anthony Weiner 
(D-New York) stated his view that the congressional record should show that beyond the work of 
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any member of congress, the reporting of Alan Schwarz had driven the issue. “We probably 
wouldn’t even be here today if it were not for some of the stories that he has written.”
62
 
Although much of the congressional testimony came from players, doctors and 
executives associated with the NFL, one theme that recurred throughout the hearings was that the 
way the NFL handled head injuries inevitably influenced safety in youth football. As 
Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Virginia) observed, panelists at these hearings emphasized that 
sports head injuries were “a problem at a very young age, in junior high school, high school, on 
up through college, and long before [the players] get to the NFL.”
63
 Representative Linda 
Sánchez (D-California) likened the NFL’s continued denial of the link between football and 
brain damage to the behavior of tobacco companies in obfuscating the connection between 
smoking and harms to health. Researcher Chris Nowinski and former NFL player Bernie Parrish 
both echoed the tobacco comparison, with Parrish testifying that  
This mild traumatic brain injury committee is the sequel to the tobacco council which 
produced its own bogus studies, paid experts to testify that tobacco products do not cause 
cancer, and it exactly parallels the way that Covington & Burling partnered Paul 
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The efforts of former players and researchers to draw an analogy between the way the 
NFL and tobacco companies had manufactured doubt about the effects of their product on human 
health were significant in framing debates over the safety of youth football. As legal and public 
health scholar Daniel Goldberg would later observe, the tobacco analogy put forward in the 
2009-2010 hearings seemed to markedly influence the NFL’s public behavior shortly thereafter. 
Just one month after the first House judiciary hearing, the NFL announced a stricter set of 
guidelines to managing concussions among its players. These included requiring any player who 
exhibited significant concussion-related symptoms such as disorientation or amnesia to be 
removed from the play for the game. Athletes who exhibited symptoms that were considered 




As Schwarz would observe, these policy changes amounted to a silent acknowledgement 
that it was no longer possible for the NFL to “defend a position that conflicted with nearly all 
scientific understanding of head trauma.” Indeed, by the end of 2009, an NFL spokesman for the 
first time acknowledged the long-term risks of football-related head injuries in announcing the 
league’s decision to donate money to Boston University’s Center for the Study of Traumatic 
Encephalopathy. “It’s quite obvious from the medical research that’s been done that concussions 
can lead to long-term problems.”
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The NFL’s shift in policy and public statements signaled the extent to which public 
awareness and perception of football-related head trauma had increased. This shift was due in 
large part to the work of an independent researcher motivated by his personal experiences of 
concussions, the reporting of a career baseball journalist with relatively fewer concerns that 
challenging the NFL would limit his press access to football games, and the reframing of 
previously overlooked research as profoundly relevant findings for youth football safety that had 
been actively minimized or denied by the football league. The growing awareness and 
acceptance of the NFL’s role in shaping concussion science is perhaps best encapsulated by a 
joke headline that the satirical newspaper The Onion ran in time for the 2014 Super Bowl: 
“Super Bowl Confetti Made Entirely from Shredded Concussion Studies.”
67
 
Yet the NFL’s new polices also indicated the NFL’s persistent efforts to distinguish 
between major brain trauma and supposedly minor, insignificant bumps to the head. As one NFL 
team doctor explained in his remarks on the policy change that allowed physician discretion for 
relatively minor symptoms, “On every play there are traumatic experiences to the head. The 
question is one of degree.” If the only the biggest and most severe brain trauma was of 
meaningful concern, then tinkering with rule changes and helmet design might address the 
problem, and tackle football could persist without significant change.
68
 
Framing a Concussion Crisis 
By the beginning of the 2010s, public awareness of concussions in youth football was 
dramatically increasing, as were demands for reforms to address the issue. Fundamentally 
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altering, let alone eliminating, the sport of football was largely not part of the framework 
advanced by advocates seeking policy changes to improve sports safety. Instead, advocates for 
reform, led by parents in response to their child’s catastrophic football injury, asked 
policymakers to intervene to mandate improved coaching and medical supervision.  
As sociologist Joseph R. Gusfield has observed in his study of drinking-driving, 
determining which individuals or institutions are given responsibility for addressing a problem is 
central to understanding how an issue is constructed as a public problem. In the case of the 
emergence of concussions as a public problem in the early twenty-first century, the individual 
adult supervisors closest to the sport on the ground—namely, parents, coaches and trainers—
were assigned the primarily responsibility of better identifying and managing concussions. In 
this context, the introduction of new laws at the state level to address the management of 
concussions in youth sports proved one of the most prominent policy responses. 
69
 
In 2009, Washington State became the first U.S. state to legally mandate return-to-play 
guidelines. This law was nicknamed the “Lystedt law” in honor of Zachary Lystedt, whose injury 
had inspired its passage. In 2006, Lystedt suffered a concussion playing high school football, 
was returned to play later in the same game, then collapsed and suffered a catastrophic brain 
injury. After spending a week on life support, Lystedt could not speak for nine months, and 
required a feeding tube for two years. Years of intensive physical therapy enabled him to regain 
the ability to walk a few steps with a cane, but the injury left him almost certainly requiring care 
for the rest of his life. In response to their son’s devastating injury, his parents lobbied the state 
of Washington to pass a law requiring, among other things, that a licensed health care provider 
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After the successful passage of this law in Washington, the Lystedt family joined with the 
Sarah Jane Brain Foundation and the American College of Sports Medicine to form the Zackery 
Lystedt Brain Project. Formally announced during the 2010 Super Bowl, this project’s goal was 
the passage of similar Lystedt laws across the United States mandating how traumatic brain 
injuries in youth sports should be managed. With the support of parent advocates and medical 
professionals, by 2014, all 50 U.S. states and Washington, D.C. had passed similar laws with 
return-to-play guidelines. The laws often also required parents and coaches to receive 
educational information on how to detect and respond to brain injuries. Lystedt laws thus 
primarily addressed the issue of how to manage concussions after they occurred, but not how to 
prevent them. In part, this was because there was very little science supporting any methods for 
how to actually prevent concussions in a collision sport. “There's so much work being done on 
how to diagnose and treat concussion, but we still are relatively not very far along as far as how 
to prevent concussions,” as one doctor observed.
71
 But the prioritization of both scientific 
research and policy strategies also contributed to a framing where individuals bore the 
responsibility for managing risks. Specifically, Lystedt laws placed the responsibility for 
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detecting and managing brain injuries with individual coaches, parents, trainers and health 
professionals supervising youth sports.
72
 
In addition to state-level laws intended to enhance adult and medical supervision of youth 
sports, parents and athletic directors sought the most advanced, state-of-the-art protective 
equipment to continue to allow children to play tackle football as safely as possible. Mike Oliver, 
the executive director of NOCSAE, told the New York Times that sales of football helmets had 
dramatically changed since 2011. “I see high school athletic directors submitting purchase orders 




Much public attention on sports-related concussions focused on efforts to identify a 
technological fix to the problem. News teams investigated schools providing young players 
football helmets with outdated or poor designs. Parents and players filed a class-action lawsuit 
against Riddell, charging that the helmet manufacturer had put forward misleading claims that 
their products could reduce the risks of concussions. Magazines highlighted helmet design 
research that could purportedly “save football.” Other companies focused on other head 
protection technologies, particularly headbands or helmet accessories, such as polyurethane 
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shells to be added to helmets to add extra cushioning. The technological imperative was also 
evident in the research and development of a “concussion collar” that would lightly constrict 
athletes’ jugular veins. The collar would thus lightly restrict the blood flow back to the heart, and 
thus purportedly provide players’ brains with additional “cushioning” and restrict the movement 
of the brain to prevent concussions.
74
  
Public anxiety about concussions also created an environment ripe for dubious claims 
about other products intended to reduce the risks of sports-related head injuries. In December 
2015, the University of Maryland issued a press release claiming that a study conducted by 
faculty at the institution had found that high school football athletes who consumed a particular 
high protein chocolate milk experienced improved cognitive and motor function, even after 
experiencing concussions. A critique of this release noted that the study did not appear to be peer 
reviewed or published, did not adequately quantify the purported benefits of the milk, and did 
not disclose whether the company producing the chocolate milk under study provided any 
additional funding or free product. Nonetheless, Clayton Wilcox, the Superintendent of 
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Washington County Public Schools in Maryland, planned to purchase $25,000 worth of the 
chocolate milk for his district’s student athletes.
75
  
Meanwhile, continuing research on CTE was suggesting that even relatively young adults 
were vulnerable to chronic brain damage sustained while playing football. In 2010, researchers at 
Boston University diagnosed CTE in Owen Thomas, a 21 year-old former football player who 
died by suicide. Thomas, who had started playing football at age 9 and participated through 
several years of college, was the youngest and first amateur player to be diagnosed with a clear 
case of CTE. A pathologist who independently confirmed the diagnosis told the New York Times, 
“This is a call for a broader range of research into this problem that extends beyond the heavy 
duty N.F.L. level of athletics.”
76
 
In fact, emerging research evidence was suggesting that beyond the most severe and 
obvious cases of sports-related brain damage, repeated “sub-concussive” hits—in other words, 
asymptomatic head trauma that did not meet the diagnostic criteria of a concussion—might cause 
structural and cumulative damage to players’ brains. In 2011, PBS FRONTLINE produced a 
documentary, Football High, examining the shifting debates at the high school level. In addition 
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to examining several serious injuries and even deaths related to football, Football High also 
highlighted research on less visible football injuries. The documentary focused on findings from 
studies conducted at the Purdue MRI Facility, a magnetic-resonance imaging center that was 
founded in 2007 at Purdue University.
77
 
According to Purdue engineering professor Tom Talavage, the lead investigator of this 
sports-related brain injury research, the original intent for the project was to evaluate athletes 
who had experienced concussions. Yet for the first few weeks of their project, none of the 50 
players on the high school football team the researchers were following were diagnosed with a 
concussion. So the researchers instead decided to bring in some players who had not experienced 
concussions and see if they could detect any changes resulting from the blows they were 
receiving to their heads.
78
 
Eventually some of the athletes under study did experience concussions, so the 
researchers ultimately conducted computer-based neurocognitive testing and functional 
magnetic-resonance imagining (fMRI) on both concussed and non-concussed student athletes 
over the course of the fall 2009 season. These exams included pre-season, in-season, and post-
season tests. The researchers also installed sensors in the players’ helmets to track the number of 
“collision events,” defined as a motion or action where the helmet accelerometer register a 
magnitude over 14.4 g (g forces are a standard measure of acceleration; 14.4 g is 14.4 times the 
force of gravity). Over the course of one season, the research team documented over 15,000 
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collision events among the 21 players participating in the study, meaning an average of over 700 
collisions per player.
79
   
Talavage’s team was surprised to find that about half the players brought in ostensibly for 
control purposes—that is, the players who showed no clinical symptoms of concussions—
exhibited significantly impaired performance on the in-season computer-based testing and/or 
fMRI imaging. The researchers also found a strong correlation between the number of collision 
events detected by the helmet sensors and changes to the players’ fMRI brain imaging, as well as 
changes to the players’ performance on the computer-based tests. In fact, Talavage explained 
that initially the team thought they must have done something wrong to observe such findings. 
But when they went back and re-evaluated the data, they confirmed that the players whose brains 
looked different on fMRI were the same players who were showing a difference in the 
neurocognitive testing. The researchers concluded that this group of high school players 
experiencing neurological changes after one season of sub-concussive hits represented “a newly-
observed category of neurological injury.”
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Talavage and his colleagues proceeded to publish a series of studies confirming these 
preliminary findings. In addition to structural changes observed in the brains of high school 
football players, emerging research in NFL players in the mid-2010s began to link multiple sub-
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concussive hits to other potential health harms, notably hormonal dysfunction.
81
 The cumulative 
effect of sub-concussive injuries on children’s future health was and remains unclear, because 
researchers have not conducted prospective studies following young athletes over long periods of 
time. But the accumulating evidence that repeated hits that caused no symptoms could cause 
neurological injury suggested a new and disturbing possibility. If sub-concussive hits caused 
chronic brain damage, then focusing on concussions alone would not address the more 
fundamental problem of repetitive brain trauma inherent to the collisions involved in tackle 
football. As Talavage frankly observed in advance of a 2014 White House Summit on 
concussions in youth sports, “Just increasing efforts to improve concussion diagnosis or even 
prevent concussions is a waste of time and taxpayer money. We need to figure out how to reduce 
the number of hits to these kids' heads.”
82
 
A team of Virginia Tech researchers studying head impacts in even younger football 
players was coming to a similar conclusion. Conducting studies where they attached sensors to 
the helmets of young Pop Warner players to measure impacts, they found that athletes as young 
as 7 and 8 years old were sustaining “head impacts similar in magnitude to severe impacts seen 
at the high school and collegiate level.” The high severity impacts occurred more frequently in 
practices than in games among the youngest players. While young players experienced fewer 
impacts per season overall than high school or college players, because they participated in fewer 
practices and games than their older counterparts, the potential for high-magnitude impacts at 
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even the youngest levels of the sport was nonetheless concerning (see Figure 21). The 
researchers likened the need to restrict heads to children’s heads to the practice of a “pitch count” 
in youth baseball, which limited the number of pitches a child could throw in order to prevent 
joint injuries. In 2015, one of the leaders of this Virginia Tech research team told Time 
Magazine, “I don’t see how a reasonable person would argue that we should count pitches to 
protect the elbow, but not count hits to protect the brain.”
83
 
Figure 21. Football Head Impact Exposure Data
84
 




7-8 years 16 g 38 g 161 
High School 21 g 56 g 565 
College 18 g 63 g 1,000 
 
But the idea that sub-concussive hits posed a more fundamental, even existential problem 
for youth collision sports was largely masked by the widespread framing of a concussion crisis. 
According to this framing, proper diagnosis and management of concussions that caused clinical 
symptoms would be sufficient to alleviate the medical risks. Improved tackling techniques, better 
helmet design, and education campaigns for players and parents all similarly fit within this 
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framework. These strategies encouraged athletes and their adult supervisors to take responsibility 
for preventing concussions in youth tackle football.
85
 
The NFL actively participated in framing concerns about youth football head injuries as 
an issue to be addressed by better adult supervision, particularly the recognition and management 
of concussions. In 2010, the commissioner of the NFL sent a letter to 44 state governors urging 
them to adopt Lystedt laws to regulate the management of concussions in youth sports. The 
professional league framed its own management of concussions as a model for youth leagues to 
follow: “Given our experience at the professional level, we believe a similar approach is 
appropriate when dealing with concussions in all youth sports. That is why the NFL and its clubs 
urge you to support legislation that would better protect your state’s young athletes by mandating 
a more formal and aggressive approach to treatment of concussions.”
86
 
The NFL also partnered with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
to create a public-service announcement about concussions in youth sports. Introduced at the end 
of 2009, this spot aired on national media in the following months during the 2010 NFL playoffs 
and Super Bowl. The 30-second voiceover emphasized the responsibility of young athletes 
themselves, as well as their parents and coaches, in reporting and managing concussions: 
Concussions and other head injuries must be taken seriously. If you're a player, protect 
yourself and your teammates. If you think you’re hurt, don’t hide it. Report it, and take 
time to recover. If you’re a coach or parent, know concussion symptoms and warning 
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signs, and never let athletes return to action before a health professional says it’s OK. 




The league also provided funding to the CDC’s Heads Up public information campaign 
on the risks of concussions, including videos, posters, online trainings and fact sheets. In 2014, 
CDC researchers published a ten year review of this campaign. They reported that their online 
training courses focused on the risks of concussions among young athletes were among their 
most popular materials, and that these courses had been developed through a grant from the 
NFL. The review did not evaluate whether the Heads Up program in fact reduced the incidence 
of concussions, but instead detailed the amount of material that had been disseminated, and 
assessed the impact of the material on recipients attitudes’ toward the severity of concussions. 
For example, they noted that among youth sports coaches who had been exposed to educational 
Heads Up print materials, 77 percent self-reported being better at identifying athletes who may 




In addition, the NFL partnered with USA Football, its youth development arm, to 
promote “heads up” tackling. This was a purportedly safer tackling technique where players were 
taught to keep their heads up and to lead with their shoulders while tackling. Introduced in 2012, 
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the Heads Up football program was funded entirely by the NFL. In a 2013 open letter to NFL 
fans, Commissioner Goodell promoted the Heads Up program, writing that 2,800 youth leagues 
including 90,000 coaches and over 600,000 youth players had registered for the program in its 
first year. Several former NFL players publicly expressed their skepticism of this effectiveness of 
this program; one former professional told ESPN in 2014 that Heads Up was intended to “create 
the illusion that the game is safe or can be made safe.” Nonetheless, the NFL’s senior vice 
president for health and safety insisted that “Heads Up Football makes the game safer.”
89
  
 The NFL framed mothers as a primary source of opposition to the sport, consistent with a 
decades-long history of sports organizations and media framing “worried moms” as needing to 
be reassured that football was not dangerous (see chapter one). Through its youth development 
arm, USA Football, the league started conducting hundreds of “Moms Clinics” in 2013. These 
clinics were intended to alleviate the fears of worried moms by teaching them the principles of 
football safety. NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell even attended several of these clinics with his 
wife Jane, highlighting the importance the league attached to them. “The biggest thing is giving 
people information they can understand,” Goodell explained. In 2015, a New York Times profile 
of these clinics quoted a NFL defensive lineman involved in teaching the mothers, “For moms, 
it’s less X’s and O’s and more safety and directions.” In other words, mothers were not expected 
to understand or need to know the most detailed football strategies and techniques. Instead, 
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 Major football organizations thus framed football head injuries as a problem amenable to 
improved supervision and information provision. Yet many youth football organizers maintained 
that football concussion concerns did not even apply to tackle football at the pre-high school 
level, because the small size of pre-pubescent children meant that they could not hit each other as 
hard as the professionals. In 2010, the safety officer for the Jersey Shore Pop Warner league, a 
league with about 12,000 players on 360 teams, stated, “I can probably count on one hand the 
number (of concussions) I’ve seen or that have been reported to us over the last several years.” In 
2014, the safety page of the Pop Warner youth football league website explained that in Pop 
Warner football, there was “an absence of catastrophic head and neck injuries and disruptive 
joint injuries found at higher levels.”
91
  
Supporters of youth football emphasized these claims in arguments to prospective youth 
football parents and the general public. In a 2015 op-ed in the Star Tribune, the largest newspaper in 
Minneapolis, an educator and former football player wrote that “Young kids simply do not have the 
combination of size and speed necessary to cause serious brain injury.” He cited research from an 
NFL-funded study published in the Journal of Pediatrics stating that “youth football is a generally 
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safe activity with regard to concussions for children aged 8-12 years.”
92
 In fact, the belief that 
football was relatively safer than driving (see chapter two) persisted to a remarkable extent in 
these arguments. “I guess since football (was) so ingrained in me growing up, I think football is 




Other writers and even physicians also pushed back against emerging concussion 
concerns of the 2010s as being overblown or even a form of hysteria. In 2013, Daniel J. Flynn, a 
conservative author and columnist for the American Spectator, penned a book characterizing 
growing concerns about concussions in football as a “cultural tic masquerading as a public health 
crusade.” Flynn further argued that limiting children’s participation in tackle football would 
effectively amount to a de facto ban on the sport, because the overwhelming majority of tackle 
football players were children. “To say you don’t want kids to play football is to say you don’t 
want football played.”
94
   
In 2015, Dr. Steven Rothman, a pediatric neurologist, penned an op-ed in the New York 
Times entitled “Parents, Stop Obsessing over Youth Concussions.” Rothman cited a 2014 ESPN 
sports poll finding that nearly 90 percent of parents were worried about the risk of injury in 
youth sports, with concussions representing the injury of greatest concern. Rothman argued that 
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this was concerning given the importance of physical activity and the high rates of obesity in the 
United States. Data about brain damage among adults in professional football could not be 
applied to children, and furthermore, Rothman argued, the “crisis” could be attributed in part to 
the loosening of the definition of a concussion in recent decades. He cited a 1977 medical text as 
requiring temporary loss of consciousness as part of the definition of a concussion, whereas by 
the 2010s, medical definitions of mild head trauma could include a range of symptoms without 
loss of consciousness. Ultimately, Dr. Rothman concluded that “too many teenagers who face 
little chance of long-term brain injury are being kept from playing in healthy organized sports 
out of an excessive sense of caution.”
95
 
Adding to the debate, in 2015 Sony Pictures released a major film on Christmas Day, 
Concussion, which starred Will Smith as Dr. Bennet Omalu. The film told the story of Dr. 
Omalu’s research on chronic traumatic encephalopathy and depicted the NFL’s efforts to 
discredit his work. The movie also included a scene where an NFL doctor warned Dr. Omalu, “If 
10 percent of mothers in this country begin to see football as a dangerous sport, that is the end 
of football.” According to media accounts and their own testimony, the movie deeply affected 
many former NFL players who watched it. Domonique Foxworth, a NFL veteran and former 
president of the NFL Players’ Association, stated, “I can no longer confidently say that I would 
trade my quality of life for the opportunity to improve the trajectory of my family’s future.”
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Pierre Woods, who played in the NFL principally with the New England Patriots, told the 
Detroit Free Press that if he had seen this movie in his freshman year of high school, “I would 
have never played football.”
97
  
In addition, the film in conjunction with broader concussion concerns appeared to have 
an impact on younger players and their parents. For example, one 18 year-old high school 
football star in Pennsylvania had received several “full ride” college football scholarships to 
Division I schools. He decided to turn them all down after seeing Concussion, because he 
decided the free college education was not ultimately worth the health risks. He stated that seeing 
the deterioration of beloved Steelers player Mike Webster on the big screen hit him especially 
hard. He explained, “Yeah, it would be free college. But your whole life is in jeopardy. You’re 
putting your body in harm’s way every single week. It was definitely a tough choice, but I think I 
made the right choice.” Similarly, in 2016, a 17 year-old high school junior explained his decision 
to quit playing football despite coming from a “football family” that loved the game: “Football 
was such a big part of my life. But if I can find the satisfaction I got from football without taking 
the same risks, I'm going to do that instead.”
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The release of the movie Concussion contributed to—and signaled—the broad awareness 
of concussions as a major health concern in American sports. Recalling anti-drug campaigns of 
the 1980s, the New York Daily News would even run a cover photo of a damaged brain with the 
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headline “This is your brain on football” (see Figure 22). But despite the increasing acceptance 
of the risks the sport posed to human brains, pronounced debates over the magnitude of these 
risks at the youth level and how to manage those risks persisted. 




Youth Football Safety Debates at a Crossroads 
 
As of 2016, debates over the safety of youth tackle football have become focused almost 
exclusively on head injuries, with relatively little discussion of bone and joint injuries, heat-
related injuries, or other potential risks of the sport. And contemporary debates over head injuries 
in youth football are at a crossroads, with competing framings of the risks of traumatic brain 
injuries resulting in significantly different potential responses to addressing the sport’s risks.  
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The prevailing “concussion crisis,” a framework shaped in many ways by the NFL and other 
sports organizations, suggested that improved adult supervision, return-to-play guidelines, better 
helmet design and other similar strategies could sufficiently address the risks of youth football. 
An alternative interpretation of the scientific evidence on sub-concussive hits indicated that the 
full-body collisions associated with tackling carried inherent risks of brain trauma that could not 
be substantially reduced. 
The tension between these two framings is evident in both medical and public debates 
over sports-related concussions. Through Lystedt laws and programs such as “Heads Up 
Football,” a range of groups—state governments, youth football organizers, coaches, the CDC, 
professional health organizations such as the American College of Sports Medicine, and many 
parents—have all sought to reduce the risks of concussion through education and supervision. 
On the other hand, advocates who have deemed the risks of tackle football as inherently high 
have promoted flag football (football without tackling) as an alternative for concerned parents. A 
handful of schools and communities have even begun to eliminate tackle football, deeming the 
risks to be unacceptable. For example, in December 2015, the recreation department of the city 
of Somerville, Massachusetts decided to end city-sponsored tackle football for children.
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 In 
2016, writer Gregg Easterbrook argued in the New York Times that changing science had made 
the risks of tackling for children unacceptable. “A generation ago, it wasn’t known that sub-
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concussive hits to little children could have lifetime neurological consequences. Now that this is 
known, youth tackle football must stop.”
101
  
Comparing the response of sports organizers and physicians to the risks of concussions in 
other contact sports in the early twenty-first century is telling. In both 2000 and 2014, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)’s Council on Sports Medicine and 
Fitness recommended against body checking in ice hockey before age 15 to cut down on 
concussions and other injuries. In 2015, the U.S. Soccer Federation responded to a class-action 
lawsuit charging the organization with negligence in managing head injuries by implementing 
new safety policies. The new guidelines, intended to cut down on head trauma, prohibited 
players age 10 and younger from heading the ball, and reduced the numbers of headers in 
practice for athletes aged 11 to 13.
102
  
 But in 2015, the AAP’s Council on Sports Medicine and Fitness did not recommend 
against tackling in youth football at any age. Although the AAP’s literature review 
acknowledged that tackling was significantly associated with increased risk of concussions, 
severe injuries, catastrophic injuries, and overall injuries, the committee instead recommended 
enhancing supervision of the sport. The AAP committee shied away from endorsing the 
elimination of tackling in youth football, because doing so would fundamentally change the way 
the game is played. The committee instead stated that it was up to the participants themselves to 
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determine whether the risks of the sport outweighed the benefits. Advocates for youth tackle 
football quickly seized upon the AAP’s statement as an endorsement of the sport. In February 
2016, the director of a youth tackle football program emphasized that the AAP “sets no limits as 
to when our children should begin playing football and realizing its rewards.”
 103
 
Why would the preeminent professional group of American pediatricians, whose stated 
mission was to optimize the health and well-being of children, recommend against body-
checking in youth hockey to prevent concussions, but not against tackling in youth football? 
Understanding the history of debates over the safety of youth football, and the position of youth 
football in American society, is essential to answering this question. 
Tackle football has nagged at American consciences for over a century. The vast amount 
of protective gear introduced to the sport could be considered one particularly visible indication 
of efforts to assuage that conscience. But ultimately, the immense popularity of the sport for 
children has been deeply tied to the very violence that renders the game dangerous. The collision 
sport was believed to have not only physical health benefits, but also profound social and moral 
benefits in teaching boys key values of competition, toughness, leadership, discipline, teamwork 
and even patriotism. The sport also fostered a form of masculinity in which physical risks were 
to be embraced and overcome. As football became the country’s most popular form of sports 
entertainment, and became even more deeply associated with both high school and college 
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educational systems, the sport also became perceived as a path to accessing resources as well as 
social and educational success. 
Football, of course, is far from the only example of a risky activity in the United States 
where concerns about health have been overwhelmed by the strength of more powerful beliefs 
and framings of risk. As historian Pamela Pennock observed in the case of tobacco, for decades 
“the abstract ideology of ‘public health’ could not muster enough rhetorical power to serve as a 
rallying cry in Americans’ struggle to control a profitable industry that made and sold a 
substance that many consumers desired.”
104
 In their examination of lead poisoning in the United 
States, Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner quoted one lead researcher as saying, “we are 
allowing industry to profit by using our children as uninformed research subjects of a vast 
experiment.” A similar observation about exposing children to the uncertain harms of repetitive 
head trauma in tackle football can and has been made. In fact, in 1973, neuroscientist Richard 
Schneider observed, “The football fields of our nation have been a vast proving ground or 
laboratory for the study of the tragic neurologic sequelae of head and neck trauma in man.”
105
 
But the risks of repeated head trauma in a competitive collision sport seemingly remained 
hidden for so long not only because of the corporate influence of the NFL (immense as that 
influence was), but also because of profound meanings and enjoyment attached to the sport of 
football. Many American parents deeply believed that participation in tackle football enhanced 
their sons’ lives, taught them prized and essential values, and made them into men. These beliefs 
were shaped by industry, but also by powerful cultural and political ideologies associated with 
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competition, masculinity, and patriotism. Many athletes themselves also derived great meaning 
and pleasure from the sport, including the sport’s risks. As one author acknowledged in a 
“reluctant manifesto” against the sport: “You know you might get hurt playing. That’s part of 
why you play, to see what you’re made of, how you take a hit, to see what happens when your 
courage meets real hazard.”
106
 
 In addition to the cultural values associated with football, scientific uncertainty and the 
relative subtlety of symptoms associated with brain trauma contributed to rendering the harms of 
repetitive brain trauma relatively invisible. Headaches, dizziness, or nausea were far less obvious 
than broken bones. Repetitive head trauma, particularly sub-concussive hits with no immediate 
symptoms, represents a form of low-level exposure that may or may not result in symptoms or 
chronic disease years or even decades into the future. Again, the comparison to lead poisoning is 
apt: chronic head trauma represents another instance of low-level harm that is relatively difficult 
for epidemiologic research to evaluate, but that in the twenty-first century cumulatively and 
disproportionately harms the most vulnerable children in American society. As with lead, these 
costs may include “silently stolen futures, lower IQs, lost productivity, narrowed life chances and 
well-being…emotional distress, and physical damage.”
107
 
But unlike lead poisoning, the physical experience of tackle football could include real 
and meaningful advantages. Athletes in many dangerous sports, including tackle football, have 
struggled with how to weigh the benefits they personally experience from the sport with the 
potential and uncertain risks: “If ‘doing what I loved’ cost me the use of my legs and my arms, or 
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the full use of my brain, would I say it was worth it? Could I measure the sport's rewards and 
stack them against the risks, and if I did, what would that balance sheet look like? What had the 
sport given me, and how much was I willing to pay in return?”
108
 
The ethical questions about how to respond to this uncertainty are very different with 
children and amateur players as compared to professional athletes. Children are not treated as 
fully autonomous in our society, and should not be treated as having the full capacity to weigh 
the risks and benefits of repetitive brain trauma. Weighing the risks and benefits of youth tackle 
football is an adult responsibility. Tracing the history of debates over the safety of youth football 
involves examining how a wide range of adults—parents, coaches, sporting goods 
manufacturers, football leagues, journalists, educators, physicians, engineers, lawyers, and 
others—have struggled with, and in many cases abdicated, this responsibility. The way these 
debates are framed can either highlight or obscure a fundamental public health question: are the 
risks of tackle football acceptable for children to undertake? For over a century, our society’s 
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